本文選題：雙邊市場　切入點(diǎn)：定價行為　出處：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：進(jìn)入21世紀(jì),雙邊市場理論才開始引起國際經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界的廣泛關(guān)注,目前雙邊市場已是產(chǎn)業(yè)組織研究的一大熱點(diǎn),它是依托于網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性理論發(fā)展起來的新興前沿理論。與傳統(tǒng)的單邊市場相比,雙邊市場涉及三個參與主體,平臺企業(yè)和兩方不同的參與者,并且平臺企業(yè)通過交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性將雙方參與者吸引到平臺上進(jìn)行交易。在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中,具有這種雙邊市場特征的行業(yè)是普遍可見的,如購物中心聯(lián)結(jié)著商戶和消費(fèi)者,展覽中心聯(lián)結(jié)著參加者和展覽商,淘寶網(wǎng)聯(lián)結(jié)著買方和賣方等。 從產(chǎn)業(yè)組織的角度看,搜索引擎市場具有鮮明的雙邊市場特點(diǎn),搜索引擎企業(yè)作為平臺連接著雙方參與者,一方參與者是個體用戶,一方參與者是廣告商,廣告商和個體用戶之間存在負(fù)的交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性：平臺上的廣告商做的廣告越多,該平臺對個體用戶的吸引力就越小；反之,個體用戶的訪問量越大,廣告商就更愿意在這個搜索引擎平臺上做廣告。本文就是依托于搜索引擎市場的雙邊市場特征對搜索引擎平臺的定價行為進(jìn)行了分析研究。 在以前的研究中,國內(nèi)鮮有學(xué)者將雙邊市場理論應(yīng)用于搜索引擎的定價研究,本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)就是在雙邊市場的理論基礎(chǔ)上,通過嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)哪Ｐ头治鑫覈阉饕娴亩▋r行為,并結(jié)合百度和谷歌在我國具體的情況分情形討論。 本文首先界定了搜索引擎市場,包括搜索引擎的定義、搜索引擎的檢索服務(wù)、搜索引擎市場的參與者利益關(guān)系、搜索引擎市場的供給分析和需求分析,闡述了搜索引擎市場的雙邊市場特征,然后分析了搜索引擎市場的定價行為這一熱點(diǎn)問題,包括定價理論基礎(chǔ)、定價策略和定價方式,進(jìn)而通過建立數(shù)學(xué)模型研究了縱向聯(lián)盟和橫向聯(lián)盟情況時搜索引擎平臺的定價行為,最后從理論上分析了搜索引擎市場的定價規(guī)制問題。 在搜索引擎這樣的雙邊市場中,定價問題是一個熱點(diǎn)的研究方向。本文始終圍繞著搜索引擎平臺的定價行為這一核心問題,首先分析了搜索引擎平臺的傾斜式定價策略,通過建立一個雙寡頭壟斷模型來考察相關(guān)參數(shù)對搜索引擎平臺定價的影響,分析研究模型得出了隨著個體用戶對廣告厭惡程度的加大,隨著個體用戶對廣告商帶來的交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)程度的加大,搜索引擎平臺對廣告商收取的廣告費(fèi)隨之增加,即搜索引擎平臺在定價時的傾斜度加大。在定價方式的分析中,根據(jù)選擇定價方式需要考慮的因素確定了我國搜索引擎平臺采用兩部收費(fèi)制的定價方式,并通過建立模型分析了相關(guān)參數(shù)對搜索引擎平臺兩部收費(fèi)的影響,分析研究模型得出了搜索引擎平臺的匹配程度的提高會減少廣告商的注冊費(fèi)用。然后通過建立數(shù)學(xué)模型對比分析了搜索引擎平臺縱向分離和縱向聯(lián)盟時的定價行為,考察了縱向聯(lián)盟下個體用戶、廣告商和搜索引擎平臺有何變化,得出了搜索引擎平臺和廣告商形成縱向聯(lián)盟時的利潤會提高,在現(xiàn)實(shí)中搜索引擎平臺有組成縱向聯(lián)盟的激勵。最后考慮了導(dǎo)致我國搜索引擎市場完全壟斷的兩種情形,通過建立完全壟斷模型分析得出了在完全壟斷情形時的搜索引擎市場中,搜索引擎平臺相對制定更低的廣告費(fèi)和擁有更多的廣告量,搜索引擎平臺和廣告商相對都獲得更高的利潤。 在分析了我國搜索引擎市場中搜索引擎平臺在各種情況下的定價行為后,接著討論了搜索引擎市場中搜索引擎平臺的傾斜式定價策略規(guī)制問題,得出了在搜索引擎這種雙邊市場中,幾乎所有的搜索引擎平臺都采取了交叉補(bǔ)貼的傾斜定價策略,廣告商對個體用戶的交叉補(bǔ)貼行為是發(fā)生在兩個相互依賴的群體之間的,目的是將個體用戶和廣告商吸引到搜索引擎平臺上,最大程度促成為雙方的交易,這是基于搜索引擎市場的雙邊市場特點(diǎn)所采取的一種吸引雙方參與者的理性定價行為。也就是說,搜索引擎平臺的傾斜式定價策略是為了解決廣告商和個體用戶需求的“雞蛋相生”問題,這種定價策略是一個長期穩(wěn)定的行為,不同于單邊市場中的交叉補(bǔ)貼行為,不屬于掠奪性定價,故反壟斷規(guī)制部門不能從傳統(tǒng)反壟斷規(guī)制角度對搜索引擎平臺的傾斜式定價進(jìn)行規(guī)制。 在本文的最后,首先歸納了本文的研究內(nèi)容和研究不足,然后依據(jù)本文的研究不足拓展了我國搜索引擎市場的未來研究方向。
[Abstract]:In twenty-first Century, the bilateral market theory began to attract the attention of international economic circles, the bilateral market is a hot research topic of industrial organization, it is relying on the frontier theory with network externality theory. Compared with the traditional one-sided market, bilateral market involves three participants, the platform of enterprise and the two party different participants, and the platform of enterprise through the cross network externalities will attract participants on both sides of trading platform. In real life, has the characteristics of this bilateral market industry is generally visible, such as shopping malls connected with businesses and consumers, the exhibition center join visitors and exhibitors, taobao.com connected with the buyer and the seller.
