本文選題：排污權(quán)交易 + 市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)��； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的不斷進(jìn)步,人類對(duì)自然的改造,不論從深度上還是廣度上都不斷擴(kuò)展,特別是工業(yè)革命以來,生產(chǎn)力的釋放刺激世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的迅猛發(fā)展。但同時(shí),也帶來了環(huán)境的破壞等負(fù)面影響,使經(jīng)濟(jì)增長與環(huán)境保護(hù)之間的矛盾日益凸顯。因此多年來各國政府紛紛采用各種手段以圖解決上述矛盾。排污權(quán)交易制度就是其中之一。所謂排污權(quán)交易是在承認(rèn)環(huán)境容量資源有限的前提下,將其商品化,并采用市場(chǎng)模式允許治污成本不同的企業(yè)對(duì)環(huán)境資源的使用權(quán)進(jìn)行交易,以實(shí)現(xiàn)一定的環(huán)境治理目標(biāo)的一種手段,事實(shí)證明它能夠較好地協(xié)調(diào)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展與環(huán)境保護(hù)的關(guān)系,是一項(xiàng)成本效益高的環(huán)境政策。 本文以排污權(quán)交易為研究對(duì)象,在對(duì)排污權(quán)交易相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行界定和國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀匯總基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)排污權(quán)交易的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行分析,構(gòu)建了排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)和二級(jí)市場(chǎng)的交易模型。本文主要對(duì)以下問題進(jìn)行了探討: 首先,對(duì)排污權(quán)交易相關(guān)概念和國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行界定和總結(jié),在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了排污權(quán)交易的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)。分析后發(fā)現(xiàn)排污權(quán)交易制度可抽象為以下組成部分:確定排污權(quán)的總量規(guī)則、排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)(配額市場(chǎng))、排污權(quán)交易二級(jí)市場(chǎng)(交易市場(chǎng))以及排污權(quán)市場(chǎng)管理規(guī)則。發(fā)現(xiàn)各部之間既有繼起性又有關(guān)聯(lián)性,每一項(xiàng)大的規(guī)則又由若干子規(guī)則組成,且各部分間具有密切的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。對(duì)比后發(fā)現(xiàn),排污權(quán)交易制度的結(jié)構(gòu)中,核心和重點(diǎn)是排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)和排污權(quán)交易二級(jí)市場(chǎng)。 其次,論文對(duì)排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)和二級(jí)市場(chǎng)中參與主體的行為進(jìn)行分析。在排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)中,參與主體分別為政府和排污企業(yè),政府處于主導(dǎo)地位。分析表明,通過政府的干預(yù),排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)會(huì)是穩(wěn)定收斂的市場(chǎng)。排污權(quán)交易二級(jí)市場(chǎng)是具有不同邊際治污成本的企業(yè)進(jìn)行排污許可證交易的場(chǎng)所,通過市場(chǎng)的作用對(duì)環(huán)境容量資源進(jìn)行優(yōu)化配置,其交易的動(dòng)力是企業(yè)之間的不同治污成本。 最后,借鑒拍賣理論和演化博弈論構(gòu)建了排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)交易模型和基于高低匹配的排污權(quán)交易二級(jí)市場(chǎng)交易模型,分析后表明:在排污權(quán)交易一級(jí)市場(chǎng)中,對(duì)于不同排污許可證分配量,政府可以通過制定不同價(jià)格策略來使得一級(jí)市場(chǎng)穩(wěn)定收斂;二級(jí)市場(chǎng)中,通過引入高低匹配交易模式,可有效地規(guī)避市場(chǎng)交易中出現(xiàn)的買賣雙方的信息不對(duì)稱現(xiàn)象,促使雙方如實(shí)地報(bào)價(jià)。
[Abstract]:With the development of science and technology, the transformation of nature has been expanded in depth and breadth, especially since the Industrial Revolution, the release of productive forces has stimulated the rapid development of the world economy. But at the same time, it also brings environmental damage and other negative effects, which makes the contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection increasingly prominent. As a result, governments have used various means to resolve these contradictions for many years. Emissions trading system is one of them. The so-called emission trading is based on the recognition of the limited capacity of environmental resources, commercialization, and the adoption of a market model to allow enterprises with different pollution control costs to trade the right to use environmental resources. It has been proved that it can coordinate the relationship between economic development and environmental protection and is a cost-effective environmental policy. This paper takes emission trading as the research object, and analyzes the market structure of emission trading on the basis of defining the relevant concepts of emission trading and summarizing the domestic and foreign research status. The trading model of primary market and secondary market of emission trading is constructed. This paper mainly discusses the following problems: Firstly, it defines and summarizes the related concepts of emission trading and the current research situation at home and abroad, and then analyzes the market structure of emission trading. It is found that the emission trading system can be abstracted into the following parts: determining the total amount of emission rights, the primary market of emission trading (quota market), the secondary market of emission trading (trading market) and the regulation of market management of emission rights. It is found that there is both succession and correlation among each part, and each big rule is composed of several sub-rules, and each part has close internal relation. It is found that in the structure of the emission trading system, the core and emphasis are the primary market of emission trading and the secondary market of emission trading. Secondly, the paper analyzes the behavior of the participants in the primary market and secondary market. In the primary market of emission trading, the main bodies are the government and the emission enterprises respectively, and the government is in the leading position. The analysis shows that the primary market of emission trading is stable and convergent through government intervention. The secondary market of emission trading is a place for enterprises with different marginal pollution control costs to trade in emission permits. Through the role of the market, the optimal allocation of environmental capacity resources is carried out, and the motive force of trading is the different pollution control costs among enterprises. Finally, based on the auction theory and evolutionary game theory, the first market trading model of emission trading and the secondary market trading model of emissions trading based on high and low matching are constructed. The analysis shows that: in the first level market of emission trading, For different emission permit allocations, the government can make the primary market converge stably by formulating different pricing strategies; in the secondary market, by introducing a high and low match trading model, It can effectively avoid the information asymmetry between buyer and seller in the market transaction, and urge both parties to quote the price truthfully.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：X196

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 李明明;大氣污染物排污權(quán)交易機(jī)制的研究[D];吉林農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué);2012年

2 高翔;陜西省環(huán)境污染物排放現(xiàn)狀與排污權(quán)交易實(shí)踐[D];西北大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：1831505