聲譽(yù)、承諾與組織形式
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-24 19:30
【摘要】：本文旨在探討一個(gè)社會(huì)中社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)制度和組織形式的決定因素。尤其是試圖 回答以下問(wèn)題:為什么在有的社會(huì)中,規(guī)則容易被人操縱,而在有的社會(huì)中,規(guī) 則容易得到實(shí)施;換言之,為什么在有的社會(huì)中,事前的承諾事后得不到遵守, 而在另外一些社會(huì)中,人們的承諾事后卻能得到實(shí)施?為什么顯性規(guī)則如法律, 在有些社會(huì)的社會(huì)生活中起著很重要的作用,而在有些社會(huì)卻形同虛設(shè)?相反, 在這些社會(huì)的經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中,一些容易被人為操縱的潛規(guī)則在起很大的作用,究竟 是什么因素決定了顯性規(guī)則與這些潛規(guī)則的相對(duì)作用?社會(huì)學(xué)家和人類(lèi)學(xué)家認(rèn) 為中國(guó)社會(huì)是倫理社會(huì),而西方社會(huì)是理性社會(huì),對(duì)上述問(wèn)題的回答有助于解釋 這個(gè)分野嗎? 與此相關(guān),具有經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)意義的問(wèn)題是,為什么有的社會(huì)盛行的是非人格化、 保持距離型的經(jīng)濟(jì)交往,而有的社會(huì)流行的是人格化、關(guān)系型的經(jīng)濟(jì)交往?從金 融制度的角度來(lái)看,為什么在有些國(guó)家的金融體系中,非人格化的、保持距離型 的融資如證券市場(chǎng)的融資在社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中發(fā)揮了重要的作用,而在另外一些國(guó) 家中,關(guān)系型的融資如銀行等金融中介的融資在資源配置中起了關(guān)鍵的作用? 從經(jīng)濟(jì)組織的角度來(lái)看,為什么有的國(guó)家的家族企業(yè)和股權(quán)集中的企業(yè)的比例遠(yuǎn) 遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了其他國(guó)家,而另外一些國(guó)家卻有著相對(duì)更多的兩權(quán)分離、股權(quán)分散的錢(qián) 德勒式企業(yè)? 這些差別有更深遠(yuǎn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)含義嗎? 本文正是要提出一個(gè)完整的理論框架來(lái)解釋以上現(xiàn)象和回答上述問(wèn)題。具體 而言: 第一章 引言 旨在說(shuō)明本文的寫(xiě)作動(dòng)因,解釋本文采用的方法和假定,并說(shuō)明本文的邏輯 結(jié)構(gòu)。 第二章 文獻(xiàn)評(píng)述 旨在評(píng)述與本文相關(guān)的四種理論——交易費(fèi)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、法與金融、軟預(yù)算約 束理論與歷史比較制度分析——的文獻(xiàn)。本章著重討論了本文與這些文獻(xiàn)的聯(lián)系 和分殊之處,更好地凸現(xiàn)了本文的立意與創(chuàng)新。 1 WP=188 第三章 聲譽(yù)、社會(huì)信任與組織形式 旨在研究聲譽(yù)和社會(huì)信任對(duì)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)制度與組織形式的影響。通過(guò)一個(gè)多層 的聲譽(yù)模型,本章得到了如下一般性結(jié)論:(1)在有著健全的聲譽(yù)和社會(huì)信任金 字塔結(jié)構(gòu)的社會(huì)中,社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)互動(dòng)更容易超越人格化層面;(2)在這樣的社會(huì)里, 顯性的正式的契約如法律會(huì)起到更重要的作用;(3)在這樣的社會(huì)里,會(huì)更容易 出現(xiàn)運(yùn)作良好的金融體系,尤其是距離型的融資會(huì)在資源配置中起到更重要的作 用;(4)相應(yīng)地,在這樣的社會(huì)中,會(huì)更容易出現(xiàn)錢(qián)德勒式的企業(yè)。 尤其是:(1)其他條件不變,在有著發(fā)達(dá)中介組織充當(dāng)聲譽(yù)載體的經(jīng)濟(jì)中, 社會(huì)互動(dòng)更容易超越人情層面,錢(qián)德勒式企業(yè)更容易出現(xiàn);(2)一個(gè)能夠承諾的 政府可以充當(dāng)聲譽(yù)的載體,并延長(zhǎng)社會(huì)信任鏈,從而更容易出現(xiàn)錢(qián)德勒式企業(yè); (3)其他條件不變,一個(gè)有著統(tǒng)一的社會(huì)文化信念和健全法律的國(guó)家更容易出 現(xiàn)錢(qián)德勒式企業(yè),因?yàn)榻y(tǒng)一的社會(huì)文化信念和健全法律有助于在出現(xiàn)多重均衡的 時(shí)候,挑選出“聚點(diǎn)均衡”,從而降低距離型社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)互動(dòng)的交易費(fèi)用。 