本文選題：旅游供應(yīng)鏈 + 雙渠道　； 參考：《蘭州理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著國民收入水平的提高及人們旅游觀念的改善,旅游逐漸成為人們放松身心,體驗(yàn)生活的基本方式,我國旅游業(yè)表現(xiàn)出強(qiáng)大的生命力。目前我國游客參與旅游活動(dòng)主要通過旅游供應(yīng)商的直銷渠道和旅游代理商的代理銷售渠道兩種方式,即在旅游產(chǎn)品供需關(guān)系上表現(xiàn)為雙渠道旅游供應(yīng)鏈模式。隨著旅游市場(chǎng)需求季節(jié)性的波動(dòng),雙渠道旅游供應(yīng)鏈表現(xiàn)為宏觀上的供需不平衡,供應(yīng)鏈成員主動(dòng)權(quán)交替更迭。在個(gè)人理性約束下,供應(yīng)鏈決策主體以自身利益最大化進(jìn)行決策,形成一個(gè)不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈過程。通過對(duì)雙方博弈過程分析知旅游市場(chǎng)最大的矛盾已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槭袌?chǎng)需求隨機(jī)波動(dòng)下的渠道利益之爭,從供需角度來看,這種矛盾表現(xiàn)為在旅游市場(chǎng)供給能力相對(duì)剛性的情況下旅游資源的有效配置問題。在這樣的背景下,論文進(jìn)一步建立了供需關(guān)系不平衡時(shí)的旅游供應(yīng)商與旅游代理商的雙渠道旅游供應(yīng)鏈決策模型。通過供應(yīng)鏈節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)間的集中決策和分散決策行為的對(duì)比分析指出,分散決策行為并不能達(dá)到供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的整體協(xié)調(diào),即旅游供應(yīng)商和旅游代理商從自身利益最大化出發(fā)的決策行為使得供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的整體收益受損,并通過數(shù)值算例進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證。文章最后針對(duì)分散決策模式下雙渠道旅游供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)失調(diào)的問題,以契約理論為基礎(chǔ),尋求使雙渠道旅游供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)的契約機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì),分別設(shè)計(jì)了兩方收益共享契約、成本分擔(dān)契約及線性激勵(lì)契約來協(xié)調(diào)雙渠道旅游供應(yīng)鏈,進(jìn)一步通過數(shù)理推導(dǎo)過程說明了前兩種協(xié)調(diào)契約并不能協(xié)調(diào)雙渠道旅游供應(yīng)鏈,并對(duì)線性激勵(lì)契約的有效性進(jìn)行證明。
[Abstract]:With the increase of national income and the improvement of people's concept of tourism, tourism has gradually become the basic way for people to relax and experience life.At present, tourists in our country participate in tourism activities mainly through the direct marketing channels of tourism suppliers and the agency sales channels of travel agents, that is to say, the tourism supply chain mode is the dual channel in the relationship between supply and demand of tourism products.With the seasonal fluctuation of tourism market demand, the two-channel tourism supply chain shows the imbalance of supply and demand on the macro level, and the initiative of supply chain members alternates.Under the restriction of individual rationality, the decision makers of supply chain make decisions based on the maximization of their own interests and form a static game process of incomplete information.Through the analysis of the game process between the two sides, we can see that the biggest contradiction in the tourism market has been transformed into the channel interest contention under the random fluctuation of market demand, and from the point of view of supply and demand,This contradiction is manifested in the efficient allocation of tourism resources under the condition of relatively rigid supply capacity in the tourism market.In this context, the paper further establishes a dual channel tourism supply chain decision-making model for tourism suppliers and travel agents when the supply and demand relationship is unbalanced.Through the comparative analysis of centralized decision and decentralized decision behavior among supply chain node enterprises, it is pointed out that decentralized decision-making behavior can not achieve the overall coordination of supply chain system.That is, the decision-making behavior of tourism suppliers and travel agents based on the maximization of their own interests makes the overall revenue of the supply chain system suffer, and is verified by a numerical example.Finally, aiming at the imbalance of tourism supply chain system in the mode of decentralized decision, based on the contract theory, this paper seeks to design the contract mechanism for the coordination of the tourism supply chain with two channels, and designs the revenue sharing contract between the two parties respectively.The cost sharing contract and the linear incentive contract are used to coordinate the two-channel tourism supply chain. Further, through the mathematical derivation process, the former two kinds of coordination contracts can not coordinate the two-channel tourism supply chain, and the validity of the linear incentive contract is proved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F592

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