【摘要】：我國現(xiàn)行的土地征收補償制度造成的土地資源被大量浪費、農(nóng)民權(quán)益嚴重受損以及社會矛盾激發(fā)等一系列嚴重的社會問題,已經(jīng)影響到了我國經(jīng)濟社會的長期、健康、持續(xù)、穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。土地征收補償問題成為了當前我國社會科學領(lǐng)域研究的熱點問題之一。本文以我國土地征收補償過程中的征地方和交地方的策略和行為為研究對象,首先簡要敘述了我國土地征收補償制度在利益主體博弈下的變遷,然后應用博弈理論對雙方在土地征收補償過程中的行為進行了理論分析和實證研究,并在博弈分析的基礎(chǔ)上結(jié)合公共管理理論提出創(chuàng)新土地征收補償制度的建議。文章分為七個部分。第一部分為緒論,說明了研究的動機,以及創(chuàng)新和不足之處。第二部分介紹征地補償、博弈及制度變遷的相關(guān)理論。第三部分并對征地補償和征地博弈研究文獻進行了綜述。第四部分對我國的征地補償制度變遷和制度創(chuàng)新進行了闡述,并比較分析了發(fā)達國家和地區(qū)的征地補償制度。通過以上分析,指出利益主體的博弈在推動我國征地補償制度變遷的重要作用。第五部分應用一個簡化的博弈模型對土地征收補償過程中征地方和交地方博弈行為進行了理論分析。第六部分應用SH高速公路JC段土地征收補償實例分析了征地方與交地方在土地征收補償博弈過程中的行為與動機。第七部分為結(jié)論與建議部分。首先得出現(xiàn)有土地征收補償制度導致了征地交易成本過高、政府公權(quán)力介入征地過程扭曲了博弈結(jié)果,造成社會福利損失的結(jié)論。最后,在新公共管理理念的指導下提出創(chuàng)新我國征地補償制度的具體建議：在現(xiàn)有制度環(huán)境條件下規(guī)范政府在征地博弈的行為；制度環(huán)境經(jīng)過改善后政府應退出征地博弈。
[Abstract]:A series of serious social problems, such as the waste of land resources caused by the current system of land expropriation and compensation, the serious damage of farmers' rights and interests and the stimulation of social contradictions, have affected the long-term, healthy and sustainable economic and social development of our country. Steady development. Land expropriation compensation has become one of the hot issues in the field of social science in China. This paper takes the strategy and behavior of land expropriation and compensation in the process of land expropriation and compensation in China as the research object. Firstly, it briefly describes the changes of the compensation system of land expropriation in China under the game of the main body of interest. Then the paper makes theoretical analysis and empirical research on the behavior of both sides in the process of land expropriation compensation by applying the game theory, and puts forward some suggestions for innovating the land expropriation compensation system based on the game analysis and the public management theory. The article is divided into seven parts. The first part is the introduction, explaining the motivation, innovation and deficiency of the research. The second part introduces the compensation for land expropriation, game and institutional changes related to the theory. The third part also summarizes the literature of compensation for land expropriation and game of land expropriation. The fourth part expounds the change and innovation of land requisition compensation system in China, and compares and analyzes the compensation system of land expropriation in developed countries and regions. Through the above analysis, this paper points out that the game of the main body of interest plays an important role in promoting the change of land requisition compensation system in China. In the fifth part, a simplified game model is used to analyze the game behavior between local and local in the process of land expropriation and compensation. The sixth part analyzes the behavior and motivation of land expropriation compensation in the process of land expropriation compensation game between local and local land expropriation by using the land expropriation and compensation examples of JC section of SH Expressway. The seventh part is the conclusion and recommendation part. First of all, the compensation system of land expropriation should lead to the high transaction cost of land expropriation, and the government's power to intervene in the process of land expropriation distorts the result of game and results in the loss of social welfare. Finally, under the guidance of the new public management concept, the author puts forward some specific suggestions for innovating the land expropriation compensation system in China: standardizing the government's game of land expropriation under the existing institutional environment, and the government should withdraw from the land expropriation game after the improvement of the institutional environment.
【學位授予單位】：福建農(nóng)林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F542;F301.2

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 薛明川;;農(nóng)地征用補償方法和標準的合理化探討[J];安徽農(nóng)業(yè)科學;2009年18期

2 周滔;楊慶媛;;土地征用制度:在博弈中演替[J];中國房地產(chǎn);2008年01期

3 王小映;賀明玉;高永;;我國農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用中的土地收益分配實證研究——基于昆山、桐城、新都三地的抽樣調(diào)查分析[J];管理世界;2006年05期

4 鄭敏;;利益集團的博弈與公共政策的選擇——以征地過程中利益集團博弈為例[J];經(jīng)營管理者;2009年08期

5 國土資源部征地制度改革研究課題組;征地制度改革研究報告[J];國土資源通訊;2003年11期

6 曾楨;朱玉婷;;基于進化博弈的農(nóng)村土地征收問題分析[J];貴州社會科學;2013年06期

7 盧玉玲;李松柏;;土地征用中基層政府與農(nóng)民的博弈行為分析[J];湖北農(nóng)業(yè)科學;2012年08期

8 楊成余;;農(nóng)地發(fā)展權(quán)制度構(gòu)建芻議[J];湖南商學院學報;2009年02期

9 鮑海君,吳次芳;關(guān)于征地補償問題的探討[J];價格理論與實踐;2002年06期

10 嚴金明;;我國征地制度的演變與改革目標和改革路徑的選擇[J];經(jīng)濟理論與經(jīng)濟管理;2009年01期

相關(guān)博士學位論文 前1條

1 喬小雨;中國征地制度變遷研究[D];中國礦業(yè)大學;2010年

，

本文編號：2322427