本章還對(duì)部分理論結(jié)果進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),并提出了針對(duì)中國(guó)的政策建議。 第四章 分權(quán)、承諾與組織形式 旨在研究一個(gè)社會(huì)的分權(quán)程度對(duì)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)制度與組織形式的影響。所謂分權(quán), 指的是社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)資源所有權(quán)的分散程度。通過(guò)軟預(yù)算約束理論的邏輯,本章證明 分權(quán)是一種承諾,從而得到了如下的一般性結(jié)論:(1)其他條件不變,在分權(quán)的 經(jīng)濟(jì)中,事前的承諾在事后更容易得到實(shí)施;(2)從而,在分權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)中,法律 的實(shí)施才有了承諾方面的基礎(chǔ),法律在社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中才會(huì)發(fā)揮相對(duì)更深的影 響;(3)其他條件不變,在分權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)中,社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)互動(dòng)更容易超越人情化層面; (4)其他條件不變,在分權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)中政府的承諾比集權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)中政府的承諾更 可信;(5)其他條件不變,在分權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)中,距離型融資會(huì)更發(fā)達(dá);(6)其他條 件不變, 在分權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)中,錢(qián)德勒式的企業(yè)會(huì)更容易出現(xiàn)。 本章還提供了進(jìn)一步的實(shí)證,并針對(duì)中國(guó)提出了一些政策建議。 第五章 分工、承諾與組織形式 旨在研究分工程度對(duì)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)制度與組織形式的影響。人們大多關(guān)注分工對(duì) 經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的宏觀(guān)效應(yīng),本章則提出了分工的一個(gè)微觀(guān)機(jī)制。通過(guò)軟預(yù)算約束理論, 本章證明分工是一種社會(huì)承諾機(jī)制。其邏輯如下:自給自足在某種程度上等價(jià)于 集權(quán),這時(shí)沒(méi)有外部交易,所有的“交易”都發(fā)生在內(nèi)部。這時(shí)候就會(huì)出現(xiàn)經(jīng)典 意義上的軟預(yù)算約束問(wèn)題,軟預(yù)算約束問(wèn)題的本質(zhì)就是事前的承諾在事后可能得 不到實(shí)施,會(huì)出現(xiàn)再談判的可能性。完全的分工,在某種程度上等價(jià)于分權(quán)。這 2 WP=189 時(shí),每個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)主體只是專(zhuān)事于某一領(lǐng)域,必須跟其他領(lǐng)域的經(jīng)濟(jì)主體進(jìn)行交往, 因而有些交易必須發(fā)生在外部,這會(huì)降低軟預(yù)算約束程度,從而事前的承諾相對(duì) 就比較可信。 本章得到了如下一般性結(jié)論:(1)其他條件不變,在有著發(fā)達(dá)分工的社會(huì), 作為一種承諾的法律在社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中會(huì)起到更大的作用;(2)其他條件不變, 社會(huì)分工發(fā)達(dá)的經(jīng)濟(jì)中,社會(huì)信任更容易超越人情化的層面;(3)其他條件不變, 高度社會(huì)分工的經(jīng)濟(jì)中,會(huì)更容易出現(xiàn)距離型融資;(4)其他條件不變,分工發(fā) 達(dá)的社會(huì)中更容易出現(xiàn)錢(qián)德勒式企業(yè);(5)勞動(dòng)分工除了通過(guò)傳統(tǒng)上的干中學(xué)效 應(yīng)以外,還通過(guò)本文提出的承諾效應(yīng),來(lái)促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。 本章還對(duì)上面
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of socio economic system and organizational form in a society.
