本文選題：減排 + 供應(yīng)鏈合作��； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著英國(guó)于2003年在《英國(guó)能源白皮書》中率先提出了“低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)”概念,并在全球范圍內(nèi)受到廣泛關(guān)注,許多國(guó)家和企業(yè)從此開始了不懈的低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)踐。一方面政府積極地實(shí)施稅收、補(bǔ)貼等政策來引導(dǎo)企業(yè)減排,另一方面企業(yè)應(yīng)對(duì)政府和民眾壓力也開始積極地投入環(huán)保實(shí)踐。本文基于實(shí)踐,運(yùn)用決策優(yōu)化的相關(guān)理論和方法,綜合考慮供應(yīng)鏈合作模式、供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)特性、政府征稅與補(bǔ)貼等情形對(duì)企業(yè)決策的影響,研究了三個(gè)在低碳供應(yīng)鏈管理中已經(jīng)存在,但尚無(wú)文獻(xiàn)研究的供應(yīng)鏈上考慮政府政策的減排活動(dòng),分別為第一部分:供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量合作設(shè)計(jì)與碳稅下的生產(chǎn)減排;第二部分:下游企業(yè)敦促與政府征稅或補(bǔ)貼政策下的生產(chǎn)減排;第三部分:雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈下考慮政府補(bǔ)貼與稅收的碳排放。第一部分研究了在裝配型供應(yīng)鏈上,當(dāng)制造商的產(chǎn)品屬性絕大程度上取決于供應(yīng)商所提供的原部件的屬性值時(shí),由于下游企業(yè)通過組裝部件和加工產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行銷售,無(wú)法直接控制部件的質(zhì)量水平,而這些部件的屬性設(shè)計(jì)(包括環(huán)保屬性和傳統(tǒng)屬性)又直接影響到產(chǎn)品的屬性,因此制造商通過與供應(yīng)商的合作來提升原部件的環(huán)保質(zhì)量和傳統(tǒng)質(zhì)量。由于環(huán)保質(zhì)量與傳統(tǒng)質(zhì)量呈互補(bǔ)關(guān)系,因此當(dāng)制造商面對(duì)的終端市場(chǎng)需求提升時(shí),所有供應(yīng)商的需求量也相應(yīng)提升。但不同質(zhì)量的變化對(duì)環(huán)境的影響卻不同,尤其是考慮政府對(duì)企業(yè)生產(chǎn)污染征稅時(shí)。該章節(jié)討論了存在政府稅收政策時(shí),制造商與供應(yīng)商的合作模式選擇問題,首先假設(shè)供應(yīng)商先行同時(shí)決策各自的質(zhì)量決策水平,若供應(yīng)商與制造商達(dá)成合作協(xié)議,則首先由供應(yīng)商和制造商共同決策質(zhì)量水平。當(dāng)政府考慮征稅時(shí),企業(yè)還需決策各自的減排水平。之后供應(yīng)商同時(shí)決策各自的批發(fā)價(jià)水平,制造商再?zèng)Q策零售價(jià)格。分析了政府征稅對(duì)企業(yè)的影響,制造商和供應(yīng)商應(yīng)該如何選擇合作模式,并比較了各種合作模式對(duì)環(huán)境和社會(huì)福利造成的影響。第二部分進(jìn)一步討論了當(dāng)供應(yīng)商的生產(chǎn)污染已經(jīng)嚴(yán)重影響到下游消費(fèi)者的生存環(huán)境時(shí),政府需要通過政策進(jìn)行調(diào)節(jié)時(shí),供應(yīng)鏈上下游的合作問題,以及政府的最優(yōu)化決策。一方面,政府可以通過對(duì)企業(yè)生產(chǎn)污染征稅,以迫使企業(yè)減排;另一方面,政府也可以通過對(duì)企業(yè)的減排投入進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼,以鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)減排。同時(shí),由于消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)逐漸增強(qiáng),與產(chǎn)品相關(guān)的單位碳排放增加會(huì)降低消費(fèi)者對(duì)產(chǎn)品的需求量,因此下游企業(yè)或迫于市場(chǎng)壓力,或出于社會(huì)責(zé)任心,會(huì)對(duì)供應(yīng)商的污染排放行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)督、審查,督促其減排。本章比較了下游企業(yè)督促上游企業(yè)減排、政府征稅、政府補(bǔ)貼、下游企業(yè)敦促同時(shí)政府進(jìn)行征稅以及下游企業(yè)敦促同時(shí)政府進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼等情形,假設(shè)政府首先決策對(duì)供應(yīng)商是征稅還是補(bǔ)貼,然后供應(yīng)商決策自己的減排水平和批發(fā)價(jià),若下游企業(yè)考慮敦促供應(yīng)鏈減排,則減排水平由供應(yīng)商和下游企業(yè)共同決定。最后,下游企業(yè)決策產(chǎn)品的零售價(jià)。根據(jù)逆向求解法,采用斯塔克爾伯格多階段博弈模型,求得各個(gè)決策主體的最優(yōu)選擇。分析了政府和企業(yè)的決策對(duì)環(huán)境和社會(huì)福利產(chǎn)生的影響。第三部分討論了在雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)下制造商通過再制造降低產(chǎn)品生命周期末對(duì)環(huán)境產(chǎn)生的碳排放,以及政府補(bǔ)貼企業(yè)的再制造和政府通過對(duì)雙渠道結(jié)構(gòu)中的電子零售商征稅以阻止消費(fèi)者搭便車,從而保護(hù)傳統(tǒng)實(shí)體店的作用。雙渠道結(jié)構(gòu)下的消費(fèi)者搭便車行為指的是由于相比于傳統(tǒng)實(shí)體店,網(wǎng)絡(luò)商店不存在店面租金、具備較少或幾乎沒有人工水電成本、有些國(guó)家的電子購(gòu)物不存在消費(fèi)稅,使得網(wǎng)絡(luò)商店的產(chǎn)品價(jià)格略低于實(shí)體店的,因此部分消費(fèi)者常常先到實(shí)體店體驗(yàn)產(chǎn)品,了解產(chǎn)品的功能、屬性,獲取專業(yè)服務(wù)人員的講解和演示,卻最終到網(wǎng)絡(luò)商店以更低的價(jià)格購(gòu)買相同的產(chǎn)品。由于企業(yè)的定價(jià)決策會(huì)影響到廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收數(shù)量,進(jìn)而影響到政府的最優(yōu)補(bǔ)貼比率,而雙渠道結(jié)構(gòu)必然影響到企業(yè)的定價(jià)(例如消費(fèi)者常常在實(shí)體店體驗(yàn)產(chǎn)品,而以更低的價(jià)格從網(wǎng)上商店購(gòu)買到同樣的產(chǎn)品,這勢(shì)必對(duì)所有企業(yè)的定價(jià)決策產(chǎn)生影響),因此該章節(jié)考慮了雙渠道結(jié)構(gòu)下消費(fèi)者搭便車問題對(duì)企業(yè)和政府決策以及環(huán)境的影響。
