【摘要】：互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的普及應用給旅游業(yè)的信息傳播和交易方式帶來了重大變革,對旅游景區(qū)的分銷渠道產(chǎn)生了顯著影響。早期關于旅游景區(qū)的競爭主要表現(xiàn)為旅游資源的空間競爭,隨著分銷渠道的多元化、網(wǎng)絡化,旅游者主導地位逐漸顯現(xiàn),旅行社不得不根據(jù)旅游者需求和市場環(huán)境做出改變,旅游景區(qū)也更加關注渠道管理和旅游供應鏈參與主體的市場行為。面對新型旅游供應鏈環(huán)境,壟斷競爭型景區(qū)如何科學地選擇渠道價格策略來尋求自身利潤的最大化,是本研究的主要目的。 本研究運用旅游供應鏈管理的思想來考察旅游景區(qū)的經(jīng)營管理環(huán)境,采用博弈論的相關方法構造博弈模型來模擬現(xiàn)實景區(qū)的決策過程,得到景區(qū)的最優(yōu)渠道價格策略。隨后,鑒于旅游供應鏈的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀和發(fā)展趨勢,分別討論分銷渠道結構變化、旅行社增值服務和客戶信息獲取及信息公開行為對景區(qū)渠道價格策略和競爭關系的影響,探討景區(qū)的應對策略。最后根據(jù)理論模型獲得的決策結果,結合景區(qū)的經(jīng)營管理實踐,從旅游供應鏈的縱向競爭和合作兩個層面提出景區(qū)的競爭策略。 研究表明,在新型旅游供應鏈環(huán)境下,旅游景區(qū)的產(chǎn)品差異和旅游者偏好轉移成本仍然是影響景區(qū)渠道價格策略的重要因素,但分銷渠道結構、旅行社的增值服務和信息獲取及信息公開行為同樣成為重要的影響因子。根據(jù)理論模型分析結果,本研究提出景區(qū)應從旅游供應鏈的角度,基于旅游者的消費需求提供增值服務,或是通過前向一體化和橫向合作來改變其在供應鏈中的主體地位,或是通過強化與分銷渠道的縱向合作,如分擔旅行社的增值服務和信息獲取成本,增強供應鏈的整體競爭力,以便在市場競爭中獲勝。 本研究首次將渠道價格作為景區(qū)的重要競爭策略進行重點探析,從旅游供應鏈的角度分析景區(qū)的價格決策環(huán)境,運用博弈論的研究方法模擬現(xiàn)實決策過程,基于旅游者的行為選擇得出景區(qū)渠道價格策略的量化結果。通過將現(xiàn)實中的影響因素內置于模型中,使決策理論結果更加科學。在實踐操作中,雖然各景區(qū)需根據(jù)自身情況因地制宜地選擇合適的做法,但理論模型所展現(xiàn)的原則和方向是具有普適性的,具有現(xiàn)實指導意義。
[Abstract]:The popularization and application of the Internet has brought great changes to the information dissemination and transaction mode of tourism industry, and has had a significant impact on the distribution channels of tourist attractions. The competition about tourist attractions in the early period was mainly manifested in the spatial competition of tourist resources. With the diversification of distribution channels and networking, the dominant position of tourists gradually appeared, and the travel agencies had to make changes according to the needs of tourists and the market environment. Scenic spots also pay more attention to channel management and the market behavior of tourism supply chain participants. Facing the new tourism supply chain environment, the main purpose of this study is how to scientifically choose the channel price strategy to maximize the profit of the monopoly competitive scenic spot. In this study, the idea of tourism supply chain management is used to investigate the management environment of scenic spots, and game theory is used to construct a game model to simulate the decision-making process of real scenic spots, and the optimal channel price strategy is obtained. Then, in view of the current situation and development trend of tourism supply chain, this paper discusses the influence of distribution channel structure change, value-added service of travel agency, customer information acquisition and information disclosure behavior on the price strategy and competition relationship of scenic spot channel, respectively. This paper discusses the coping strategies of scenic spots. Finally, according to the decision results obtained from the theoretical model, combined with the practice of management and management of scenic spots, this paper puts forward the competitive strategies of scenic spots from the vertical competition and cooperation of tourism supply chain. The research shows that under the new tourism supply chain environment, the product difference of tourist attractions and the cost of tourist preference transfer are still the important factors affecting the channel price strategy, but the distribution channel structure. The value-added service, information access and information disclosure of travel agencies are also important factors. According to the results of theoretical model analysis, this study suggests that scenic spots should provide value-added services based on tourists' consumption demand from the perspective of tourism supply chain, or change their dominant position in the supply chain through forward integration and horizontal cooperation. Or through strengthening vertical cooperation with distribution channels, such as sharing the cost of value-added services and information acquisition of travel agencies, enhancing the overall competitiveness of the supply chain, in order to win in the market competition. For the first time, this study focuses on the channel price as an important competitive strategy of the scenic spot, analyzes the price decision-making environment of the scenic spot from the perspective of tourism supply chain, and simulates the realistic decision-making process by using the research method of game theory. Based on tourists' behavior choice, the quantitative results of channel price strategy of scenic spots are obtained. The results of decision-making theory are more scientific by putting the influencing factors in the model. In practice, although each scenic spot should choose the appropriate method according to its own situation, the principle and direction of the theoretical model is universal and has practical guiding significance.
【學位授予單位】：海南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F590

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