本文關(guān)鍵詞： 快遞企業(yè) 共同配送 演化博弈 激勵(lì)機(jī)制　出處：《鄭州大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：快遞業(yè)作為我國(guó)的新興行業(yè),發(fā)展速度快,為我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展做出了巨大貢獻(xiàn)。由于我國(guó)快遞業(yè)發(fā)展時(shí)間過短,市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入的門檻較低,經(jīng)營(yíng)者數(shù)量較多,市場(chǎng)集中度偏低,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈且無序,使得目前我國(guó)快遞企業(yè)普遍出現(xiàn)服務(wù)質(zhì)量欠缺、資源浪費(fèi)嚴(yán)重,而且資源共享及利用率較低,配送成本較高。如何解決這一發(fā)展問題是亟需關(guān)注的,而實(shí)施共同配置就是解決這一問題的最優(yōu)方案,開展快遞企業(yè)間共同配送服務(wù)有利于降低社會(huì)物流總成本,又可以有效刺激社會(huì)需求,促進(jìn)資源的優(yōu)化配置,有力的推動(dòng)了市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展。因此,本文首先將整理和歸納共同配送及演化博弈的國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,隨后分析我國(guó)快遞業(yè)現(xiàn)狀及共同配送的必要性。接下來,基于演化博弈分析了快遞企業(yè)間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作涉及的影響因素,建立了競(jìng)合機(jī)制下快遞企業(yè)間共同配送的演化博弈模型,從模型假設(shè)、模型建立、模型求解、參數(shù)分析以及數(shù)值仿真,分析不同快遞企業(yè)間合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為及其動(dòng)態(tài)演化過程,對(duì)因素的變化影響路徑選擇和演化博弈結(jié)果進(jìn)行研究,從而為構(gòu)建快遞企業(yè)間共同配送的激勵(lì)機(jī)制的研究奠定基礎(chǔ)。最后,通過快遞企業(yè)間共同配送激勵(lì)機(jī)制的構(gòu)建,以期促進(jìn)快遞企業(yè)間共同配送的形成與實(shí)施,進(jìn)而促進(jìn)我國(guó)快遞行業(yè)的發(fā)展。以上研究結(jié)果表明:快遞企業(yè)獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)時(shí)產(chǎn)生的收益對(duì)快遞企業(yè)間共同配送結(jié)果和演化博弈中的合作概率沒有影響,但是快遞企業(yè)的初始合作意愿則對(duì)共同配送的形成具有決定性作用。同時(shí),共同配送所帶來的額外合作收益的分配比例必須合理,快遞企業(yè)之間才會(huì)形成穩(wěn)定的長(zhǎng)期合作關(guān)系,即共同配送合作關(guān)系。此外,鞍點(diǎn)的橫縱坐標(biāo)值是競(jìng)合機(jī)制下系統(tǒng)演化博弈路徑改變的閥值,各因素參數(shù)對(duì)快遞企業(yè)間共同配送的演化路徑改變具有不同的影響:共同配送的形成與額外合作收益正相關(guān),與共同配送投入成本和企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況負(fù)相關(guān),而且存在一個(gè)最優(yōu)的共同配送的額外合作收益的分配系數(shù),使得快遞企業(yè)間共同配送的合作可能性最大。最后,本文結(jié)合快遞企業(yè)間共同配送演化博弈模型分析結(jié)論,從五個(gè)影響因素出發(fā),構(gòu)建了快遞企業(yè)間共同配送的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,期望促使快遞企業(yè)間的合作,以期引導(dǎo)共同配送能夠順利形成并運(yùn)行。
[Abstract]:As a new industry of our country, express industry has made great contribution to the economic development of our country. Because of the short time of development, the threshold of market access is lower, and the number of operators is more. The market concentration is low, the competition is fierce and disorderly, which makes the express delivery enterprises in our country generally lack of service quality, serious waste of resources, and low resource sharing and utilization. Distribution cost is high. How to solve this development problem is urgent concern, and the implementation of common allocation is the best solution to solve this problem. Developing joint distribution service among express delivery enterprises is conducive to reducing the total cost of social logistics, but also can effectively stimulate social demand, promote the optimal allocation of resources, and promote the healthy development of the market economy. This paper will sort out and summarize the domestic and foreign research status of joint distribution and evolution game, and then analyze the current situation of express delivery industry and the necessity of joint distribution. Based on the evolutionary game, this paper analyzes the influence factors of competition and cooperation between express delivery enterprises, and establishes the evolutionary game model of joint distribution between express delivery enterprises under the mechanism of competition and cooperation, which is based on the hypothesis of the model, the establishment of the model, and the solution of the model. Parameter analysis and numerical simulation to analyze the cooperative competition behavior and its dynamic evolution process among different express delivery enterprises, and to study the influence of factors on path selection and evolution game results. Finally, through the construction of joint distribution incentive mechanism among express delivery enterprises, in order to promote the formation and implementation of joint distribution among express enterprises. The above research results show that the income generated by express companies when they operate independently has no effect on the joint distribution results and the cooperation probability in evolutionary game between express delivery enterprises. However, the initial cooperation intention of express delivery enterprises has a decisive role in the formation of joint distribution. At the same time, the distribution ratio of additional cooperative benefits brought by joint distribution must be reasonable. Express delivery enterprises will form a stable long-term cooperation relationship, that is, joint distribution cooperation relationship. In addition, the saddle point of the vertical coordinate value is the system evolution game path change threshold under the competing mechanism. Each factor parameter has different influence on the evolution path change of joint distribution among express delivery enterprises: the formation of joint distribution is positively related to the additional cooperative income, and negatively related to the input cost of joint distribution and the operating risk of the enterprise. And there is an optimal co-distribution of additional cooperative income distribution coefficient, which makes the cooperation between express delivery enterprises is the most likely. Finally. Based on the conclusion of the game model of joint distribution evolution among express delivery enterprises, this paper constructs the incentive mechanism of joint distribution among express delivery enterprises from five factors, in order to promote the cooperation between express delivery enterprises. In order to guide the joint distribution can be formed and run smoothly.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F259.23

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