發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-29 12:37

  本文選題：省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益　切入點(diǎn)：協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展,既包括區(qū)域內(nèi)部諸要素(資源、環(huán)境、人口、產(chǎn)業(yè)等)之間的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,即區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)；也包括減少區(qū)域間發(fā)展差距,消除區(qū)域間利益沖突,即區(qū)際協(xié)調(diào)(魏后凱2009,范恒山,孫久文2011)。本文的研究屬于區(qū)際協(xié)調(diào)。區(qū)際協(xié)調(diào)要以區(qū)際利益協(xié)調(diào)為主線(陳秀山,楊艷2008)。為簡(jiǎn)化研究,本文站在政府的層面,僅研究不同省(直轄市)之間的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)。如無(wú)特殊說(shuō)明,本文所涉及的省際協(xié)調(diào)均指省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)。 首都圈范圍界定為：北京市、天津市、河北省全境,即京津冀三省市全域(李國(guó)平2004；譚維克,趙弘2011；祝爾娟2012)。本文所提首都圈均指京津冀三省市全域。 省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益非均衡是首都圈區(qū)域協(xié)同發(fā)展面臨的核心矛盾,具體表現(xiàn)為：產(chǎn)業(yè)同構(gòu)與惡性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、區(qū)域市場(chǎng)分割與地方保護(hù)、省際公共物品供給不足、貧富分化與生態(tài)惡化、政績(jī)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與重復(fù)建設(shè)等若干方面。造成首都圈省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益非均衡的直接原因是區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的客觀要求同行政邊界剛性約束的矛盾,根本原因是地方政府的有限理性和市場(chǎng)的不完全性�；谏鲜鲈�,省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的建立顯得尤為必要。省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制是一種區(qū)域利益再分配機(jī)制。這種機(jī)制不僅對(duì)于縮小省際差距十分重要,還是化解省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益矛盾,推進(jìn)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化必不可少的工具。本文的理論意義旨在突破行政邊界剛性約束的羈絆,沖破地方政府利益固化的藩籬,破除制約首都圈區(qū)域協(xié)同發(fā)展的機(jī)制障礙,以經(jīng)濟(jì)的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系為基石,進(jìn)行省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)。 本文使用空間計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)局域自相關(guān)(Moran指數(shù)Ii)方法,通過(guò)實(shí)證分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：2004年至2012年間,首都圈地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)空間溢出效應(yīng)明顯。首都圈的經(jīng)濟(jì)空間溢出效應(yīng)已經(jīng)突破了省際行政邊界,如果再基于行政邊界研究省際利益協(xié)調(diào),可能并不十分合理,而是亟需建立能夠突破行政邊界羈絆的省際協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。經(jīng)濟(jì)的空間溢出是經(jīng)濟(jì)的客觀規(guī)律。它說(shuō)明了省際協(xié)調(diào)需要突破行政邊界羈絆的必要性。 省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益強(qiáng)調(diào)區(qū)際關(guān)系,它側(cè)重于經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的再分配。省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益是指特定的省(直轄市)從其他省(直轄市)或國(guó)家獲得的排他性收益,屬于社會(huì)福利再分配范疇；是生產(chǎn)要素不完全流動(dòng)性,市場(chǎng)不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性,地方政府不完全理性所表現(xiàn)出的空間優(yōu)勢(shì)。省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益具體表現(xiàn)為產(chǎn)業(yè)省際轉(zhuǎn)移稅收分享、省際基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施共建成本分?jǐn)�、省際生態(tài)補(bǔ)償?shù)取?省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制是以專門聯(lián)合委員會(huì)制度為協(xié)調(diào)形式的一種省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益讓度與分配的長(zhǎng)效機(jī)制,是解決省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益沖突的規(guī)則,是地方政府間的合同,是一類利益分配函數(shù),是一個(gè)省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益再分配的過(guò)程；在此過(guò)程中,區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)調(diào)權(quán)威機(jī)構(gòu)被國(guó)家授權(quán)對(duì)各區(qū)域利益主體的立場(chǎng)加以評(píng)定,并作出對(duì)各方在執(zhí)行過(guò)程中具有法律約束力的量化仲裁決定。 省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)是一場(chǎng)博弈,是策略依存的。首都圈省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益博弈主體是京津冀三地政府。省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制不需要每個(gè)博弈主體的策略在任何情況下均是最優(yōu)的,只要博弈主體的策略是針對(duì)對(duì)手采取策略基礎(chǔ)上的最優(yōu)策略即可,則省際納什均衡是省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制突破行政邊界剛性約束的理論基礎(chǔ)。省際納什均衡是指省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)中每個(gè)博弈主體都不能也不想單方面改變自己的策略而增加收益；每個(gè)博弈主體所選策略均是對(duì)其他區(qū)域所選策略的最佳利益分配。省際納什均衡是各省間相互讓渡利益的結(jié)果；區(qū)域考核指標(biāo)一體化是省際納什均衡達(dá)到帕累托最優(yōu)狀態(tài)的前提條件；當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)區(qū)域考核指標(biāo)一體化時(shí),省際納什均衡達(dá)到帕累托最優(yōu)狀態(tài)。 