From the perspective of industrial organization, the search engine market with bilateral market characteristics, the search engine business as a platform to connect with both participants, one participant is individual users, a participant is advertiser, there is negative network externalities between advertisers and individual users, advertisers make more advertisements, attractive the platform for individual users is smaller; on the other hand, the greater the amount of access to individual users, advertisers prefer to advertise in the search engine platform. This paper is based on the pricing behavior of the search engine market in the bilateral market characteristics of the search engine platform is studied.
In a previous study, few scholars have applied research on pricing theory of two-sided market in search engine, the innovation of this paper is the theoretical foundation of the bilateral market, through the rigorous model analysis of China's search engine pricing behavior, and the combination of Baidu and Google in China's specific situation of the case discussion.
This paper first defines the search engine market, including the definition of search engine, search engine service, search engine market participants interests, analysis of supply and demand analysis of the search engine market, expounds the features of the two-sided market search engine market, and then analyzes the hot issue of the pricing behavior of the search engine Market, including pricing the theoretical basis, pricing strategy and pricing, the pricing behavior of search engine platform and by establishing the mathematical model of longitudinal and transverse alliance alliance, the pricing regulation of the search engine market from the theoretical analysis.
In the search engine in such a bilateral market, the pricing problem is a hot research direction. This paper revolves around the core issue of the pricing behavior of search engine platform, firstly analyzes the skewed pricing strategy of search engine platform, to examine the effects of related parameters on the search engine platform pricing through the establishment of a duopoly model analysis of the model with individual users for advertising aversion increase with the increase of the degree of cross network effect brought by individual users to advertisers, search engine platform to increase advertisers advertising Fei Suizhi, the inclination of the search engine platform increase in pricing. In the analysis of pricing, according to the choice of pricing the way to consider the Chinese search engine platform using two part tariff pricing methods, and establish a model to analyze the phase The parameters influence on the search engine platform two charges, analysis of the model of the registration fee, improve the degree of the search engine platform will reduce the advertisers. Then the pricing behavior of the search engine platform longitudinal separation and vertical alliance and analyses the contrast through the establishment of mathematical model, the influence of a longitudinal Alliance of individual users, advertisers and search what is the change of engine platform, the search engine platform and advertisers formed vertical alliances when the profit will increase, in reality the search engine platform is composed of vertical alliance incentive. Finally we consider two things result of our search engine market monopoly, by establishing the complete monopoly model analyzed the monopoly situation the search engine market, search engine platform is relatively lower making advertising and have more advertising, search engine platform and Advertisers have relatively high profits.
In the analysis of China's search engine market pricing behavior in the search engine platform in a variety of situations, and then discusses the skewed pricing strategies for regulation of the search engine market, the search engine in this bilateral market, almost all of the search engine platform have taken inclined cross subsidy pricing strategy the cross subsidy behavior advertisers on individual users were between two mutually dependent groups, to individual users and advertisers to search engine platform, the greatest degree of promoting become parties to the transaction, which is a kind of rational pricing behavior to attract both participants take bilateral market characteristics of the search engine market based on. That is to say, the skewed pricing strategy is to solve the users and advertisers of the "chicken and egg" problem, This pricing strategy is a long-term stable behavior. Unlike cross market subsidies in unilateral markets, it is not a predatory pricing. Therefore, antitrust regulation departments cannot regulate the tilt pricing of search engine from the perspective of traditional antitrust regulation.
At the end of this paper, we first summarize the research contents and research limitations of this paper, and then expand the future research direction of China's search engine market based on the deficiency of this research.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：F49;F274

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