【摘要】：1958年,Modigliani和Miller提出了著名的MM定理,創(chuàng)建了現(xiàn)代資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論。其指出,在完美市場的假設(shè)條件下,企業(yè)的籌資決策不影響企業(yè)市場價值,并且企業(yè)的投資與資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)。然而,完美市場假設(shè)條件太過苛刻,信息不對稱和委托代理等問題的存在使得企業(yè)的籌資成本因資本來源不同而不同,企業(yè)的投資策略與資本結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān),企業(yè)普遍面臨融資約束問題。國家實(shí)行財(cái)政改革以來,省級政府被授予較大的處理轄區(qū)內(nèi)相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)事務(wù)的權(quán)力,同時重GDP的官員考核晉升制度也提升了地方政府對經(jīng)濟(jì)活動的干預(yù)動機(jī)。對企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動的干預(yù)離不開對資源的掌控,地方政府一方面通過掌控金融、能源等核心資本間接控制企業(yè)活動,另一方面又通過制定相關(guān)政策或依賴政企的依附關(guān)系直接干預(yù)企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動。因此,政府質(zhì)量的高低對企業(yè)資源配置能力與效率有著重大的影響。本文以滬深兩市A股市場1333家非銀行上市公司2006～2012年間的面板數(shù)據(jù)為研究對象,通過托賓Q投資理論模型考察了省級地方政府質(zhì)量對上市公司投、融資的影響,并進(jìn)一步研究了不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)上市場公司其投、融資受地方政府質(zhì)量影響的情況。本文結(jié)果顯示,上市公司投資支出與表征投資機(jī)會的托賓Q值成正相關(guān)關(guān)系,這種正相關(guān)關(guān)系隨著政府質(zhì)量的提高而加強(qiáng),托賓Q值能代表投資機(jī)會；上市場公司的投資支出與企業(yè)經(jīng)營現(xiàn)金流量成正相關(guān)關(guān)系,這種正相關(guān)關(guān)系隨著政府質(zhì)量的提高得減弱,中國上市公司普遍存在融資約束現(xiàn)象。為進(jìn)一步深入研究企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對投、融資的影響,本文分別考察了省級地方政府質(zhì)量對國有、非國有上市公司以及中央國有和地方國有上市公司投、融資的影響,結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),相較于國有上市公司,省級地方政府質(zhì)量對非國有上市公司投、融資影響較大；相較于中央國有上市公司,省級地方政府質(zhì)量對地方國有上市公司投、融資有較大影響。在投資的效果分析中,本文發(fā)現(xiàn),地方政府質(zhì)量較高的地區(qū),上市公司投資能帶來企業(yè)銷售收入更大的增長。最后,本文從政府、企業(yè)兩個角度出發(fā),提出改善上市公司投、融資現(xiàn)狀的政策建議。
[Abstract]:In 1958, Modigliani and Miller put forward the famous MM theorem and established the modern capital structure theory. It points out that under the assumption of perfect market, the financing decision of the enterprise does not affect the market value of the enterprise, and the investment of the enterprise is independent of the capital structure. However, the perfect market assumption is too harsh, the information asymmetry and the principal-agent problems make the financing cost of the enterprise vary according to the capital source. The investment strategy of the enterprise is related to the capital structure. Enterprises generally face financing constraints. Since the implementation of fiscal reform, provincial governments have been given greater powers to deal with economic affairs within their jurisdiction, and the system of assessing and promoting GDP officials has also enhanced the incentive for local governments to intervene in economic activities. Intervention in the economic activities of enterprises cannot be separated from the control of resources. On the one hand, local governments indirectly control enterprise activities by controlling core capital such as finance, energy, etc. On the other hand, it directly interferes with the economic activities of enterprises by making relevant policies or relying on the dependence of government and enterprises. Therefore, the quality of the government has a significant impact on the ability and efficiency of enterprise resource allocation. Based on the panel data of 1333 non-bank listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2006 to 2012, this paper investigates the impact of provincial local government quality on the investment and financing of listed companies through Tobin Q investment theory model. Furthermore, the paper studies the influence of local government quality on the investment and financing of market companies with different property rights. The results show that there is a positive correlation between the investment expenditure of listed companies and the Tobin Q value, which is strengthened with the improvement of government quality, and the Tobin Q value can represent the investment opportunity. There is a positive correlation between the investment expenditure of the listed companies and the cash flow of the enterprises, which weakens with the improvement of the government quality, and the phenomenon of financing constraints exists in the listed companies in China. In order to further study the influence of the property right of enterprises on investment and financing, this paper investigates the influence of the quality of provincial local government on the investment and financing of state-owned, non-state-owned listed companies, as well as central and local state-owned listed companies, respectively. Compared with the state-owned listed companies, the quality of provincial local governments has a greater impact on the investment and financing of non-state-owned listed companies, while compared with the central state-owned listed companies, the quality of provincial local governments has a greater impact on the investment of local state-owned listed companies. In the analysis of the effect of investment, it is found that the investment of listed companies can bring more growth of sales income in the areas with high quality of local government. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to improve the current situation of investment and financing of listed companies from the two angles of government and enterprise.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D630;F275;F832.4

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