本文選題：銀行并購 + 并購反壟斷��； 參考：《武漢大學》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：銀行并購反壟斷管制是銀行反壟斷管制的重要方面，2007年全面爆發(fā)的美國金融危機引發(fā)了人們對銀行反壟斷管制的思考，同樣也引起了人們對銀行并購反壟斷管制的關(guān)注。對中國而言，對銀行并購反壟斷的管制還十分薄弱，機構(gòu)缺失，法律缺失，程序和方法缺失，既不能有效地管制國內(nèi)銀行實施的濫用市場力的并購，也不能有效地管制外資銀行在中國境內(nèi)實施的有損中國金融安全的并購，更不利于國內(nèi)銀行通過海外并購占領國際市場。因此，這一研究具有很強的理論意義和現(xiàn)實意義。 本文以“后危機”為背景，以銀行并購為研究對象，以反壟斷管制為研究視角，論證“后危機”時代加強銀行并購反壟斷管制的必要性、機理、方法與程序，在國際比較的基礎上，設計出中國銀行業(yè)并購的反壟斷管制政策。 美國金融危機爆發(fā)的一個重要原因在于銀行的掠奪性借貸行為，而掠奪性借貸的產(chǎn)生則要歸因于反壟斷管制的不作為。因此，加強銀行業(yè)的反壟斷管制是應對金融危機的重要舉措。作為銀行反壟斷管制重要組成部分的銀行并購反壟斷，在當前背景下，尤其必要。 銀行并購反壟斷的機理主要有兩個，一是哈佛學派的SCP范式，另一是威廉姆森的效率權(quán)衡理論。SCP范式認為市場結(jié)構(gòu)決定企業(yè)行為，企業(yè)行為影響企業(yè)績效。按照這一理論，對市場結(jié)構(gòu)的管制是最重要的，由于并購提高了市場集中度，導致了市場結(jié)構(gòu)的變化，進而對企業(yè)績效產(chǎn)生了不利影響，因此需要對并購進行反壟斷管制。并購→集中度提高→銀行市場力提高→社會福利損失，這一邏輯的并購效應我們稱為并購的負效應。威廉姆森的效率權(quán)衡理論認為，即使并購帶來了負效應，導致了社會福利受損，但如果并購同時帶來了效率的提高，且效率的提高足以抵消并購產(chǎn)生的負效應，那么這起并購不應被禁止；只有那些并購帶來的效率不足以抵消社會福利受損的并購才應被禁止。并購導致的效率提高的效應我們稱為并購的正效應。銀行并購的競爭性評估即是對這兩方面進行權(quán)衡。本文對威廉姆森的靜態(tài)效率進行了修正，重點說明了對效率的定量評價方法，包括對效率的傳遞率和“補償?shù)倪呺H成本降低”的定量分析。 銀行并購反壟斷的機制可分為五種機制：相關(guān)市場界定機制、市場力測定機制、并購效應評估機制、壟斷緩釋因素分析機制、分拆機制。其中，對相關(guān)市場界定機制，重點介紹了市場界定的方法，如SSNIP檢驗、HarrisSimons(1989)的臨界損失檢驗、KatzShapiro（2003）的“總的轉(zhuǎn)換率”檢驗；對市場力測定，重點介紹了離散選擇模型在銀行業(yè)中的運用；對并購效應評估機制，重點介紹了轉(zhuǎn)換率方法和向上價格壓力法；對壟斷緩釋因素，分析了如下緩釋因素：競爭者；市場進入；顧客的轉(zhuǎn)換成本；失敗銀行救濟；公共利益；人口遷移等；對分拆機制，文章提示了銀行并購分拆的原理、目標和機制設計，這為后面我們設計中國的銀行并購分拆制度準備了理論基礎。 中國缺乏對銀行并購實施反壟斷管制的經(jīng)驗，需要借鑒其它國家或地區(qū)的經(jīng)驗來為我所用。文章選取有代表性的國家或地區(qū)（包括美國、加拿大、歐盟、澳大利亞、日本、中東歐國家），從價值取向、機構(gòu)設置、相關(guān)市場的界定、并購反壟斷臨界值的確定、競爭效應分析等方面比較他們在銀行并購反壟斷政策上的異同，并輔以案例，為中國銀行業(yè)“走出去”，實施海外并購戰(zhàn)略提供經(jīng)驗指導和決策參考。 銀行并購的反壟斷管制最基本的一步是界定相關(guān)市場。美國費城銀行案中，將銀行并購反壟斷的相關(guān)地區(qū)市場界定為“本地市場”，將相關(guān)產(chǎn)品市場界定為“銀行服務群”。這一界定是否適用于中國銀行業(yè)的并購反壟斷管制，文章對此進行了實證分析。通過設計消費者和中小企業(yè)融資調(diào)查問卷，在本地抽樣調(diào)查1500個消費者、200家中小企業(yè)，文章驗證了傳統(tǒng)的“本地市場”假設和“群服務”假設在中國的合理性，根據(jù)中國銀行業(yè)市場的競爭態(tài)勢和發(fā)展趨勢，提出了中國對銀行并購實施反壟斷的相關(guān)市場界定的方法。 從各國對銀行并購實施反壟斷管制的實踐看，經(jīng)濟性分析越來越普遍，其地位日益突出。