首都圈省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的頂層設(shè)計(jì)包括五個(gè)分機(jī)制,分別是協(xié)商機(jī)制、仲裁機(jī)制、分享機(jī)制、分?jǐn)倷C(jī)制和補(bǔ)償機(jī)制�；诮�(jīng)濟(jì)空間溢出效應(yīng)的視角,京津冀三地政府可以通過(guò)市長(zhǎng)聯(lián)席會(huì)議進(jìn)行跨界橫向協(xié)調(diào)以達(dá)到省際納什均衡,即協(xié)商機(jī)制；基于地方政府有限理性和市場(chǎng)不完全性的視角,當(dāng)?shù)胤秸越M織式的橫向協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)法達(dá)到省際納什均衡時(shí),中央政府通過(guò)設(shè)立超越地方行政區(qū)劃的權(quán)威仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行縱向協(xié)調(diào)以達(dá)到省際納什均衡,即仲裁機(jī)制；基于財(cái)稅機(jī)制改革的視角,首都圈產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移的省際納什均衡是橫向分稅制,即分享機(jī)制；基于投資機(jī)制改革的視角,首都圈跨界基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施共建的省際納什均衡是橫向成本分?jǐn)傊?即分?jǐn)倷C(jī)制；基于自然資源資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)權(quán)制度改革的視角,首都圈生態(tài)聯(lián)防聯(lián)控的省際納什均衡是財(cái)政橫向轉(zhuǎn)移支付制,即補(bǔ)償機(jī)制。五個(gè)分機(jī)制中,協(xié)商機(jī)制、仲裁機(jī)制體現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)的形式和程序,而分享機(jī)制、分?jǐn)倷C(jī)制和補(bǔ)償機(jī)制體現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)的具體內(nèi)容。仲裁機(jī)制屬于縱向協(xié)調(diào),保證了協(xié)調(diào)的公平；協(xié)商機(jī)制屬于橫向協(xié)調(diào),保證了協(xié)調(diào)的效率。首都圈省際經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的路徑選擇是縱橫結(jié)合。五個(gè)分機(jī)制共同作用發(fā)揮合力,才能突破行政邊界羈絆,促進(jìn)區(qū)域協(xié)同發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Coordinated regional development, including regional internal factors (resources, environment, population, industry etc.) for sustainable development, regional coordination; including the development gap between regions to reduce and eliminate conflicts of interest between regions, namely the interregional coordination (Fan Hengshan, Wei Houkai 2009, Sun Jiuwen 2011). This study belongs to interregional coordination. Interregional coordination to interregional coordination as the main line (Chen Xiushan, Yang Yan 2008). In order to simplify the research, this paper stands at the government level, only on different provinces (municipalities) coordination between economic interests. If no special instructions, inter provincial coordination involved in this thesis refer to inter provincial coordination of economic interests.
Metropolitan area is defined as: Beijing City, Tianjin City, Hebei Province, the three provinces of Beijing Tianjin Hebei region (Li Guoping 2004; Zhao Hong 2011; Tan Weike, Juan Zhu Er 2012). The capital circle refer to the three provinces of Beijing Tianjin Hebei region.
Provincial economic interests is the core contradiction facing the unbalanced coordinated development of metropolitan area, the specific performance: industry structure and vicious competition, regional market segmentation and local protectionism, lack of regional public goods supply, polarization and deterioration of ecological environment, some aspects of political competition and repeated construction. The provincial capital circle caused by economic benefits of non balanced direct cause is the objective requirement of regional economic integration with the administrative boundary of the rigid constraints of contradiction, the fundamental reason is not completely limited rational local government and market. Based on the above reasons, the provincial economic benefit coordinating mechanism is necessary. The inter provincial economic interests coordination mechanism is a regional redistribution mechanism. This mechanism is not only important for narrowing the gap between provinces, provincial or resolve conflicts of economic interests, to promote regional economic integration essential tool. This The theoretical significance of this article is to break through the rigid constraints of administrative boundaries, break through the barriers of local governments' interests, and break away from the institutional obstacles that restrict the coordinated development of the capital area, and coordinate the inter provincial economic interests based on the internal relationship of the economy.
