本文選題：國(guó)有資產(chǎn)　切入點(diǎn)：“委托——代理”　出處：《貴州大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 國(guó)有企業(yè)是我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的支柱,是財(cái)政收入的主要來源。國(guó)有企業(yè)改革是整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的中心環(huán)節(jié),是中國(guó)改革成敗的關(guān)鍵。因此,對(duì)此必須引起我們的高度重視。本文就此作了一些新的探索。下面是本文的主要內(nèi)容摘要。 論文首先簡(jiǎn)述了重構(gòu)我國(guó)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)法律關(guān)系的緊迫性和必要性,介紹了國(guó)內(nèi)關(guān)于國(guó)有資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)現(xiàn)狀及有關(guān)法律關(guān)系理論研究概況。我國(guó)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)的主要現(xiàn)實(shí)困境就是所有權(quán)“虛置”問題,出資人職能和政府公共管理職能相混淆,導(dǎo)致政府宏觀監(jiān)管職能效率低下,國(guó)有企業(yè)生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)成本過高,國(guó)有資產(chǎn)流失嚴(yán)重。 接著分述了國(guó)外國(guó)有資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)模式及有關(guān)理論成果：美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)是立法機(jī)關(guān),也是國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的所有者。它可以通過立法方式來決定國(guó)有企業(yè)的設(shè)立、撤銷或內(nèi)部體制的改革,根據(jù)實(shí)際需要設(shè)立常設(shè)委員會(huì)或臨時(shí)特別委員會(huì)對(duì)有關(guān)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理的問題進(jìn)行調(diào)查,審議有關(guān)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理的議案,同時(shí)掌握國(guó)家財(cái)權(quán)。 英國(guó)議會(huì)也是國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的所有者,它通過對(duì)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)進(jìn)行調(diào)整改造,不但在很大程度上甩掉了政府對(duì)虧損企業(yè)的財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼包袱,而且將變現(xiàn)的國(guó)有資產(chǎn)投入到新的高科技行業(yè)和“外部性”明顯的行業(yè)(他們的產(chǎn)品主要用于出口),這樣強(qiáng)化了國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)的引導(dǎo)力和控制力。 法國(guó)議會(huì)還設(shè)立公共部門觀察所,設(shè)立公眾經(jīng)常參與清點(diǎn)的制度,以增加國(guó)有資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的透明度。同時(shí),議員還擁有直接或間接的調(diào)查權(quán)。讓國(guó)有資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)治理主體象私人企業(yè)一樣按照市場(chǎng)規(guī)則運(yùn)行,“一視同仁,平等競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”。 在西方市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)國(guó)家中,國(guó)有資產(chǎn)所占比例都比較小,尤其是經(jīng)營(yíng)性國(guó)有資產(chǎn)比重更是少之又少。另外,他們的契約觀念深入人心,國(guó)有企業(yè)改革中的一切重大關(guān)系均由契約條款來界定。這從由民法中拓展到商法中的“委托—代理”契約理論就可見一斑。 美國(guó)高爾森和羅易在1993年撰文斷言：“對(duì)美國(guó)公司治理的分析是解決所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離問題”。而把這一問題概括為“委托——代理(principal—agent)"問題的是羅斯、詹森和麥克林,他們最先使用這一概念來論證股東和經(jīng)理之間存在的公司治理關(guān)系而享譽(yù)理論界。詹森和麥克林(Jensen和Meckling)公司理論的邏輯起點(diǎn)是Berle和Means提出的所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離理論。在兩權(quán)分離的公司,股東與管理者之間的關(guān)系是一種委托代理關(guān)系。 然后論文重點(diǎn)闡述了我國(guó)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)“委托——代理”經(jīng)營(yíng)法律關(guān)系的制度重構(gòu),創(chuàng)設(shè)人大及其常委會(huì)下的國(guó)有資產(chǎn)“委托——代理”經(jīng)營(yíng)法律關(guān)系模式,即人大及其常委會(huì)擁有國(guó)有資產(chǎn)所有權(quán),直接行使國(guó)有資產(chǎn)出資人職能,設(shè)立國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理公司及金融控股公司,設(shè)置雙重“委托——代理”經(jīng)營(yíng)法律關(guān)系。 緊接著論文具體安排了一些監(jiān)督與職責(zé)的相關(guān)制度設(shè)計(jì),包括國(guó)有資產(chǎn)代理人資格認(rèn)證制度、獨(dú)立董事和獨(dú)立監(jiān)事制度、參與型民主管理制度、專職人大代表制度、檢舉制度、經(jīng)濟(jì)巡查制度、政府對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)的宏觀監(jiān)管制度、行業(yè)自律制度等,以及有關(guān)各方法律責(zé)任之規(guī)制。 論文最后綜述這種制度設(shè)計(jì)的優(yōu)越性和國(guó)有企業(yè)與國(guó)家之間平等市場(chǎng)主體地位的真正確立需要觀念的更新和一定時(shí)間的技術(shù)準(zhǔn)備。
[Abstract]:The state-owned enterprise is the pillar of our national economy, is the main source of revenue. The reform of state-owned enterprises is the central link of the reform of the economic system, is the key to the success of the reform of China. Therefore, this must cause our attention. In this paper, some new exploration on this. The following are the main contents of this paper abstract.
