本文選題：討價還價　切入點：有效區(qū)間　出處：《重慶大學》2003年碩士論文

【摘要】： 在經(jīng)濟生活中，商品交易時的討價還價是一個普通和常見的現(xiàn)象，但其對于相對長期價格和短期價格而言的即期價格的確定卻發(fā)揮著重要作用。雖然，已經(jīng)有一些模型分析過討價還價問題,但是，對于討價還價過程中的交易雙方——賣者和買者的可接受價格區(qū)間，以及在此基礎(chǔ)上一個明確的討價還價區(qū)間問題，這方面的分析卻鮮見闡述，并且已有的研究是將這么一個討價還價區(qū)間作為一個給定條件加以考慮的，但是如何得到這個區(qū)間，卻沒有進行分析，這，就是論文首先要考慮的問題。 論文先從交易者在商品選擇過程中可接受的價格區(qū)間入手，，根據(jù)交易者擁有的市場信息和其自身的效用評價等因素來考慮最優(yōu)的機會選擇，這樣，在機會選擇的基礎(chǔ)上就可以分析得到一個討價還價過程中的“有效區(qū)間”的概念。這也就是交易雙方在討價還價之初選擇交易商品、選擇交易對手的問題。 但是，現(xiàn)實中的賣者和買者之間可能并不一定都是一對一的進行討價還價，由于不能區(qū)分不同的買者，賣者可能會面對一對多進行討價還價的情形，此時討價還價雙方的有效區(qū)間會發(fā)生一定的變化，而賣者是從自身的單位時間內(nèi)收益最大化進行考慮，買者則是單獨決策。 在分析了有效區(qū)間的問題之后，論文開始討論討價還價的過程，并把這個過程劃分為兩個不同的階段：信息交換階段、討價還價階段。信息交換階段雖然也有“報價－還價”的現(xiàn)象，但是此時的“報價－還價”不同于討價還價階段的“報價－還價”，因為前者是在進行信息交換并通過各種可能的信息交換方式來得到一個穩(wěn)定的“共同區(qū)間”，當交易雙方中任一方對于在共同區(qū)間內(nèi)最終成交價格的預期不在有效區(qū)間內(nèi)時，如果另一方不能使其預期發(fā)生改變并在有效區(qū)間的范圍內(nèi)，那么交易就會中止；而此時的“報價－還價”就是各種信息交換方式中的一種。討價還價階段中的“報價－還價”則是當交易雙方的信息交換完畢，并都有動機繼續(xù)交易時，在“共同區(qū)間”中為了達成交易而相互之間逐步作出的讓步。 在討價還價階段，“報價－還價”的原則則遵循“公平還價”的過程，此時的“公平”概念是一個交易者整體的評價，而不僅僅指某一次的還價的數(shù)額是否與自身的讓步相當。
[Abstract]:In economic life, bargaining in commodity trading is a common and common phenomenon, but it plays an important role in determining spot prices relative to long-term and short-term prices. There are some models that have analyzed the bargaining problem, however, for the acceptable price range between the seller and the buyer in the bargaining process, and for a clear bargaining range on this basis, This analysis is rarely discussed, and existing studies have taken such a bargaining interval into account as a given condition, but how to get the interval has not been analysed. This is the first question to be considered in the paper. The paper starts with the acceptable price range in the process of commodity selection and considers the optimal choice of opportunity according to the market information and the utility evaluation of the trader. On the basis of the choice of opportunity, the concept of "effective range" in the bargaining process can be analyzed, which is the problem of the parties choosing the goods and counterparties at the beginning of the bargain. However, in reality, the seller and the buyer may not always bargain one-to-one, because they cannot distinguish between different buyers, the seller may face the situation of one-to-many bargaining. At this point, the effective range of both bargaining parties will change to a certain extent, while the seller will consider the maximization of the profit per unit time, while the buyer will make a separate decision. After analyzing the problem of effective interval, the paper begins to discuss the bargaining process, and divides the process into two different stages: the information exchange stage. Although there is also the phenomenon of "quotation and counter-offer" in the information exchange stage, But the "offer-counteroffer" at this time is different from the "quote-counteroffer" in the bargaining stage, because the former is exchanging information and obtaining a stable "common interval" through various possible ways of exchanging information. If one of the parties to the transaction does not expect the final transaction price within the common range to be within the valid range, If the other party cannot change its expectations and fall within the valid range, the transaction will be terminated; At this point, "quotation-counteroffer" is one of the various ways of exchanging information. In the bargaining stage, "quote-counteroffer" is when the information exchange between the two parties to the transaction is completed and both parties have an incentive to continue the transaction. A gradual concession made between one another in a "common interval" in order to make a deal. In the bargaining stage, the principle of "quotation and counteroffer" follows the process of "fair counteroffer". The concept of "fairness" is the evaluation of a trader as a whole, not just whether the amount of a counter-offer is equal to his own concession.
【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2003
【分類號】：F014.31

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)博士學位論文 前2條

1 張國琪;國際技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓價格討價還價模型研究[D];吉林大學;2007年

2 李群峰;知識型企業(yè)合作剩余分配討價還價博弈分析[D];首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學;2011年

相關(guān)碩士學位論文 前1條

1 王峰;多屬性采購拍賣與多屬性采購談判的比較研究[D];重慶大學;2011年

本文編號：1659049