本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于博弈論的道路貨運(yùn)綠色發(fā)展及政府補(bǔ)貼分配研究　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 道路貨運(yùn)行業(yè) 綠色貨運(yùn) 博弈論 博弈模型 補(bǔ)貼分配

【摘要】：全球氣候變化是人類現(xiàn)在及未來長時(shí)間內(nèi)面臨的最嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)之一,主要原因就在于溫室氣體的排放和能源的消耗快速增長。交通運(yùn)輸行業(yè)是排放溫室氣體和消耗能源的大戶,也是城市空氣質(zhì)量問題的重要來源,其中道路貨運(yùn)行業(yè)又占據(jù)相當(dāng)大的部分。因此,推動(dòng)貨運(yùn)行業(yè)的節(jié)能減排,發(fā)展綠色貨運(yùn),已成為社會(huì)關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)。綠色貨運(yùn)是針對(duì)傳統(tǒng)貨運(yùn)的負(fù)外部性,基于節(jié)約資源、保護(hù)環(huán)境的理念發(fā)展而成的一種新的貨運(yùn)模式。雖然我國政府大力倡導(dǎo)綠色貨運(yùn)的發(fā)展,為道路貨運(yùn)行業(yè)提供創(chuàng)造競爭優(yōu)勢(shì)的新契機(jī),但由于缺乏合理的激勵(lì)機(jī)制和利益分配機(jī)制,現(xiàn)有的綠色化行為往往流于表面,并沒有真正的落實(shí),從而導(dǎo)致綠色貨運(yùn)在我國發(fā)展的十分緩慢。本文以道路貨運(yùn)行業(yè)為研究對(duì)象,將綠色貨運(yùn)引入其中,以促進(jìn)道路貨運(yùn)行業(yè)綠色發(fā)展為目的,并把道路貨運(yùn)行業(yè)從業(yè)務(wù)上看成運(yùn)輸企業(yè)和租賃企業(yè)兩類企業(yè),建立租賃企業(yè)、運(yùn)輸企業(yè)和政府三方博弈模型,對(duì)博弈主體之間的關(guān)系和主體的收益情況進(jìn)行研究。具體的工作:首先,對(duì)綠色貨運(yùn)進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)分析。從綠色貨運(yùn)的內(nèi)涵,租賃企業(yè)、運(yùn)輸企業(yè)和政府之間的利益關(guān)系,租賃企業(yè)、運(yùn)輸企業(yè)和政府之間的博弈現(xiàn)象三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行分析。其次,根據(jù)博弈模型的相關(guān)概述和特定的假設(shè)條件,建立綠色化博弈模型,通過博弈樹和收益矩陣分析主體間的博弈關(guān)系,運(yùn)用納什均衡分析得出純策略和混合策略均衡分析結(jié)果。通過博弈分析得出政府在促進(jìn)綠色貨運(yùn)的發(fā)展中起引導(dǎo)作用,通過制定財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼的政策,可以促進(jìn)綠色貨運(yùn)的發(fā)展。然后,根據(jù)模型假設(shè)建立綠色化補(bǔ)貼分配模型,運(yùn)用非合作和合作博弈均衡對(duì)模型進(jìn)行分析,研究政府如何分配補(bǔ)貼可以達(dá)到綠色最優(yōu)化,以及影響補(bǔ)貼分配的因素。通過對(duì)比不同博弈均衡的分析結(jié)果,可以得出博弈主體的邊際效益會(huì)影響補(bǔ)貼的分配。最后,以某綜合物流園區(qū)的道路貨運(yùn)企業(yè)為例,利用具體數(shù)據(jù),帶入博弈模型和補(bǔ)貼分配模型進(jìn)行計(jì)算,驗(yàn)證模型。
[Abstract]:Global climate change is one of the most serious challenges facing mankind now and in the long term. The main reason lies in the rapid growth of greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption. Transport industry is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption, but also an important source of urban air quality problems. Therefore, promoting energy saving and emission reduction of freight industry and developing green freight has become the focus of social concern. Green freight is the negative externality of traditional freight. Based on the concept of saving resources and protecting the environment, a new freight transport model is developed. Although our government strongly advocates the development of green freight transport, it provides a new opportunity for the road freight industry to create competitive advantages. However, due to the lack of a reasonable incentive mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism, the existing green behavior often flows to the surface, and does not really implement. As a result, the development of green freight in China is very slow. This paper takes the road freight industry as the research object, introduces the green freight transport into it, in order to promote the green development of road freight industry. And the road freight industry from the business as transport enterprises and leasing enterprises two types of enterprises, the establishment of leasing enterprises, transport enterprises and government game model. The specific work: first of all, the green freight system analysis. From the connotation of green freight, leasing enterprises. The relationship between transport enterprises and the government, leasing enterprises, transport enterprises and the game between the government are analyzed in three aspects. Secondly, according to the relevant overview of the game model and specific assumptions. The green game model is established, and the game relationship between the agents is analyzed by the game tree and the income matrix. Through game analysis, the government plays a leading role in promoting the development of green freight transport, through the formulation of financial subsidies policy. It can promote the development of green freight transport. Then, according to the model hypothesis to establish a green subsidy allocation model, using non-cooperative and cooperative game equilibrium to analyze the model. This paper studies how the government allocates subsidies to achieve green optimization, and the factors that affect the allocation of subsidies. By comparing the results of different game equilibrium analysis. It can be concluded that the marginal benefit of the main body of the game will affect the distribution of subsidies. Finally, taking a road freight transport enterprise in a comprehensive logistics park as an example, using specific data, the game model and subsidy allocation model are introduced to calculate. Verify the model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45;F224.32;F542

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前6條

1 張忠會(huì);賴飛屹;謝義苗;;基于納什均衡理論的電力市場三方博弈分析[J];電網(wǎng)技術(shù);2016年12期

2 鐘海巖;徐長冬;任曉婷;;三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤分配策略研究[J];商場現(xiàn)代化;2014年06期

3 余曉鐘;張煥杰;;政府工程項(xiàng)目業(yè)主、承包商和監(jiān)理方的合謀博弈分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題探索;2008年11期

4 陳淑敏;;三方博弈的納什均衡求解[J];科教文匯(上旬刊);2007年03期

5 丁立言;運(yùn)輸技術(shù)的新發(fā)展——智能交通運(yùn)輸系統(tǒng)[J];物流技術(shù)與應(yīng)用;1998年02期

6 邱新有;陳e，

本文編號(hào)：1364836