Answer the following questions: Why are rules easy to be manipulated in some societies?
It is easy to be implemented; in other words, in some societies, prior commitments can not be followed afterwards.
In other societies, people's commitments can be implemented afterwards. Why are explicit rules like law?
In some societies, social life plays a very important role. In some societies, they exist in name only. On the contrary,
In these social economic life, some hidden rules which are easy to be manipulated are playing a great role.
What factors determine the relative role of explicit rules and these latent rules? Sociologists and anthropologists agree that
For the Chinese society is an ethical society, while western society is a rational society, the answers to these questions help explain.
Is this division?
In this connection, the question of economic significance is why the prevalence of personification is prevalent in some societies.
Keep distance oriented economic exchanges, while some societies are personified, and relational economic exchanges are from gold.
From the perspective of financial system, why is the non personification and distance keeping in some countries' financial system?
Financing, such as financing in the securities market, plays an important role in social and economic life, while in other countries
At home, the financing of relational finance, such as banks, plays a key role in resource allocation.
From the perspective of economic organization, why is the proportion of family businesses and shareholding enterprises in some countries far away?
Far more than other countries, while other countries have relatively more two rights separation.
Dler enterprises? Do these differences have a more profound economic meaning?
This article is to put forward a complete theoretical framework to explain the above phenomena and answer the above questions.
For:
Chapter one introduction
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the motivation of this article, explain the methods and assumptions adopted in this article, and illustrate the logic of this article.
Structure.
Review of the second chapters
The purpose of this review is to comment on four theories related to this article: transaction cost economics, law and finance, and soft budget.
The literature on beam theory and historical comparative institutional analysis. This chapter focuses on the relationship between this paper and these documents.
The differences and differences can better highlight the intention and innovation of this article.
One
WP=188
The third chapter, reputation, social trust and organizational form
The purpose of this study is to study the impact of reputation and social trust on social economic system and organizational form.
In this chapter, we get the following general conclusions: (1) we have a sound reputation and a social trust fund.
In the society of pyramid structure, social economic interaction is more likely to transcend personification; (2) in such a society,
Explicit formal contracts, such as law, will play a more important role; (3) in such a society, it will be easier.
A well functioning financial system, especially distance financing, will play a more important role in resource allocation.
Use; (4) correspondingly, in such a society, Chandler type enterprises will be more prone to appear.
In particular, (1) other conditions remain unchanged in an economy that has developed intermediary organizations as a carrier of reputation.
Social interaction is easier to surpass the human dimension, and Chandler type enterprises are more likely to appear; (2) a commitment.
The government can act as a carrier of reputation and extend the chain of social trust, making it easier for Chandler enterprises.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. A country with a unified social and cultural belief and a sound law is more likely to come out.
Now Chandler enterprises, because the unified social and cultural beliefs and sound laws help to create multiple equilibria.
At the same time, pick up "accumulation point equilibrium", thereby reducing transaction costs of distance type social economic interaction.
This chapter also empirically tests some of the theoretical results and proposes policy recommendations for China.
The fourth chapter of decentralization, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of the decentralization of a society on the social economic system and organizational form.