銀行并購反壟斷管制的經(jīng)濟分析包括單邊效應和協(xié)調(diào)效應分析。對單邊效應的分析，文章重點介紹并購模擬技術(shù)的運用，并對并購模擬這一技術(shù)進行了評價；對協(xié)調(diào)效應的研究，通過改進傳統(tǒng)的“核對表”方法，將之與“一致同意-甄別欺騙-可信的懲罰”范式結(jié)合，提出銀行業(yè)并購規(guī)制的協(xié)調(diào)效應新的分析框架。這一新的框架是：從Friedman的“平衡誘惑均衡”概念入手，不是研究銀行卡特爾的形成條件，而是從卡特爾穩(wěn)定性指標（δ）來判斷銀行并購的協(xié)調(diào)效應。 隨著中國銀行業(yè)對外開放進程的深化，外資銀行加強了對中國銀行業(yè)市場的滲透。并購是外資銀行進入中國市場的重要手段，對外資銀行的并購，我們需要做辯證分析，一方面，外資銀行并購有利于中國銀行業(yè)的競爭局面的形成；另一方面，外資銀行并購也有可能損害中國銀行業(yè)的競爭，甚至有損中國金融安全，因此，需要對外資銀行并購進行反壟斷管制。本文從發(fā)展中國家的視角，分析了外資銀行在華并購的動機，并對外資銀行進入中國市場的競爭效應進行了實證研究，，最后設計了外資銀行并購的反壟斷管制政策。 設計中國銀行業(yè)并購的反壟斷政策是本文的重點和落腳點。銀行業(yè)并購反壟斷的政策設計包括銀行并購反壟斷的機構(gòu)設置、反壟斷的原則、標準與目標、銀行并購申報制度、競爭評估制度、并購救濟制度等；除此以外，文章還從需求邊和供給邊兩方面論述了構(gòu)建中國銀行業(yè)競爭政策的主要內(nèi)容，它是對前一個內(nèi)容的深化與發(fā)展。 本文的主要觀點是：（1）在“后危機”時代，中國既要加強對銀行審慎性的監(jiān)管，更要強化對銀行的競爭性管制，二者不可或缺。（2）在機構(gòu)設置上，由商務部的反壟斷局負責銀行并購的反壟斷管制，同時賦予銀監(jiān)會相應的權(quán)利和義務。（3）銀行并購的反壟斷管制應以“合理原則”為核心原則，考慮到外資銀行并購對國家金融安全的影響，對外資銀行并購還需進行國家金融安全審查。（4）構(gòu)建合理的銀行并購申報制度，實行兩步審查法，申報標準應相對寬松。（5）重視經(jīng)濟性分析方法在銀行并購反壟斷管制中的運用，包括相關(guān)市場界定的方法、單邊效應和協(xié)調(diào)效應評估的方法以及效率評估方法等。（6）在銀行并購的反壟斷管制中，合理運用適用除外和域外適用制度。（7）加強國際反壟斷的協(xié)調(diào)。一是商務部與國外競爭權(quán)威的雙邊和多邊協(xié)調(diào)機制的建設；另一是銀監(jiān)會與外國銀行監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的國際協(xié)調(diào)機制的建設。
[Abstract]:The bank ' s anti - monopoly control is an important aspect of the bank ' s anti - monopoly control . In 2007 , the American financial crisis triggered the attention of people to the anti - monopoly control of the banks . In the case of China , the regulation of the anti - monopoly of the banks ' M & A is weak , the mechanism is missing , the law is missing , the procedure and the method are missing , which can not only effectively control the acquisition of the domestic banks ' abuse of market forces , but also can not effectively control the domestic banks ' merger and acquisition of international markets through overseas acquisitions . Therefore , the research has a strong theoretical and practical significance .

