發(fā)布時間：2019-03-02 19:35

【摘要】：自1958年Modigliani與Miller提出MM理論以來,企業(yè)債務(wù)融資、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與非效率投資的關(guān)系一直是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論研究的重要問題之一。國外學(xué)者基于委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論等從不同的角度對此進(jìn)行了理論分析,并結(jié)合公司治理的實踐進(jìn)行了大量的實證研究。隨著中國資本市場的發(fā)展和公司治理實踐的不斷深化,這一問題也越來越受到國內(nèi)學(xué)者的關(guān)注。 本文以32家中國旅游業(yè)上市公司2003至2011年的非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,考察中國旅游業(yè)上市公司債務(wù)融資與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對非效率投資的影響。實證結(jié)果表明：中國旅游業(yè)上市公司非效率投資與總資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān),債務(wù)融資對投資過度具有顯著的治理效應(yīng),對投資不足表現(xiàn)出顯著的融資約束效應(yīng)；中國旅游業(yè)上市公司非效率投資與第一大股東持股比例存在負(fù)相關(guān),公司第一大股東持股比例的上升未能顯著的抑制投資不足,也未能顯著的緩解投資不足；第一大股東持股比例和總資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率的交乘項系數(shù)與非效率投資存在負(fù)相關(guān),中國旅游業(yè)上市公司非效率投資對總資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率的敏感程度隨著第一大股東持股比例的上升而降低�？毓晒蓶|性質(zhì)和總資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率的交乘項系數(shù)與非效率投資存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān),控股股東性質(zhì)為國有控股的中國旅游業(yè)上市公司相比較控股股東性質(zhì)為非國有控股的中國旅游業(yè)上市公司而言,公司非效率投資對總資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率的敏感程度顯著增加。 為了促進(jìn)中國旅游業(yè)上市公司健康持續(xù)發(fā)展,針對中國旅游業(yè)上市公司債務(wù)融資、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和非效率投資的情況,本文提出以下建議：第一,積極發(fā)展債券市場,豐富企業(yè)債務(wù)融資渠道。第二,放寬股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓條件,促進(jìn)企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)多元化發(fā)展。第三,提升公司治理水平,防止非效率投資問題加深。
[Abstract]:Since the MM theory was put forward by Modigliani and Miller in 1958, the relationship between corporate debt financing, equity structure and inefficient investment has been one of the important issues in modern enterprise theory research. On the basis of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and so on, foreign scholars have carried on theoretical analysis from different angles, and have carried on a lot of empirical research in combination with the practice of corporate governance. With the development of Chinese capital market and the deepening of corporate governance practice, this problem has been paid more and more attention by domestic scholars. In this paper, the effects of debt financing and equity structure on inefficiency investment of 32 Chinese tourism listed companies from 2003 to 2011 are studied by taking the unbalanced panel data from 2003 to 2011 as a sample to investigate the effects of debt financing and equity structure on inefficiency investment of Chinese tourism listed companies. The empirical results show that there is a significant negative correlation between inefficient investment and total asset-liability ratio of listed companies in China's tourism industry. Debt financing has a significant governance effect on over-investment and a significant financing constraint effect on underinvestment. There is a negative correlation between the inefficient investment of Chinese tourism listed companies and the proportion of the largest shareholder, and the increase of the proportion of the largest shareholder of the company has not significantly inhibited the underinvestment, nor has it significantly alleviated the underinvestment. There is a negative correlation between the intersection coefficient of the first largest shareholder's shareholding ratio and the total asset-liability ratio and the inefficiency investment. The sensitivity of inefficient investment to the total asset-liability ratio of Chinese tourism listed companies decreases with the increase of the share holding ratio of the largest shareholder. There is a significant negative correlation between the nature of controlling shareholders and the ratio of total assets and liabilities and the inefficiency investment. Compared with Chinese tourism listed companies whose controlling shareholders are non-state-owned, the sensitivity of inefficient investment to total asset-liability ratio is significantly increased in Chinese tourism listed companies whose controlling shareholders are state-owned. In order to promote the healthy and sustainable development of China's tourism listed companies, in view of the debt financing, equity structure and inefficient investment of Chinese tourism listed companies, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: first, actively develop the bond market; Enrich corporate debt financing channels. Second, relax the conditions of equity transfer, promote the diversified development of enterprise ownership structure. Third, improve the level of corporate governance and prevent inefficient investment from deepening.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：海南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F590.66;F592.6

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本文編號：2433393