It refers to the decentralization of the ownership of social economic resources. This chapter proves the logic of the theory of soft budget constraint.
Decentralization is a commitment, which leads to the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in decentralization.
In the economy, prior commitments are easier to implement afterwards; (2) thus, in a decentralized economy, the law
Only when implementation has the basis of commitment, will the law play a relatively deeper role in social and economic life.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, social economic interaction is more likely to surpass human relations.
(4) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, the commitment of the government is more than that of the centralized government.
Credible; (5) other conditions remain unchanged, and in the decentralized economy, distance financing will be more developed; (6) other articles.
In the decentralized economy, Chandler style enterprises will be easier to emerge.
This chapter also provides further evidence and puts forward some policy recommendations for China.
The fifth chapter division of labor, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of division of labor on social economic system and organizational form.
The macroscopical effect of economic growth, this chapter puts forward a micro mechanism of division of labor.
This chapter proves that division of labor is a social commitment mechanism. Its logic is as follows: self sufficiency is equivalent to a certain extent.
Centralization, when there is no external transaction, all transactions happen inside. This time there will be a classic.
In the sense of soft budget constraint, the essence of soft budget constraint is that prior commitments may be obtained afterwards.
If there is no implementation, there will be the possibility of renegotiation. A complete division of labor is, to some extent, equivalent to decentralization.
Two
WP=189
At the time, each economic entity only specializes in a certain field, and must interact with other economic subjects in other fields.
As a result, some transactions must take place externally, which will reduce the degree of soft budget constraint and lead to relative commitments.
It's more believable.
This chapter draws the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in a society with a well-developed division of labor.
As a promise law, it will play a greater role in social and economic life; (2) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a developed economy with social division of labor, social trust is more likely to surpass the level of humanization; (3) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a highly socially divided economy, distance financing will be more prone; (4) other conditions remain unchanged.
Chandler's enterprises are more likely to appear in Da's society; (5) division of labor can be achieved through traditional practice.
Besides, it also promotes economic development through the commitment effect proposed in this paper.
This chapter is also on the above
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F091.349
本文編號(hào)：2142422
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of socio economic system and organizational form in a society.
Answer the following questions: Why are rules easy to be manipulated in some societies?
It is easy to be implemented; in other words, in some societies, prior commitments can not be followed afterwards.
In other societies, people's commitments can be implemented afterwards. Why are explicit rules like law?
In some societies, social life plays a very important role. In some societies, they exist in name only. On the contrary,
In these social economic life, some hidden rules which are easy to be manipulated are playing a great role.
What factors determine the relative role of explicit rules and these latent rules? Sociologists and anthropologists agree that
For the Chinese society is an ethical society, while western society is a rational society, the answers to these questions help explain.
Is this division?
In this connection, the question of economic significance is why the prevalence of personification is prevalent in some societies.
Keep distance oriented economic exchanges, while some societies are personified, and relational economic exchanges are from gold.
From the perspective of financial system, why is the non personification and distance keeping in some countries' financial system?
Financing, such as financing in the securities market, plays an important role in social and economic life, while in other countries
At home, the financing of relational finance, such as banks, plays a key role in resource allocation.
From the perspective of economic organization, why is the proportion of family businesses and shareholding enterprises in some countries far away?
Far more than other countries, while other countries have relatively more two rights separation.
Dler enterprises? Do these differences have a more profound economic meaning?
This article is to put forward a complete theoretical framework to explain the above phenomena and answer the above questions.
For:
Chapter one introduction
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the motivation of this article, explain the methods and assumptions adopted in this article, and illustrate the logic of this article.
Structure.
Review of the second chapters
The purpose of this review is to comment on four theories related to this article: transaction cost economics, law and finance, and soft budget.
The literature on beam theory and historical comparative institutional analysis. This chapter focuses on the relationship between this paper and these documents.
The differences and differences can better highlight the intention and innovation of this article.
