本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈 + 供應(yīng)商侵入��； 參考：《西南交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：電子商務(wù)以及第三方物流快速發(fā)展,越來(lái)越多的供應(yīng)商正在通過(guò)直銷(xiāo)渠道侵入零售市場(chǎng),同時(shí)新渠道的引入可能引起渠道沖突的發(fā)生。本文的研究是基于供應(yīng)商和傳統(tǒng)零售商組成的基礎(chǔ)模型,從供應(yīng)商侵入問(wèn)題和雙渠道協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制兩個(gè)方面開(kāi)展研究。關(guān)于供應(yīng)商侵入問(wèn)題,本文從以下兩方面探討。首先,考慮零售商的損失規(guī)避,研究了態(tài)度信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)時(shí)的供應(yīng)商侵入問(wèn)題。研究表明:供應(yīng)商侵入總使零售商的效用惡化;供應(yīng)商的效用發(fā)生好轉(zhuǎn)還是惡化,將取決于直銷(xiāo)成本、損失規(guī)避系數(shù)的取值;可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)供應(yīng)商與零售商"贏(yíng)-虧"、"虧-虧"的情形。其次,考慮伯川德競(jìng)爭(zhēng),研究基于需求信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)的供應(yīng)商侵入問(wèn)題。研究表明:供應(yīng)商侵入使供應(yīng)商、零售商的收益情況好轉(zhuǎn)還是惡化,將取決于直銷(xiāo)成本和產(chǎn)品替代系數(shù)的取值;在一定范圍內(nèi),信息共享可以使供應(yīng)商和零售商獲取比相應(yīng)不對(duì)稱(chēng)信息下更多的收益。最后,本文采用了信息共享和引入契約兩種方式對(duì)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制進(jìn)行探討。研究表明:在考慮零售商的損失規(guī)避且態(tài)度信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中,當(dāng)供應(yīng)商的直銷(xiāo)成本和傳統(tǒng)零售渠道的市場(chǎng)占有率較低時(shí),僅針對(duì)一定取值范圍的損失規(guī)避系數(shù),信息共享可以實(shí)現(xiàn)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào);雙方收入共享契約的引入可以有效解決雙渠道的不協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of e-commerce and third party logistics, more and more suppliers are invading the retail market through direct marketing channels, and the introduction of new channels may lead to channel conflicts. The research of this paper is based on the basic model of supplier and traditional retailer, from two aspects of supplier intrusion and dual channel coordination mechanism. This paper discusses the problem of supplier intrusion from the following two aspects. Firstly, considering the loss aversion of retailers, the problem of supplier intrusion when attitude information is asymmetric is studied. The research shows that the supplier invading always makes the retailer's utility worse, and whether the supplier's utility will get better or worse will depend on the direct selling cost and the value of loss evading coefficient. Suppliers and retailers may "win-lose" and "lose-loss" situation. Secondly, considering Bertrand competition, the problem of supplier intrusion based on asymmetric demand information is studied. The research shows that the profit of suppliers, retailers and retailers will depend on the value of direct selling cost and product substitution coefficient. Information sharing enables suppliers and retailers to obtain more revenue than the corresponding asymmetric information. Finally, this paper discusses the coordination mechanism of double channel supply chain by information sharing and contract. The results show that when the direct selling cost of suppliers and the market share of traditional retail channels are low in the dual-channel supply chain which takes into account the loss aversion of retailers and asymmetric attitude information, the loss circumvention coefficient of a certain value range is only targeted at the direct selling cost of suppliers and the market share of traditional retail channels. Information sharing can realize the coordination of supply chain with two channels, and the introduction of revenue sharing contract between two parties can effectively solve the problem of disharmony between two channels.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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