本文選題：旅游消費者 + 導游人員��； 參考：《河北大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國旅游產(chǎn)業(yè)迅猛發(fā)展，旅游市場上的一些供給、需求的非理性的特點明顯具有博弈特征。隨著旅行社之間的競爭也越演越烈，采取的價格競爭策略也有了質的變化，由傳統(tǒng)的價格競爭轉變?yōu)閱我坏膼盒詢r格競爭，甚至出現(xiàn)零團費的旅游線路，同時在旅游線路中明確的增加了自費項目來獲取利潤。由于旅游市場機制的不規(guī)范加之旅游法規(guī)的不完善及旅行社監(jiān)督管理不善，導致導游人員在提供旅游服務時擅自增加旅游景點，強制推銷旅游線路之外的旅游產(chǎn)品，從中獲取“灰色收入”，這種現(xiàn)象屢見不鮮，旅游者作為導游及旅行社收益的根源所在，對旅游產(chǎn)品及導游提供的服務質量相對比較敏感，由于上述現(xiàn)象的出現(xiàn)，旅游者對旅游行業(yè)中旅行社和導游兩個參與人事先就會存在厭惡偏見，這種先驗概率的存在使得旅游者對旅行社的選擇問題及導游人員在向旅行社推銷自費項目問題上產(chǎn)生一種“矛盾”這就構成了一種博弈行為，本文通過對與自費項目直接相關的利益主體—旅游者、旅行社和導游員之間是否進行選擇進行具體的描述和分析，首先通過對三個參與人中的兩兩博弈過程進行分析，分別對旅行社和旅游者之間、旅行社和導游人員之間以及導游人員和旅游者之間的博弈進行系統(tǒng)分析，運用完全信息博弈模型、不完全信息靜態(tài)、動態(tài)博弈模型、委托-代理模型等相關經(jīng)濟理論進行剖析，，然后又針對三個參與人的同時參與的完全信息靜態(tài)博弈收益矩陣進行分析，論證了在完全信息下，旅行社、導游人員和旅游者如何實現(xiàn)帕累托最優(yōu)風險分擔。同時提出了在加強政府監(jiān)督的情況下，關于旅行社激勵機制設置和誠信機制管理相關對策和措施，為如何實現(xiàn)旅行社自身更好的發(fā)展提供理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of tourism industry in China, the irrational characteristics of supply and demand in the tourism market are obviously characterized by game theory. As the competition among travel agencies becomes more and more intense, the price competition strategy adopted has also changed qualitatively, from the traditional price competition to a single vicious price competition, and even a zero-tour tour route. At the same time in the tourism routes explicitly increased self-financing projects to gain profits. As a result of the non-standard mechanism of the tourism market and the imperfect tourism laws and regulations and the poor supervision and management of travel agencies, tour guides unauthorized to increase tourist attractions while providing tourism services, and to force the promotion of tourism products outside the tourist routes. This phenomenon is not uncommon. Tourists, as tour guides and travel agents, are relatively sensitive to the quality of tourism products and services provided by tour guides. Tourists have a preemptive bias against travel agents and tour guides in the travel industry. The existence of this transcendental probability makes the tourist's choice of travel agency and tour guide produce a kind of "contradiction" on the issue of selling self-paid items to the travel agency, which constitutes a game behavior. Through the specific description and analysis of the choice between tourists, travel agencies and tour guides who are directly related to self-funded projects, this paper first analyzes the process of pairwise game among the three participants. The game between travel agencies and tourists, between travel agencies and tour guides, and between tour guides and tourists is analyzed systematically. The game model of complete information is used, and the static and dynamic game models of incomplete information are used. The principal-agent model and other related economic theories are analyzed, and then the return matrix of three participants participating in the static game of complete information at the same time is analyzed, and it is proved that under the complete information, the travel agency, How to realize Pareto optimal risk sharing between tour guides and tourists. At the same time, under the condition of strengthening the government supervision, the paper puts forward the relevant countermeasures and measures about the establishment of travel agency incentive mechanism and the management of credit mechanism, which provides the theoretical basis for how to realize the better development of travel agency itself.
【學位授予單位】：河北大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F592.3;F224.32

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