[Abstract]:As Britain took the lead in the concept of "low carbon economy" in the British energy white paper in 2003 and received extensive attention all over the world, many countries and enterprises started unremitting low-carbon economic practice. On the one hand, the government actively implemented the policies of tax and subsidy to guide the enterprises to reduce the emission reduction, on the other hand, the enterprises should deal with the government. And the public pressure has also begun to actively invest in environmental practice. Based on practice, this paper uses the relevant theories and methods of decision-making optimization to consider the effect of supply chain cooperation mode, supply chain structure characteristics, government taxation and subsidies on enterprise decision-making, and studies the existence of three in low carbon supply chain management, but there is no literature research. On the supply chain, we consider the emission reduction activities of government policy, which are the first part: the quality cooperation design of supply chain and the emission reduction under the carbon tax; the second part: the downstream enterprise urges the production reduction under the government tax or the subsidy policy; the third part: the first part considers the carbon emissions of the government subsidies and taxes under the dual channel closed loop supply chain. In the assembly supply chain, when the manufacturer's product properties are largely dependent on the attribute values of the original components provided by the supplier, the quality level of the components can not be controlled directly by the downstream enterprises, which are sold by the assembly and processing products, and the properties of these components, including the environmental properties and traditional genera, are not directly controlled. As a result, manufacturers cooperate with suppliers to improve the environmental quality and traditional quality of the components. Since the quality of the environment is complementary to the traditional quality, the demand for all suppliers is also improved when the manufacturer is facing the demand for the terminal market. There are different effects on the environment, especially when the government has to tax the production pollution of enterprises. This chapter discusses the choice of the mode of cooperation between the manufacturer and the supplier when the government tax policy exists. First, it is assumed that the supplier decides the level of the quality decision at the same time, and if the supplier and the manufacturer reach a cooperation agreement, the first one is the first one. When the government considers taxation, the enterprise needs to decide the level of their respective emission reduction when the government considers the tax. Then the suppliers make their respective wholesale price levels, and the manufacturer makes the decision on the retail price. The influence of the government tax on the enterprise is analyzed. How should the manufacturer and supplier choose the cooperation mode and compare it The second part further discusses that when the production pollution of the supplier has seriously affected