制度變遷與美國國際經(jīng)濟政策
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-25 07:57
【摘要】： 本文的核心研究問題是:為什么美國國內(nèi)制度結(jié)構(gòu)的特點及其變遷,會在美國國際經(jīng)濟政策選擇中發(fā)揮重大的作用,它具體又是如何發(fā)揮作用?本文將集中考察美國國際經(jīng)濟政策的制度邏輯,強調(diào)國家政權(quán)和國內(nèi)社會的區(qū)分,以及這兩者的制度關(guān)系和互動模式所給美國國際經(jīng)濟政策帶來的影響。 具體而言,本文主要研究美國國內(nèi)三個層次的制度變遷如何影響美國國際經(jīng)濟政策的制定。這三個層次的制度變遷分別是國家與社會關(guān)系的宏觀制度結(jié)構(gòu),行政-立法-中間三大部門的中觀政府體系,以及部門內(nèi)部微觀的決策系統(tǒng)。其中框定其他層次制度關(guān)系的宏觀制度結(jié)構(gòu)——國家與社會關(guān)系——是決定美國國際經(jīng)濟政策的最核心、最本質(zhì)的制度關(guān)系。 本文認(rèn)為,美國的國內(nèi)制度結(jié)構(gòu)(國家與社會關(guān)系)的變遷,具體體現(xiàn)為行政-立法兩大部門關(guān)系以及各部門內(nèi)部微觀決策系統(tǒng)的調(diào)整,塑造了體系、國家和社會三個層次的變量對美國國際經(jīng)濟決策發(fā)揮作用的次序和方式,決定了國內(nèi)社會的利益與偏好和國際體系的壓力與刺激,如何作用于處于兩者中間位置的國家政權(quán),進而對聯(lián)邦政府通過政策工具的選擇來改變美國與世界的經(jīng)濟關(guān)系施加了影響。國家既處在國家之間進行政治經(jīng)濟互動的體系之中,又在國內(nèi)社會的范疇之內(nèi)運行。 國家是全體國民公共利益的代表者,而社會是由無數(shù)的私人行為體構(gòu)成,社會利益體現(xiàn)為私人利益的總和,而由于社會結(jié)構(gòu)天然就是失衡的,因此,社會利益往往體現(xiàn)為特殊利益,國家與社會圍繞國際經(jīng)濟決策的權(quán)力競爭,體現(xiàn)為公共利益與特殊利益的競爭。由于美國的國家利益越來越多地通過政府在國際體系中的政策行為來實現(xiàn),國家與社會的關(guān)系決定了政府在國際體系中通過國際經(jīng)濟政策保衛(wèi)公共利益的能力。 本文認(rèn)為,在一個“強國家、弱社會”的制度結(jié)構(gòu)下,即“強總統(tǒng)、弱國會”的政府體系下,美國聯(lián)邦政府將根據(jù)美國在國際體系中的總體利益理性地進行國際經(jīng)濟決策,努力實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟利益與安全利益、國際利益與國內(nèi)利益的平衡;在一個“弱國家、強社會”的制度結(jié)構(gòu)下,即“弱總統(tǒng)、強國會”的政府體系下,美國聯(lián)邦政府的國際經(jīng)濟決策更容易迎合國內(nèi)社會的特殊利益,淪為國內(nèi)政治過程的產(chǎn)物。 本文致力于復(fù)興國際關(guān)系研究中的比較政治學(xué)(國內(nèi)政治)傳統(tǒng),通過考察制約或刺激國家對外政策選擇的國內(nèi)制度因素,以挑戰(zhàn)新現(xiàn)實主義所堅持的一些基本研究方法和研究假定,將國內(nèi)政治找回來;同時,本文試圖超越單純的國內(nèi)導(dǎo)向的研究路徑,關(guān)注國際體系的壓力和刺激如何通過變遷中的國內(nèi)制度作用于政府決策。本文的研究路徑,體現(xiàn)了作者試圖為打破傳統(tǒng)的國際關(guān)系與國內(nèi)政治的界限而進行的努力。筆者通過構(gòu)建一種解釋美國國際經(jīng)濟政策的制度變遷理論,驅(qū)動當(dāng)今風(fēng)頭正勁的國際政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)與比較政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)之間的對話和聯(lián)姻。它將傳統(tǒng)分離的國際關(guān)系與國內(nèi)政治兩大領(lǐng)域進行學(xué)理上的整合,以加強對國家對外經(jīng)濟政策和國際經(jīng)濟互動的解釋力。
[Abstract]:The core research questions of this paper are: why and how will the characteristics and changes of American domestic institutional structure play an important role in the choice of American international economic policies? This paper will focus on the institutional logic of American international economic policies, emphasizing the distinction between national political power and domestic society, and the two. The impact of institutional relationship and interaction mode on us international economic policy.
Specifically, this paper mainly studies how the institutional changes at three levels in the United States affect the formulation of American international economic policies. The institutional changes at these three levels are the macro-institutional structure of the relationship between the state and society, the meso-governmental system of the administrative-legislative-intermediate departments, and the micro-decision-making system within the departments. The macro-institutional structure that defines institutional relations at other levels, the relationship between state and society, is the core and essential institutional relationship that determines American international economic policy.
