本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬粘性的實(shí)證研究　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：近年來(lái)高管薪酬一直是人們熱議的話題，也是理論界研究的焦點(diǎn)。高管薪酬作為解決企業(yè)內(nèi)委托代理問(wèn)題的一種手段，其存在的根本目的在于激勵(lì)管理層為股東工作，通過(guò)企業(yè)價(jià)值增值最終實(shí)現(xiàn)股東利益的最大化。隨著越來(lái)越多的上市公司選擇業(yè)績(jī)型報(bào)酬作為公司高層管理人員的報(bào)酬形式，我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬機(jī)制逐步趨向合理。然而社會(huì)關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)永遠(yuǎn)是高管薪酬是否過(guò)高。2008年經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)爆發(fā)，股市震蕩，公眾對(duì)上市公司的信任越發(fā)脆弱，而各種“天價(jià)薪酬”的曝光無(wú)疑是火上澆油。通過(guò)統(tǒng)計(jì)2007-2011年我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬總額發(fā)現(xiàn)，，高管薪酬在總額上一直呈現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)趨勢(shì)，且增幅明顯。但高管薪酬機(jī)制理應(yīng)與激勵(lì)機(jī)制同時(shí)作用，作為懲罰的約束機(jī)制卻并沒(méi)有良好的體現(xiàn)在我國(guó)上市公司數(shù)據(jù)上，2007年-2011年五年間高管薪酬下降的上市公司僅有1793家，占全部統(tǒng)計(jì)樣本的26.33%。高管的薪酬到底如何變化值得我們做進(jìn)一步的研究。 國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)于高管薪酬的研究經(jīng)過(guò)較長(zhǎng)時(shí)間的積累，已經(jīng)不斷驗(yàn)證了相關(guān)理論推斷的結(jié)果，而研究的內(nèi)容也不斷變化。早期的研究多偏重于高管薪酬制定影響因素，并且往往以單一年度上市公司數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本，這時(shí)的研究多得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為我國(guó)上市公司的高管薪酬偏低且并沒(méi)有起到預(yù)期的激勵(lì)作用。隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)逐年完善，可用來(lái)研究的樣本數(shù)據(jù)也更加完整，學(xué)者的研究開(kāi)始轉(zhuǎn)向以三至五年的上市公司數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本，并在研究影響高管薪酬因素時(shí)范圍更廣，思考的角度也更繁復(fù)。這部分學(xué)者的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬不僅受業(yè)績(jī)，還受到公司規(guī)模、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿、公司成長(zhǎng)性、獨(dú)立董事等許多其他因素的影響。近年來(lái)，已經(jīng)有學(xué)者開(kāi)始關(guān)注高管薪酬變化的特征，國(guó)外已有學(xué)者對(duì)高管薪酬粘性進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)的研究，國(guó)內(nèi)也有少數(shù)學(xué)者提出了高管薪酬粘性的概念，但對(duì)于我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬是否存在粘性的實(shí)證研究卻寥寥可數(shù)。 本文欲在研究公司業(yè)績(jī)對(duì)高管薪酬影響的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)高管薪酬是否存在粘性進(jìn)行探索。選取滬深兩市2007年-2011年五個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)年度披露相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)的公司作為研究樣本，構(gòu)建模型，通過(guò)結(jié)合使用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析與回歸分析的方法，首先驗(yàn)證高管薪酬受到公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響，其次研究公司業(yè)績(jī)對(duì)高管薪酬的反作用，最后在此基礎(chǔ)上引入薪酬差值作為因變量，業(yè)績(jī)差值作為自變量，探討兩者之間的關(guān)系。 根據(jù)實(shí)證分析得出結(jié)論：我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬受公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響，并且高管薪酬對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)具有正向的激勵(lì)作用，高管薪酬的變化在公司業(yè)績(jī)上升和下降兩種不同情況下所表現(xiàn)出的上升和下降的幅度不同，當(dāng)公司業(yè)績(jī)上升時(shí)高管薪酬的增加值要大于公司業(yè)績(jī)下降時(shí)的減少值，即高管薪酬的變化在公司業(yè)績(jī)變化時(shí)表現(xiàn)出不對(duì)稱性，高管薪酬存在粘性。
[Abstract]:In recent years, executive compensation has been a hot topic, but also the focus of theoretical research. Executive compensation as a means to solve the problem of principal-agent in enterprises. The fundamental purpose of its existence is to encourage management to work for shareholders. As more and more listed companies choose performance-based compensation as the form of compensation for the top management of the company. However, the focus of social attention is always whether the executive compensation is too high. In 2008, the economic crisis broke out, and the stock market fluctuated. The public trust in listed companies is becoming more and more fragile, and the exposure of various "sky-high compensation" is undoubtedly adding fuel to the fire. Executive compensation has been showing a trend of growth in the total amount, and the increase is obvious. But the executive compensation mechanism should work with the incentive mechanism at the same time. As a punishment of the constraint mechanism is not well reflected in the data of listed companies in China, from 2007 to 2011 five years of decline in executive compensation of listed companies only 1 793. 26.33% of the total statistical sample. How the executive compensation changes are worthy of further study. Domestic and foreign scholars for executive compensation research after a long period of accumulation, has constantly verified the results of relevant theoretical inference. The content of the study is also constantly changing. The early studies focus on the executive pay development factors, and often take a single annual listed company data as the research sample. At this time, most of the research concluded that the executive compensation of listed companies in China is on the low side and does not play the role of incentive. As the capital market in China has been improved year by year, the sample data that can be used to study is more complete. Scholars' research began to shift to three to five years of listed company data as a sample, and in the study of executive compensation factors more widely. The perspective of thinking is more complex. This part of the scholars found that the executive compensation of listed companies in China not only by performance, but also by the size of the company, financial leverage, corporate growth. In recent years, some scholars have begun to pay attention to the characteristics of executive compensation changes, foreign scholars have carried out a systematic study of executive pay stickiness. There are a few domestic scholars put forward the concept of executive pay stickiness, but there are few empirical studies on whether there is stickiness in executive compensation of listed companies in China. This paper intends to study the impact of corporate performance on executive compensation on the basis of. To explore whether there is stickiness of executive compensation. Select the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2011 to disclose the relevant data of five fiscal years as a research sample to build a model. Through the use of descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis, the paper first verifies that executive compensation is affected by company performance, and then studies the counteraction of company performance on executive compensation. Finally, the paper introduces the compensation margin as dependent variable and the performance difference as independent variable to discuss the relationship between them. According to the empirical analysis, we can conclude that the executive compensation of listed companies in China is affected by the performance of the company, and the executive compensation has a positive incentive to the performance of the company. The change of executive compensation in the company performance rise and fall in two different cases show the rise and fall of the range of different. When the company's performance is rising, the added value of executive compensation is larger than the decrease of the company's performance, that is, the change of executive compensation shows asymmetry when the company's performance changes, and the executive compensation has stickiness.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F276.6;F224

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