本文選題：寡頭壟斷 + 有限理性�。� 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：寡頭壟斷市場指的是由少數(shù)幾個生產(chǎn)者完全控制的一類市場結(jié)構(gòu)。眾所周知,寡頭壟斷市場因寡頭間顯著的互動行為而成為所有市場結(jié)構(gòu)當(dāng)中最為復(fù)雜的一類市場。由于資本的集聚、區(qū)域的封閉性以及相關(guān)政策限制等方面的原因,寡頭壟斷現(xiàn)象在現(xiàn)實經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中是大量存在的。我國作為通過改革開放從計劃經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型為社會主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體,在很多經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域都體現(xiàn)出寡頭壟斷的特征。 排污權(quán)交易機(jī)制作為以市場為載體的環(huán)境保護(hù)措施,相比于傳統(tǒng)的行政命令式的排污收費(fèi)制度,該制度具有較低的管理成本,在污染物排放總量控制方面也具有一定的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激能力。但很多現(xiàn)有的研究表明,排污權(quán)交易的效率很大程度上依賴于市場的結(jié)構(gòu)。在完全競爭的市場環(huán)境下,排污權(quán)交易機(jī)制能夠充分發(fā)揮自身的優(yōu)勢,但是在非理想化的存在壟斷勢力的市場環(huán)境下,排污權(quán)交易制度有可能導(dǎo)致市場的扭曲,從而影響治理污染的效果。 本文建立了存在產(chǎn)品差異性的雙寡頭壟斷博弈模型。在Bowley寡頭壟斷產(chǎn)量競爭模型中引入了污染排放與排污權(quán)交易機(jī)制,在傳統(tǒng)博弈論框架下分析了排污權(quán)交易制度的實施對Bowley-Nash均衡的影響。分析結(jié)果表明,對于引入排污權(quán)交易后的雙寡頭產(chǎn)量競爭博弈的Bowley-Nash均衡,寡頭間產(chǎn)品差異程度、排污權(quán)交易市場中排污許可證的價格以及兩個廠商各自的污染產(chǎn)生系數(shù)會對寡頭壟斷均衡產(chǎn)量產(chǎn)生影響,而廠商的污染治理成本系數(shù)與初始排污許可證數(shù)量不會引起廠商的均衡產(chǎn)量變化。此外,在產(chǎn)品存在替代性的情況(事實上這在寡頭壟斷市場中是更為常見的)下,若一個污染企業(yè)的污染產(chǎn)生系數(shù)相對于其競爭對手的污染產(chǎn)生系數(shù)足夠小,則排污權(quán)交易將使其均衡產(chǎn)量有所提高,盡管這一機(jī)制也增加了它的生產(chǎn)總可變成本�？梢�,排污權(quán)交易機(jī)制有助于刺激污染企業(yè)提高自身生產(chǎn)技術(shù),降低自身的污染產(chǎn)生系數(shù)以期在競爭中獲利,而這也將對改善環(huán)境起到積極作用。 隨后,本文拋棄了經(jīng)典的完全理性假設(shè),為兩個寡頭廠商分別賦予了異質(zhì)的更切實際的有限理性產(chǎn)量調(diào)整機(jī)制,構(gòu)建了描述有限理性廠商動態(tài)博弈行為的二維離散非線性動力系統(tǒng)。數(shù)理研究表明,該有限理性動態(tài)博弈系統(tǒng)有一個不穩(wěn)定的邊界均衡和一個局部穩(wěn)定的內(nèi)點(diǎn)均衡,且該有限理性動態(tài)博弈的內(nèi)點(diǎn)均衡與完全理性靜態(tài)博弈的Bowley-Nash均衡完全一致。但的穩(wěn)定性條件將對模型各參數(shù)提出更嚴(yán)格的要求。當(dāng)模型參數(shù)不能滿足這一條件時(盡管它們相容于模型的合理性條件),雙寡頭的有限理性動態(tài)博弈的過程將十分復(fù)雜。 本文利用數(shù)值模擬的方法分析了兩個有限理性參數(shù)(基于邊際利潤信號的產(chǎn)量調(diào)整速度與適應(yīng)性調(diào)整系數(shù))以及排污權(quán)價格的取值變化下系統(tǒng)可能產(chǎn)生的復(fù)雜動態(tài)行為。數(shù)值模擬的結(jié)果表明,(1)基于邊際利潤的調(diào)整速度對均衡的穩(wěn)定性具有強(qiáng)烈的擾動作用,隨著取值的增大,系統(tǒng)將呈現(xiàn)分岔甚至混沌的復(fù)雜行為;(2)適應(yīng)性調(diào)整系數(shù)也對均衡的穩(wěn)定具有破壞作用,但破壞能力遠(yuǎn)不及。(3)在模型其他參數(shù)的不同條件下,排污權(quán)價格的變動對系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定性的影響也是不同的,在由某一類參數(shù)條件確定的市場機(jī)制當(dāng)中,排污權(quán)交易價格變化也會引發(fā)系統(tǒng)混沌行為的產(chǎn)生,從而對市場造成不可預(yù)知的扭曲和破壞作用。
[Abstract]:The oligopoly market refers to a type of market structure controlled by a small number of producers. It is well known that oligopoly markets have become the most complex of all market structures because of the significant interaction between oligopolies. The oligopoly, due to the accumulation of capital, the closeness of the region, and the related policy restrictions, is an oligopoly. The phenomenon of monopoly exists in the real economic life. As an emerging economy, which has transformed from a planned economy to a socialist market economy through reform and opening up, it embodies the characteristics of oligopoly in many economic fields.