This paper holds that the change of the domestic institutional structure (the relationship between the state and society) in the United States is embodied in the adjustment of the relationship between the two branches of administration and legislation and the micro-decision-making system within each department, which shapes the order and manner in which the variables of the system, state and society play their roles in the international economic decision-making of the United States and determines the domestic society. Interests and preferences, and the pressures and incentives of the international system, how they act on the state power in the middle of the two, and then influence the choice of policy instruments by the federal government to change the economic relations between the United States and the world. Run within categories.
The state is the representative of the public interest of the whole nation, and the society is made up of numerous private actors, and the social interests are embodied in the sum of the private interests. Because the social structure is naturally unbalanced, the social interests are often embodied in the special interests, and the power competition between the state and society around the international economic decision-making is embodied in the public interests. The competition between interests and special interests. As the national interests of the United States are more and more realized through the policies and actions of the government in the international system, the relationship between the state and society determines the ability of the government to defend the public interests through international economic policies in the international system.
This paper holds that under the institutional structure of "a strong country, a weak society", i.e. the government system of "a strong president, a weak congress", the federal government of the United States will rationally make international economic decisions in accordance with the overall interests of the United States in the international system, and strive to achieve the balance of economic and security interests, international interests and domestic interests. Under the system structure of "weak country, strong society", that is, under the government system of "weak president, strong congress", the international economic decision-making of the United States federal government is easier to cater to the special interests of the domestic society and become the product of the domestic political process.
This paper is devoted to reviving the tradition of comparative politics (domestic politics) in the study of international relations. By examining the domestic institutional factors that restrict or stimulate the choice of foreign policies, it tries to challenge some basic research methods and assumptions adhered to by neo-realism so as to retrieve domestic politics. The research path of this paper reflects the author's efforts to break the boundaries between traditional international relations and domestic politics. The author constructs an institutional change to explain American international economic policy. Theory, which drives the dialogue and marriage between international political economics and comparative political economics, integrates the traditional separation of international relations with domestic politics in order to enhance the explanatory power of the country's foreign economic policies and international economic interactions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：F091.349;F171.2
本文編號：2202261
[Abstract]:The core research questions of this paper are: why and how will the characteristics and changes of American domestic institutional structure play an important role in the choice of American international economic policies? This paper will focus on the institutional logic of American international economic policies, emphasizing the distinction between national political power and domestic society, and the two. The impact of institutional relationship and interaction mode on us international economic policy.
Specifically, this paper mainly studies how the institutional changes at three levels in the United States affect the formulation of American international economic policies. The institutional changes at these three levels are the macro-institutional structure of the relationship between the state and society, the meso-governmental system of the administrative-legislative-intermediate departments, and the micro-decision-making system within the departments. The macro-institutional structure that defines institutional relations at other levels, the relationship between state and society, is the core and essential institutional relationship that determines American international economic policy.
This paper holds that the change of the domestic institutional structure (the relationship between the state and society) in the United States is embodied in the adjustment of the relationship between the two branches of administration and legislation and the micro-decision-making system within each department, which shapes the order and manner in which the variables of the system, state and society play their roles in the international economic decision-making of the United States and determines the domestic society. Interests and preferences, and the pressures and incentives of the international system, how they act on the state power in the middle of the two, and then influence the choice of policy instruments by the federal government to change the economic relations between the United States and the world. Run within categories.
The state is the representative of the public interest of the whole nation, and the society is made up of numerous private actors, and the social interests are embodied in the sum of the private interests. Because the social structure is naturally unbalanced, the social interests are often embodied in the special interests, and the power competition between the state and society around the international economic decision-making is embodied in the public interests. The competition between interests and special interests. As the national interests of the United States are more and more realized through the policies and actions of the government in the international system, the relationship between the state and society determines the ability of the government to defend the public interests through international economic policies in the international system.
This paper holds that under the institutional structure of "a strong country, a weak society", i.e. the government system of "a strong president, a weak congress", the federal government of the United States will rationally make international economic decisions in accordance with the overall interests of the United States in the international system, and strive to achieve the balance of economic and security interests, international interests and domestic interests. Under the system structure of "weak country, strong society", that is, under the government system of "weak president, strong congress", the international economic decision-making of the United States federal government is easier to cater to the special interests of the domestic society and become the product of the domestic political process.
This paper is devoted to reviving the tradition of comparative politics (domestic politics) in the study of international relations. By examining the domestic institutional factors that restrict or stimulate the choice of foreign policies, it tries to challenge some basic research methods and assumptions adhered to by neo-realism so as to retrieve domestic politics. The research path of this paper reflects the author's efforts to break the boundaries between traditional international relations and domestic politics. The author constructs an institutional change to explain American international economic policy. Theory, which drives the dialogue and marriage between international political economics and comparative political economics, integrates the traditional separation of international relations with domestic politics in order to enhance the explanatory power of the country's foreign economic policies and international economic interactions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：F091.349;F171.2
【引證文獻】
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前5條
1 張慶偉;美國政府對跨國公司的監(jiān)管研究[D];山東大學(xué);2011年
2 劉振環(huán);美國貿(mào)易政策取向的歷史演變[D];吉林大學(xué);2010年
3 辛玫;美元霸權(quán)的國際政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)探析[D];吉林大學(xué);2010年
4 姜偉;美國對日本貿(mào)易政策演變的政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究[D];遼寧大學(xué);2010年
5 王志;美國多邊貿(mào)易政策研究（1934-2009）[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2010年
，本文編號：2202261
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