the living environment of the downstream consumers, the government needs to regulate the upstream and downstream of the supply chain, as well as the optimal decision of the government when the policy is adjusted. On the one hand, the government is available. On the other hand, the government can encourage enterprises to reduce their emissions by subsidies to encourage enterprises to reduce emissions. At the same time, because of the increasing awareness of the consumer's environmental protection, the increase in carbon emissions associated with products will reduce consumer demand for products, so the downstream enterprises or In this chapter, the downstream enterprises urge the upstream enterprises to reduce the emission reduction, the government tax, the government subsidies, the downstream enterprises urge the government to levy taxes at the same time, and the downstream enterprises urge the government to carry out subsidies, and so on. Let the government first decide whether to tax or subsidize the suppliers, and then the suppliers make their own emission reduction and wholesale prices. If the downstream enterprises consider urging the supply chain to reduce the emission reduction, the reduction level is decided by the suppliers and the downstream enterprises. Finally, the downstream enterprises make the zero price of the product. The multi stage game model is used to obtain the optimal choice of each decision maker. The influence of government and enterprise decision on the environment and social welfare is analyzed. The third part discusses the carbon emissions produced by the manufacturer to reduce the environment at the end of the product life cycle by remanufacturing under the double channel closed loop supply chain structure, and the government subsidized enterprises. Remanufacturing and the government taxed the electronic retailers in the dual channel structure to prevent consumers from hitchhiking, thus protecting the role of traditional physical stores. The double channel structure of consumer hitchhiking is that there is no store rent, less or almost no cost of artificial electricity because of a store rent compared to a traditional entity store. There is no consumption tax in some countries' electronic shopping, which makes the price of the product of the network shop slightly lower than the entity store, so some consumers often experience the product first to the entity store, understand the function of the product, the attribute, get the explanation and demonstration of the professional service personnel, but finally buy the same product at the lower price of the network store. The pricing decision of the enterprise will affect the amount of recycling of the waste products, and then affect the Optimal Subsidy ratio of the government, and the dual channel structure will inevitably affect the pricing of the enterprise (for example, the consumers often experience the product in the entity shop and buy the same product from the online store at a lower price, which is bound to make a decision on the pricing of all enterprises. " Therefore, this chapter takes into account the impact of consumers' free riding problems on business and government decision-making and environment under dual channel structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F205

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