One
WP=188
The third chapter, reputation, social trust and organizational form
The purpose of this study is to study the impact of reputation and social trust on social economic system and organizational form.
In this chapter, we get the following general conclusions: (1) we have a sound reputation and a social trust fund.
In the society of pyramid structure, social economic interaction is more likely to transcend personification; (2) in such a society,
Explicit formal contracts, such as law, will play a more important role; (3) in such a society, it will be easier.
A well functioning financial system, especially distance financing, will play a more important role in resource allocation.
Use; (4) correspondingly, in such a society, Chandler type enterprises will be more prone to appear.
In particular, (1) other conditions remain unchanged in an economy that has developed intermediary organizations as a carrier of reputation.
Social interaction is easier to surpass the human dimension, and Chandler type enterprises are more likely to appear; (2) a commitment.
The government can act as a carrier of reputation and extend the chain of social trust, making it easier for Chandler enterprises.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. A country with a unified social and cultural belief and a sound law is more likely to come out.
Now Chandler enterprises, because the unified social and cultural beliefs and sound laws help to create multiple equilibria.
At the same time, pick up "accumulation point equilibrium", thereby reducing transaction costs of distance type social economic interaction.
This chapter also empirically tests some of the theoretical results and proposes policy recommendations for China.
The fourth chapter of decentralization, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of the decentralization of a society on the social economic system and organizational form.
It refers to the decentralization of the ownership of social economic resources. This chapter proves the logic of the theory of soft budget constraint.
Decentralization is a commitment, which leads to the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in decentralization.
In the economy, prior commitments are easier to implement afterwards; (2) thus, in a decentralized economy, the law
Only when implementation has the basis of commitment, will the law play a relatively deeper role in social and economic life.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, social economic interaction is more likely to surpass human relations.
(4) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, the commitment of the government is more than that of the centralized government.
Credible; (5) other conditions remain unchanged, and in the decentralized economy, distance financing will be more developed; (6) other articles.
In the decentralized economy, Chandler style enterprises will be easier to emerge.
This chapter also provides further evidence and puts forward some policy recommendations for China.
The fifth chapter division of labor, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of division of labor on social economic system and organizational form.
The macroscopical effect of economic growth, this chapter puts forward a micro mechanism of division of labor.
This chapter proves that division of labor is a social commitment mechanism. Its logic is as follows: self sufficiency is equivalent to a certain extent.
Centralization, when there is no external transaction, all transactions happen inside. This time there will be a classic.
In the sense of soft budget constraint, the essence of soft budget constraint is that prior commitments may be obtained afterwards.
If there is no implementation, there will be the possibility of renegotiation. A complete division of labor is, to some extent, equivalent to decentralization.
Two
WP=189
At the time, each economic entity only specializes in a certain field, and must interact with other economic subjects in other fields.
As a result, some transactions must take place externally, which will reduce the degree of soft budget constraint and lead to relative commitments.
It's more believable.
This chapter draws the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in a society with a well-developed division of labor.
As a promise law, it will play a greater role in social and economic life; (2) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a developed economy with social division of labor, social trust is more likely to surpass the level of humanization; (3) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a highly socially divided economy, distance financing will be more prone; (4) other conditions remain unchanged.
Chandler's enterprises are more likely to appear in Da's society; (5) division of labor can be achieved through traditional practice.
Besides, it also promotes economic development through the commitment effect proposed in this paper.
This chapter is also on the above
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F091.349
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前4條
1 汪秀瓊;制度環(huán)境對(duì)企業(yè)跨區(qū)域市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入模式的影響機(jī)制研究[D];華南理工大學(xué);2011年
2 林文杰;轉(zhuǎn)軌進(jìn)程中的俄羅斯金融工業(yè)集團(tuán)研究[D];遼寧大學(xué);2008年
3 趙瑩;中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)軟預(yù)算約束問(wèn)題研究[D];遼寧大學(xué);2008年
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