美國次貸危機研究—基于信息經(jīng)濟學的思考
發(fā)布時間:2018-06-25 21:23
本文選題:信息不對稱 + 次貸危機。 參考:《吉林大學》2011年博士論文
【摘要】:自2007年4月以來爆發(fā)的美國次貸危機無論是在廣度還是在深度都已經(jīng)遠遠超過了1929-1933年大蕭條。但危機沒有爆發(fā)在新興市場和發(fā)展中國家,而是在金融業(yè)高度發(fā)達、監(jiān)管措施最為完備的美國,表明了我們對于金融危機的理解和認知仍存在缺陷,傳統(tǒng)金融危機理論仍需要完善。而從信息不對稱角度來剖析金融危機,揭示現(xiàn)代金融結構及其對經(jīng)濟行為的影響,構成了20世紀90年代金融危機研究的主要方面。本文就是選取了信息經(jīng)濟學的視角,嘗試對美國次貸危機形成機理、傳導機制和應對措施進行深入分析,并就中國如何強化金融監(jiān)管防范金融危機提出某些具體建議。 美國次貸危機的爆發(fā)固然有歷史沿革下的美元本位、貿易失衡、放松管制等各種矛盾的積累,但美國金融市場上信息不對稱問題持續(xù)的積淀已經(jīng)到了必須正確認識的地步。由信息不對稱引發(fā)的金融市場逆向選擇、道德風險和信號發(fā)送等扭曲市場機制造成市場失靈,進而導致市場參與主體非理性行為是美國次貸危機爆發(fā)的真正原因。而危機傳導過程中自我增強效應、非預期傳導效應、擴大加速效應和統(tǒng)一市場效應又在以往危機傳導理論未給予足夠重視的。這些集合到一起,使得美國次貸危機既有較強的破壞性,又有迅速的蔓延性。而解決之道,則應從提高信息透明度,確保信息傳導有效性,強化市場紀律和信息披露入手;同時建立良好的薪酬激勵和實施有效的外部監(jiān)管加強內外部約束,在市場不能自我糾正和調整時,以外部力量解決市場失靈,從而使金融市場恢復正常運行狀態(tài)。
[Abstract]:The subprime mortgage crisis in the United States since April 2007 has far exceeded the depth and breadth of the Great Depression of 1929-1933. But the crisis did not break out in emerging markets and developing countries, but in the United States, where the financial sector is highly developed and the most comprehensive regulatory measures, indicating that our understanding and understanding of the financial crisis is still flawed. The traditional theory of financial crisis still needs to be perfected. From the angle of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the financial crisis, reveals the modern financial structure and its influence on economic behavior, which constitutes the main aspect of the financial crisis research in the 1990s. From the perspective of information economics, this paper attempts to analyze deeply the formation mechanism, transmission mechanism and countermeasures of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, and puts forward some concrete suggestions on how to strengthen financial supervision and prevent financial crisis in China. Although the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States has a historical evolution of the dollar standard, trade imbalance, deregulation and other contradictions of accumulation, but the continued accumulation of information asymmetry in the United States financial market has reached the point that must be correctly understood. The adverse selection, moral hazard and signal sending of financial market caused by information asymmetry lead to market failure, which leads to irrational behavior of market participants, which is the real reason for the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. However, in the process of crisis transmission, the self-reinforcing effect, the unexpected conduction effect, the expanding acceleration effect and the unified market effect have not been paid enough attention to in the previous crisis conduction theory. Together, the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States has both strong destructive and rapid spread. The solution should be to improve information transparency, ensure the effectiveness of information transmission, strengthen market discipline and information disclosure, and establish good compensation incentives and effective external supervision to strengthen internal and external constraints. When the market is unable to correct and adjust itself, the market failure can be solved by external force, so that the financial market can return to normal operation.
【學位授予單位】:吉林大學
【學位級別】:博士
【學位授予年份】:2011
【分類號】:F831.59;F062.5
【引證文獻】
相關碩士學位論文 前1條
1 王巖英;異地城市商業(yè)銀行運營安全危機預控管理體系研究[D];大連海事大學;2011年
,本文編號:2067539
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