本文關(guān)鍵詞： 轉(zhuǎn)移支付 企業(yè)發(fā)展 產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《廈門大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自從1994年我國實行分稅制改革政策以來,中央政府財政收入大幅度增加,與此同時,中央政府將事權(quán)大量下放給地方政府,導(dǎo)致了政府間財力與事權(quán)的縱向不匹配,這使得中央政府實施的轉(zhuǎn)移支付愈來愈受到人們的關(guān)注。轉(zhuǎn)移支付的實施對于實現(xiàn)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)均衡發(fā)展具有重要的意義。但我國的轉(zhuǎn)移支付在實施過程中,由于相關(guān)制度的不完善,存在著諸多問題,這些問題使得轉(zhuǎn)移支付在調(diào)節(jié)地區(qū)發(fā)展差距的同時對我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的諸多方面都產(chǎn)生了一定的負(fù)面影響。本文主要考察轉(zhuǎn)移支付對我國企業(yè)發(fā)展以及產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)合理化所產(chǎn)生的影響。 首先,本文考察了轉(zhuǎn)移支付對國有企業(yè)和民營企業(yè)發(fā)展的影響,通過建立一個國有企業(yè)、民營企業(yè)和地方政府的三部門模型進(jìn)行分析,并以分稅制改革后中國1994-2011年各省面板數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ),運(yùn)用固定效應(yīng)模型和隨機(jī)效應(yīng)模型進(jìn)行實證檢驗。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),地方政府在使用轉(zhuǎn)移支付時會優(yōu)先考慮對國有企業(yè)進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼。這樣,轉(zhuǎn)移支付的補(bǔ)貼使國有企業(yè)產(chǎn)生了道德風(fēng)險而降低了效率,同時,對國有企業(yè)的補(bǔ)貼擠壓了轉(zhuǎn)移支付中用于提供公共服務(wù)的部分,從而影響了民營企業(yè)的發(fā)展,對整個經(jīng)濟(jì)造成了不良的影響。此外,本文還針對我國東中西部不同區(qū)域的情況做了比較與揭示。 其次,本文考察了轉(zhuǎn)移支付對我國產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的合理化調(diào)整所起的作用。本文構(gòu)建了一個簡單的政府間博弈模型,理論分析了轉(zhuǎn)移支付對產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)所產(chǎn)生的影響,并利用中國1994-2011年省級面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了實證檢驗,發(fā)現(xiàn)轉(zhuǎn)移支付對地區(qū)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)合理化產(chǎn)生了兩方面效應(yīng),即一方面轉(zhuǎn)移支付由于過度投資于能較快給當(dāng)?shù)貛鞧DP高增長的資本密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)而直接擴(kuò)大了地區(qū)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的偏離度；另一方面國有企業(yè)與轉(zhuǎn)移支付的相互作用同時也會間接地阻礙地區(qū)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的合理化調(diào)整。同樣,本文還比較了我國東中西部的具體情況,發(fā)現(xiàn)西部地區(qū)轉(zhuǎn)移支付對地區(qū)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)合理化的阻礙作用更大。 最后,在對理論和實證研究結(jié)果進(jìn)行總結(jié)的基礎(chǔ)上,本文就我國完善中央轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度以及規(guī)范地方政府行為給出了幾方面的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since 1994, China has implemented the tax sharing reform policy, the central government revenue has increased significantly, at the same time, the central government will be a large number of decentralization to local governments. It leads to the vertical mismatch between the financial resources and the power of the government. This makes people pay more and more attention to the transfer payment implemented by the central government. The implementation of the transfer payment is of great significance for the sustainable and balanced development of China's economy. However, the transfer payment in China is in the process of implementation. Because of the imperfect system, there are many problems. These problems make the transfer payment have a certain negative impact on many aspects of our economy while adjusting the regional development gap. This paper mainly discusses the transfer payment to the development of Chinese enterprises and the rationalization of industrial structure. The impact. First of all, this paper examines the impact of transfer payment on the development of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, through the establishment of a state-owned enterprise, private enterprise and local government three-sector model to analyze. Based on the provincial panel data of China from 1994 to 2011 after the reform of the tax sharing system, the empirical test is carried out by using the fixed effect model and the stochastic effect model. Local governments will give priority to subsidies to state-owned enterprises when using transfer payments. Thus, the subsidies of transfer payments will cause moral hazard and reduce efficiency of state-owned enterprises at the same time. Subsidies to state-owned enterprises have squeezed the part of transfer payments used to provide public services, thus affecting the development of private enterprises and adversely affecting the economy as a whole. This paper also compares and reveals the situation of different regions in the east, west and west of China. Secondly, this paper examines the role of transfer payment in the rationalization of China's industrial structure. This paper constructs a simple intergovernmental game model. Theoretical analysis of the impact of transfer payments on the industrial structure, and the use of China 1994-2011 provincial panel data for empirical testing. It is found that transfer payment has two effects on the rationalization of regional industrial structure. On the one hand, transfer payment directly expands the deviation degree of regional industrial structure because of overinvestment in capital-intensive industries which can bring fast growth of GDP to local areas. On the other hand, the interaction between state-owned enterprises and transfer payments will also indirectly hinder the rationalization of regional industrial structure adjustment. It is found that the transfer payment in the western region hinders the rationalization of the regional industrial structure. Finally, on the basis of summing up the theoretical and empirical research results, this paper gives some policy suggestions on how to perfect the central transfer payment system and standardize the behavior of local government.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F812.45;F279.2;F121.3

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