This dissertation firstly introduces the urgency and necessity of the reconstruction of China's state-owned assets management legal relationship, introduces the domestic present situation of the state-owned assets and the relevant management on legal relation theory research. The main difficulty of our state-owned asset management is the ownership of "dummy" problem, capital function and public management function leads to confusion, the government's macro regulatory functions of inefficient state-owned enterprises, production and operation cost is too high, serious loss of state assets.
Then, the state-owned asset management mode of foreign countries and the related theoretical achievements: the United States Congress is a legislative body, is also the owner of state-owned assets. It is decided to set up state-owned enterprises by way of legislation, reform the revocation or internal system, according to the establishment of a standing committee or temporary special Committee to investigate the problem of the actual needs of the state-owned assets management and consider the relevant State-owned Assets Management Bill, and master the national property rights.
The British Parliament is also the owner of state-owned assets, through the reform and adjustment of state-owned assets, not only to a great extent to get rid of government subsidies to loss making enterprises burden, and will the realization of state-owned assets into a new high-tech industry and the "external" obvious industry (their products are mainly for export), so strengthening the guiding force and the controlling force of state-owned economy.
The French parliament also set up the public sector to set up public observation, often participate in the inventory system, to increase the transparency of state-owned asset management activities. At the same time, members also have the right of investigation and directly or indirectly. Let the state-owned asset management governance as private business. In accordance with the rules of the market operation, "the same, equal competition."
In the western market economy countries, the proportion of state-owned assets are relatively small, especially the proportion of operating state-owned assets is less and less. In addition, the concept of contract of their people, all the major relations in the reform of state owned enterprises by the contract to define the terms of this. From civil law to expand the business law the "principal-agent" contract theory is remarkable.
The United States high and in 1993 the author Roy Wilson asserted: "the analysis of American corporate governance is the problem of the separation of ownership and control. To solve this problem and summarized as the" principal-agent "(principal - agent) is the problem of Ross, Jansen and Mclean, they were the first to use this concept to prove the existence of between the shareholders and the managers of the relationship between corporate governance and reputation theory. Jansen and Mclean (Jensen and Meckling), the logical starting point of theory is the theory of separation of ownership and control of the Berle and Means is proposed. In the separation of two rights of the company, the relationship between shareholders and managers is a kind of principal-agent relationship.
Then the paper focuses on the state-owned assets "principal agent system reconstruction" business law, the creation of the NPC and its Standing Committee of state owned assets under the "principal-agent" business legal relation mode, namely the NPC and its Standing Committee have the ownership of state-owned assets, directly exercise the functions of state-owned assets, the establishment of the State-owned Assets Management Corporation and financial holding company set double "principal-agent" business legal relationship.
Then the relevant system design some specific arrangements and supervision responsibilities, including state-owned assets agent qualification certification system, independent directors and independent supervisors, participatory democracy management system, professional people's Congress system, legal system, economic inspection system, the government of state-owned enterprise's macro regulation, industry self-regulation, and regulation of legal liability of the parties concerned.
At last, the paper summarizes the superiority of this system design and the real establishment of the equal market main body between state owned enterprises and the state. It needs updating concepts and preparing for a certain time.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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