cooperation game 在 宏觀經(jīng)濟管理與可持續(xù)發(fā)展 分類中 的翻譯結(jié)果
本文關(guān)鍵詞:供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗決策的非合作博弈分析,,由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。
在分類學(xué)科中查詢 所有學(xué)科 宏觀經(jīng)濟管理與可持續(xù)發(fā)展 數(shù)學(xué) 企業(yè)經(jīng)濟 計算機軟件及計算機應(yīng)用 貿(mào)易經(jīng)濟 管理學(xué) 經(jīng)濟理論及經(jīng)濟思想史 工業(yè)經(jīng)濟 機械工業(yè) 歷史查詢
Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied. 首先,通過兩階段的動態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價的非合作博弈過程,雙向動態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價格和利潤分配的影響; 短句來源 NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE 客戶競爭驅(qū)動的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈 短句來源 Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain 供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗決策的非合作博弈分析 短句來源 Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics. 非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 Non-Cooperation game theory has already become an important tool of the economic research, there are many applications in modern economics. 非合作博弈已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究的一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有這諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 更多 Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied. 首先,通過兩階段的動態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價的非合作博弈過程,雙向動態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價格和利潤分配的影響; 短句來源 NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE 客戶競爭驅(qū)動的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈 短句來源 Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain 供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗決策的非合作博弈分析 短句來源 Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics. 非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 Non-Cooperation game theory has already become an important tool of the economic research, there are many applications in modern economics. 非合作博弈已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究的一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有這諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 更多 Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied. 首先,通過兩階段的動態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價的非合作博弈過程,雙向動態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價格和利潤分配的影響; 短句來源 NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE 客戶競爭驅(qū)動的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈 短句來源 Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain 供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗決策的非合作博弈分析 短句來源 Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics. 非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 Non-Cooperation game theory has already become an important tool of the economic research, there are many applications in modern economics. 非合作博弈已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究的一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有這諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 更多 Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied. 首先,通過兩階段的動態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價的非合作博弈過程,雙向動態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價格和利潤分配的影響; 短句來源 NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE 客戶競爭驅(qū)動的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈 短句來源 Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain 供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗決策的非合作博弈分析 短句來源 Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics. 非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 Non-Cooperation game theory has already become an important tool of the economic research, there are many applications in modern economics. 非合作博弈已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究的一項重要工具,在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)中有這諸多應(yīng)用。 短句來源 更多
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Firstly,this article defines the conception of the green trade barrier,and clarifies its coming into being.Secondly,with the non-cooperation game analysing,this article clarifies the green trade barrier,which made by developed countries,is the trade barrier to developing countries.At last,this article describes good affection of the green trade barrier with Kuznets Curve,and using the green trade barrier improves the actuality of China's environmental protection and economy.
本文通過對綠色貿(mào)易壁壘概念、產(chǎn)生的理解,運用非合作博弈模型分析了它是發(fā)達(dá)國家對發(fā)展中國家造成的貿(mào)易障礙,繼而利用環(huán)境庫茲涅茨曲線闡明綠色貿(mào)易壁壘對發(fā)展中國家產(chǎn)生的正面效應(yīng),進(jìn)一步利用綠色貿(mào)易壁壘改善我國的環(huán)境、經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)狀。
From the perspective of viewing customer's competition requirements and on the basis of analyzing the goal of each manufacturing task submitted by correspondent customer maximizing its own payoffs (mainly focusing on the finishing time of each manufacturing task), together with the deficiency of traditional strategies, methods and models of task schedule, a non-cooperation game model with complete information for task schedule is presented and established. In this task scheduling model, the players correspond...
From the perspective of viewing customer's competition requirements and on the basis of analyzing the goal of each manufacturing task submitted by correspondent customer maximizing its own payoffs (mainly focusing on the finishing time of each manufacturing task), together with the deficiency of traditional strategies, methods and models of task schedule, a non-cooperation game model with complete information for task schedule is presented and established. In this task scheduling model, the players correspond to the jobs submitted respectively by related customers, the strategies of each job correspond to the selectable geographical distributive machines related to the processes of this job, and the payoff of each job is defined as the reciprocal of its finishing time. As such, obtaining the optimal scheduling results is determined by the Nash equilibrium (NE) point of this game. In order to find the NE point, genetic algorithm is introduced. A numerical case study is given to demonstrate the feasibility of above methods.
從客戶競爭需求的角度出發(fā),在分析其提交制造任務(wù)的各自利潤最大化(重點考慮任務(wù)的完成時間)調(diào)度目標(biāo)的基礎(chǔ)上,針對傳統(tǒng)的任務(wù)調(diào)度策略、方法和模型的不足,采用博弈論,提出并構(gòu)建了一種具備完全信息的非合作博弈的任務(wù)調(diào)度模型。在該任務(wù)調(diào)度模型中,來源于不同客戶的制造任務(wù)被映射為博弈模型中的局中人,與各制造任務(wù)所包含的工序集對應(yīng)的可選加工設(shè)備被映射為各制造任務(wù)的可行方案集,各制造任務(wù)加工完成時間的倒數(shù)被映射為其收益函數(shù)。據(jù)此,對上述任務(wù)調(diào)度目標(biāo)的求解就等價為尋求該任務(wù)調(diào)度模型的Nash均衡點,對Nash均衡點的具體求解,采用遺傳算法實現(xiàn)。最后給出具體的實例來驗證其可行性。
Quality assurance is a basic requirement for establishment and maintenance of the long-term cooperation relationship of the supply chain.The paper proposes a non-cooperation game analysis model of sampling inspection in quality management of supply chain,and analyzes how the downstream manufacturers should determine their sampling plan based on the quality of supplier's product.Simulation results show that the sampling plan of a supply chain is different from the traditional sampling plan of an independent...
Quality assurance is a basic requirement for establishment and maintenance of the long-term cooperation relationship of the supply chain.The paper proposes a non-cooperation game analysis model of sampling inspection in quality management of supply chain,and analyzes how the downstream manufacturers should determine their sampling plan based on the quality of supplier's product.Simulation results show that the sampling plan of a supply chain is different from the traditional sampling plan of an independent enterprise.In comparison with the traditional sampling plan,the sampling plan described in this paper can lower the costs,and increase the expected profits of supplier and manufacturer.
保證產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量是建立與維護(hù)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)間長期穩(wěn)定合作關(guān)系的重要基礎(chǔ)。本文提出一種供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗決策的非合作博弈模型,以分析供應(yīng)鏈的下游制造商應(yīng)如何根據(jù)供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量水平確定其抽檢方案。仿真結(jié)果表明,供應(yīng)鏈背景下抽檢方案不同于單個企業(yè)各自優(yōu)化的制造商抽檢方案。考慮供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)間互動關(guān)系的抽檢方案與不考慮這種關(guān)系的獨立抽檢方案相比,能有效降低抽樣成本,并使供應(yīng)商和制造商獲得更大的期望收益。
 
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本文關(guān)鍵詞:供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗決策的非合作博弈分析,由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。
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