【摘要】：自然資源作為大自然賦予人類的財(cái)富，本應(yīng)給資源豐裕區(qū)域的民眾帶來“福音”，但現(xiàn)實(shí)中資源豐裕區(qū)域卻被受困于“資源詛咒”�！百Y源詛咒”如何形成、如何規(guī)避和治理？學(xué)術(shù)界從多個(gè)角度探討，其中，資源豐裕區(qū)域存在的尋租性腐敗現(xiàn)象，被認(rèn)為是引致“資源詛咒”的主要原因之一。已有文獻(xiàn)多集中于某個(gè)國家的案例分析，或者是政治、制度視角等。 本文基于經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)視角，運(yùn)用委托—代理理論和博弈論方法，，嘗試構(gòu)建資源豐裕區(qū)域政府官員、資源開采企業(yè)和民眾相互之間的博弈模型，分析國外資源豐裕國家/區(qū)域?qū)ぷ庑愿瘮‖F(xiàn)象的表現(xiàn)，探討其成因，比較其治理實(shí)踐，并針對(duì)我國資源豐裕區(qū)域的尋租性腐敗現(xiàn)象的特點(diǎn)及成因，提出治理的對(duì)策建議。本研究有助于豐富“資源詛咒”、尋租腐敗等理論，對(duì)我國資源豐裕區(qū)域的尋租性腐敗現(xiàn)象治理也具有一定的借鑒價(jià)值。論文的主要結(jié)論如下： 第一，資源豐裕區(qū)域?qū)ぷ庑愿瘮‖F(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生，是由于資源豐裕區(qū)域政府官員、資源開采企業(yè)與民眾相互之間的博弈過程，所導(dǎo)致的公共權(quán)力委托—代理關(guān)系的失效。對(duì)資源豐裕區(qū)域進(jìn)行透明化管理，有助于彌補(bǔ)資源豐裕區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)主體之間的信息不對(duì)稱，以起到治理該區(qū)域的尋租性腐敗現(xiàn)象的目的。 第二，通過比較國外資源豐裕區(qū)域?qū)ぷ庑愿瘮‖F(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生環(huán)節(jié)、形成原因以及治理尋租性腐敗現(xiàn)象的透明化管理方式，進(jìn)而得出：治理資源豐裕區(qū)域?qū)ぷ庑愿瘮‖F(xiàn)象，必須構(gòu)建民眾監(jiān)督、企業(yè)自律和政府管制的監(jiān)管體系，并嚴(yán)格將這一監(jiān)管體系應(yīng)用到對(duì)資源豐裕區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)事務(wù)中去。 第三，我國資源豐裕區(qū)域的尋租性腐敗現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生，主要集中于資源開采企業(yè)資格的審批環(huán)節(jié)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施及相關(guān)設(shè)施的建設(shè)環(huán)節(jié)、資源開采企業(yè)的安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管環(huán)節(jié)、資源開采企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品運(yùn)輸與銷售環(huán)節(jié)。治理我國資源豐裕區(qū)域?qū)ぷ庑愿瘮‖F(xiàn)象，需要企業(yè)加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制、激勵(lì)與處罰機(jī)制建設(shè)；加強(qiáng)社會(huì)監(jiān)督建設(shè)，發(fā)揮民眾的社會(huì)監(jiān)督職能；建立政府官員誠信記錄建設(shè)及加強(qiáng)對(duì)腐敗官員的查處與懲治力度等。
[Abstract]:Natural resources, as the wealth given by nature to human beings, should bring "good news" to the people in resource-rich areas, but in reality, resource-rich areas are trapped by "resource curses". How does the "resource curse" form, how to circumvent and govern? Among them, the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas is considered to be one of the main causes of "resource curse". The literature has focused on the case study of a country, or political, institutional perspective and so on. Based on the perspective of economics, using the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper attempts to build a game model between government officials, resource mining enterprises and people in resource-rich regions. This paper analyzes the manifestations of rent-seeking corruption in countries / regions with abundant resources abroad, probes into its causes, compares its governance practice, and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for the governance of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich regions in China. This study is helpful to enrich the theory of "resource curse" and rent-seeking corruption, and also has some reference value to the governance of rent-seeking corruption in the resource-rich areas of our country. The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: first, the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas is caused by the game process between government officials, resource-mining enterprises and people in resource-rich regions. The invalidation of the principal-agent relationship of public power. The transparent management of resource-rich regions is helpful to make up for the asymmetry of information among the economic subjects in resource-rich regions, so as to control the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in this region. Secondly, by comparing the producing links of the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in the regions with abundant resources abroad, the causes of the phenomenon, and the transparent management mode of the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption, it is concluded that the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in the regions with abundant resources can be controlled. It is necessary to establish a regulatory system of public supervision, self-discipline of enterprises and government regulation, and strictly apply this regulatory system to regional economic and social affairs with abundant resources. Third, the emergence of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas in China is mainly focused on the examination and approval of the qualifications of resource mining enterprises, the construction of infrastructure and related facilities, and the safety production supervision of resource-mining enterprises. The product transportation and sale link of resource mining enterprise. To deal with the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in China's resource-rich areas, enterprises should strengthen the internal supervision mechanism, encourage and punish the construction of mechanism, strengthen the construction of social supervision, and give full play to the social supervision function of the people. To establish the honest record of government officials and strengthen the investigation and punishment of corrupt officials.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D630.9

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本文編號(hào)：2249401