On the basis of international comparison , the thesis designs the anti - monopoly control policy of China ' s banking M & A .

One of the important reasons for the financial crisis in the United States lies in the predatory lending behavior of banks , while the generation of predatory lending is due to the inaction of anti - monopoly control . Therefore , strengthening the anti - monopoly control of banking is an important measure to deal with the financial crisis . As a major component of the bank ' s anti - monopoly control , the anti - monopoly of M & A is especially necessary in the current context .

The mechanism of the anti - monopoly of M & A is mainly two , one is the SCP paradigm of the Harvard School , and the other is the efficiency trade - off theory of William Mons . According to this theory , the market structure decides the enterprise behavior and the enterprise behavior influences the performance of the enterprise . According to this theory , it is the negative effect of M & A .
The efficiency of M & A is not enough to offset the damage of social welfare . The effect of M & A is the positive effect of M & A . The competitive evaluation of M & A is the positive effect of M & A . The competitive evaluation of M & A is a trade - off . In this paper , the static efficiency of M & A is corrected , and the quantitative evaluation method of efficiency , including the transfer rate of efficiency and the quantitative analysis of the marginal cost of compensation .

The mechanism can be divided into five mechanisms : relevant market defining mechanism , market force measurement mechanism , M & A effect evaluation mechanism , monopoly slow - release factor analysis mechanism and separation mechanism .
This paper focuses on the application of discrete selection model in banking industry .
The evaluation mechanism of M & A effect is introduced , and the conversion rate method and upward price pressure method are mainly introduced .
The sustained - release factors of monopoly were analyzed , and the following slow - release factors were analyzed : competitors ;
Market access ;
customer ' s conversion cost ;
Failure Bank Relief ;
Public interest ;
Population migration , etc . ;
This paper suggests the principle , goal and mechanism design of the bank merger and acquisition , which provides the theoretical basis for the later design of China ' s bank M & A separation system .

China lacks the experience of implementing anti - monopoly control on the merger and acquisition of banks , and needs to draw lessons from other countries or regions . The article selects representative countries or regions ( including the United States , Canada , EU , Australia , Japan , Central and Eastern Europe ) , compares their similarities and differences from value orientation , institutional setting , related markets , merger and acquisition anti - monopoly thresholds , competition effect analysis , etc . , and provides empirical guidance and decision - making reference for China ' s banking " go out " and implement overseas M & A strategies .

The most basic step in the anti - monopoly control of bank M & A is to define the relevant market . In the case of Philadelphia Bank of America , the relevant regional market of the anti - monopoly of M & A is defined as the " local market " , and the relevant product market is defined as " bank service group " . This article makes an empirical analysis on whether the traditional " local market " hypothesis and " group service " hypothesis are applicable to China ' s banking industry .

The economic analysis of the anti - monopoly control of M & A includes single - side effect and coordination effect analysis . The analysis of single - side effect includes single - side effect and coordination effect analysis .
By improving the traditional " checklist " method and combining it with the " consensus - screening fraud - credible punishment " model , this paper puts forward a new analytical framework for the coordination effect of banking M & A regulation . This new framework is to judge the coordination effect of the bank M & A from Cartel ' s stability index ( 未 ) .

With the deepening of the opening process of China ' s banking industry , foreign banks have strengthened the penetration of China ' s banking market . The acquisition is an important means for foreign banks to enter the Chinese market . As a result , we need to make a dialectical analysis on the mergers and acquisitions of foreign banks . On the one hand , the merger of foreign banks is conducive to the formation of competition in China ' s banking industry ;
On the other hand , foreign bank mergers and acquisitions may damage China ' s banking industry and even undermine China ' s financial security . Therefore , it is necessary to carry out anti - monopoly control on the merger and acquisition of foreign banks . From the perspective of developing countries , this paper analyzes the motives of foreign banks ' merger and acquisition in China , and makes an empirical study on the competition effect of foreign banks in China ' s market . Finally , the anti - monopoly control policy of foreign banks ' merger and acquisition is designed .

The anti - monopoly policy in the design of China ' s banking M & A is the focus and the foothold in this paper . The policy design of the anti - monopoly of M & A includes the establishment of the anti - monopoly mechanism , the principle of anti - monopoly , the standard and the target , the system of the application of the merger and acquisition of the bank , the system of competition evaluation and the remedy system of M & A .
In addition , the article discusses the main contents of the construction of China ' s banking competition policy from both the demand side and the supply side , which is the deepening and development of the previous content .

The main point of this paper is : ( 1 ) In the post - crisis era , China should strengthen the supervision of bank ' s prudence and strengthen the competitive regulation of the bank .
Another is the establishment of an international coordination mechanism between the Banking Regulatory Commission and the foreign bank regulator .
【學位授予單位】：武漢大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.3;D630

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