本文選題：財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)　切入點(diǎn)：經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)　出處：《廈門大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來,我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)保持著年均10%左右的增長(zhǎng)速度,在世界各國(guó)中被認(rèn)為是增長(zhǎng)奇跡。市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的改革,尤其是財(cái)政體制的變革始終貫穿于這一進(jìn)程之中。我國(guó)財(cái)政體制的改革一直是以財(cái)政分權(quán)為中心,即逐步下放中央的部分財(cái)政權(quán)益,給予地方政府更多的財(cái)政自主權(quán),調(diào)動(dòng)地方政府發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)的積極性。在此背景之下,地方政府出于地方經(jīng)濟(jì)利益和官員個(gè)人的政治利益在稅收和財(cái)政支出方面展開了激烈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。隨著地方政府稅收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的空間逐步減小,地方政府財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)演變成地方政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的主要手段,其主要表現(xiàn)形式為提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的公共產(chǎn)品和公共服務(wù)吸引經(jīng)濟(jì)資源�；诖�,本文力圖在財(cái)政分權(quán)的框架下研究我國(guó)地方政府財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題,從空間的視角探究我國(guó)地方政府財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的存在性,并從理論和實(shí)證的角度論證其與我國(guó)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)的關(guān)系。最后,在此基礎(chǔ)上為改善財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)格局,促進(jìn)全國(guó)資源合理配置,保證經(jīng)濟(jì)健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展提供政策參考。 本文利用1997-2012年我國(guó)各省區(qū)的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行空間計(jì)量分析發(fā)現(xiàn),相鄰地區(qū)財(cái)政支出每提高1個(gè)百分點(diǎn),會(huì)直接導(dǎo)致本地人均財(cái)政支出上升0.37405個(gè)百分點(diǎn),相鄰地區(qū)間的策略反應(yīng)是直接的。接著,本文通過面板門限回歸模型驗(yàn)證了筆者的猜想：財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)在我國(guó)各地區(qū)之間的表現(xiàn)不一致。更為具體地,在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展處于較低水平的地區(qū),財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響并不顯著；在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展處于中高水平的地區(qū),財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的積極效應(yīng)大于消極效應(yīng),有助于促進(jìn)地方經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。最后,本文據(jù)此提出了相關(guān)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China's economy has maintained an average annual growth rate of about 10 percent, which is regarded as a growth miracle in all countries of the world. In particular, the reform of the financial system has always been running through this process. The reform of our financial system has always focused on fiscal decentralization, that is, gradually devolving part of the central government's financial rights and interests, giving local governments more financial autonomy. Mobilize the enthusiasm of local governments to develop the economy. In this context, Local governments compete fiercely in tax and fiscal expenditure for the sake of local economic interests and the political interests of individual officials. As the space for local governments to compete for tax revenue gradually decreases, The competition of local government fiscal expenditure has evolved into the main means of local government competition. The main form of competition is to provide high-quality public goods and public services to attract economic resources. This paper tries to study the competition of local government fiscal expenditure in China under the framework of fiscal decentralization, and probes into the existence of local government fiscal expenditure competition in China from the perspective of space. Finally, it provides a policy reference for improving the competitive pattern of fiscal expenditure, promoting the rational allocation of national resources and ensuring the healthy and stable development of economy. Based on the spatial analysis of the data from 1997 to 2012, it is found that the increase of fiscal expenditure by 1 percentage point in adjacent regions will directly lead to an increase of 0.37405 percentage points in local per capita fiscal expenditure. The strategic response between adjacent regions is direct. Then, this paper verifies the author's conjecture by using the panel threshold regression model: the performance of the competitive economic effect of fiscal expenditure in different regions of China is not consistent. In areas where economic development is at a low level, the impact of fiscal expenditure competition on regional economy is not significant, and the positive effect of fiscal expenditure competition is greater than that of negative effects in areas where economic development is at a medium and high level. It is helpful to promote local economic growth. Finally, this paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45

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