In this paper, using spatial econometrics local autocorrelation (Moran index Ii) method, through empirical analysis found that from 2004 to 2012, the capital economic circle space area spillover effect is obvious. The economic spatial spillover effect of the capital circle has exceeded the provincial administrative boundaries, if based on the administrative boundary of inter provincial coordination of interests, may not be very reasonable, but the establishment of the administrative boundary to break through the fetters of the inter provincial coordination mechanism needs. Spatial spillover economy is the objective economic rules. It explains the necessity of inter provincial coordination needs to break the fetters of the administrative boundary.
Provincial economic benefits emphasize the relationship between regions, it focuses on the redistribution of economic interests. Economic interest refers to a specific province (municipality) from other provinces (municipalities) exclusive income or country gained, belong to the social welfare redistribution category; the factor of production and incomplete liquidity, market competition, space the advantage of the local government is not completely rational shows. The provincial economic benefits embodied in industry inter provincial transfer of tax sharing, provincial infrastructure construction and cost sharing, inter provincial ecological compensation.
Provincial economic interests coordination mechanism is the long-term mechanism to a special joint committee system as a provincial economic interests coordination form to degree and distribution, is to solve the conflict of economic interests of provincial rules, is the contract between the local government, is a kind of benefit distribution function, is a process of interprovincial redistribution of economic interests in this process; in the Regional Economic Coordination Authority is authorized by the state of the regional interests of the main position to assess, and make a decision to quantify the arbitration the parties legally binding in the implementation process.
Provincial economic interests coordination is a game of strategy is dependent. The metropolitan area is the main economic interests of the game three of Tianjin government. The provincial economic interests coordination mechanism does not require each of the main game strategy in any case are the best, as long as the main game strategy is the optimal strategy can be based on the the opponent, is provincial Nash equilibrium is the theoretical basis of regional economic coordination mechanism of interests beyond administrative boundaries of the rigid constraints of Nash equilibrium. The provincial refers to each provincial economic interests coordination in the main game can also do not want to unilaterally change their strategies and increase revenue; each player selected strategy is the best strategy for the selection of other profit distribution area. The Nash equilibrium is the mutual interests of provincial transfer between provinces results; regional integration is the provincial assessment index reached the Nash equilibrium, tired The precondition of the optimal state is supported; when and only when the regional assessment index is integrated, the inter provincial Nash equilibrium reaches the Pareto optimal state.
The top-level design of inter provincial economic interests coordination mechanism of the capital circle including five sub mechanisms, respectively is the negotiation mechanism, arbitration mechanism, sharing mechanism, sharing mechanism and compensation mechanism. The economic spatial spillover effect from the perspective of three of Tianjin government through the joint meeting of mayors of provincial cross-border horizontal coordination to achieve the Nash equilibrium, namely the negotiation mechanism local government; limited rationality and incomplete markets based on the perspective, when the local government since the coordination organization cannot reach the provincial Nash equilibrium, the central government vertical coordination to achieve the provincial Nash equilibrium through the establishment of arbitration institutions beyond the local administrative division of authority, namely the arbitration mechanism; tax system reform based on the perspective of the capital circle the Nash equilibrium is the provincial industrial transfer horizontal tax system, share mechanism; investment mechanism reform based on the perspective of the capital circle base Infrastructure to build the provincial Nash equilibrium is transverse cost allocation system, the allocation mechanism; reform of property right system of natural resources assets based on the perspective of Nash equilibrium provincial capital ecological joint prevention and control of the horizontal financial transfer payment system and the compensation mechanism. The negotiation mechanism five mechanism, and reflect the form of coordination and arbitration mechanism the program, and sharing mechanism, sharing mechanism and compensation mechanism of the specific content of coordination. The arbitration mechanism belongs to the vertical coordination, to ensure coordination of fairness; negotiation mechanism belongs to the horizontal coordination, ensure the coordination efficiency. Path provincial economic interests coordination mechanism of the capital circle is the choice of vertical and horizontal integration. The five sub mechanisms play together in order to break the administrative boundaries, fetters, promote regional coordinated development.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F127;F812.0

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 吳穎;基于公共支出政策的區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)協(xié)調(diào)性研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2008年

2 安康;我國(guó)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)調(diào)互動(dòng)發(fā)展統(tǒng)計(jì)測(cè)度研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 李君艷;京津冀地區(qū)產(chǎn)業(yè)協(xié)同發(fā)展策略研究[D];天津師范大學(xué);2015年

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