The emission trading mechanism, as an environmental protection measure based on the market, compares with the traditional administrative commanding charge system, which has a low management cost and has a certain economic stimulation ability in the control of total emission of pollutants. However, many existing studies have shown that the efficiency of emission trading is very efficient. It depends on the structure of the market. In a completely competitive market environment, the emission trading mechanism can give full play to its own advantages, but in the non idealized market environment of monopoly power, the emission trading system may lead to the distortion of the market, thus affecting the effect of the governance pollution.
In this paper, a dual oligopoly game model with product difference is established. In the Bowley oligopoly monopoly production competition model, the pollution emission and emission trading mechanism is introduced. Under the traditional game theory, the influence of the implementation of the emission trading system on the Bowley-Nash equilibrium is analyzed. The results show that the emission trading is introduced. After the Bowley-Nash equilibrium of the output competition game of the duopoly, the degree of the difference between the oligopoly products, the price of the pollutant emission permit in the emission trading market and the pollution production coefficient of the two manufacturers will affect the oligopoly equilibrium output, and the manufacturer's pollution control cost coefficient and the initial discharge license number will not cause the factory. In addition, in the case of substitution in the product (in fact this is more common in the oligopoly market), if the pollution production coefficient of a polluting enterprise is relatively small enough relative to its competitors, the emission trading will increase its balanced output, although the mechanism is also increased. In addition, the total variable cost of production is added. It can be seen that the emission trading mechanism helps to stimulate the polluting enterprises to improve their own production technology and reduce their pollution generating coefficients in order to profit in the competition, and this will also play an active role in improving the environment.
Then, this paper discarded the classical rational hypothesis and gave two oligopoly firms with a more tangible and practical finite rational yield adjustment mechanism, and constructed a two-dimensional discrete nonlinear dynamic system describing the dynamic game behavior of a finite rational manufacturer. The boundary equilibrium and a locally stable interior point equilibrium, and the internal point equilibrium of the finite rational dynamic game is exactly the same as the Bowley-Nash equilibrium of the fully rational static game. But the stability conditions will put forward more stringent requirements for the parameters of the model. When the model parameters can not meet this condition (although they are compatible with the model, the model parameters are not satisfied. The rationality of duopoly's dynamic game with bounded rationality will be very complicated.
In this paper, the complex dynamic behavior of two finite rational parameters (based on the output adjustment speed and adaptability adjustment coefficient based on the marginal profit signal) and the value of the emission price is analyzed in this paper. The results of the numerical simulation show that (1) the stability of the equilibrium is based on the adjustment speed of marginal profit. The system will have a strong disturbance, with the increase of the value, the system will show the complex behavior of bifurcation and even chaos; (2) the adaptability adjustment coefficient also has a destructive effect on the equilibrium stability, but the failure ability is far less than. (3) under the different conditions of other parameters of the model, the change of the price of the pollution right of the system has no effect on the stability of the system. In the same market mechanism determined by a certain kind of parameter conditions, the change of the trading price of the emission rights will also lead to the emergence of the chaotic behavior of the system, thus causing unpredictable distortions and destruction to the market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：X196;F224.32

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