本文選題：監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：電力監(jiān)管　出處：《西南政法大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：中國國家電力監(jiān)管委員會自2003年成立以來，一直處于監(jiān)管無效的困境中，長期被大型電力企業(yè)架空權(quán)力，其執(zhí)掌的電力行業(yè)市場化改革，迄今為止仍游離在電力行業(yè)的邊緣地帶。這種狀態(tài)是導(dǎo)致我國電力行業(yè)效率低下、缺乏可持續(xù)發(fā)展能力的制度性原因之一。為了推進(jìn)電力行業(yè)的市場化改革，提高電力行業(yè)的效率，增強(qiáng)電力行業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展能力，2013年的國務(wù)院機(jī)構(gòu)改革，撤銷了電監(jiān)會，其電力監(jiān)管職能被配置給了新組建的國家能源局。新國家能源局能走出原電監(jiān)會監(jiān)管無效的困境嗎？或者，中國怎樣才能擺脫電力監(jiān)管無效的困境？從法學(xué)角度觀察，這一中國現(xiàn)實(shí)問題的答案，依賴于對電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的基本理論問題的探尋：應(yīng)該怎樣合理乃至最優(yōu)配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力？或者，應(yīng)該怎樣配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力，才具有正當(dāng)性乃至具有更高的正當(dāng)度？（正當(dāng)?shù)牟攀呛侠淼�，正�?dāng)度越高，越優(yōu)。） 本研究旨在為中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的優(yōu)化（使之具有正當(dāng)性乃至更高的正當(dāng)度）提供法理基礎(chǔ)及制度設(shè)計(jì)，在研究路徑上分三步：首先，通過確立電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置在理論上應(yīng)然的正當(dāng)狀態(tài)，為中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的優(yōu)化提供理論依據(jù)；其次，通過確立中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的實(shí)然狀態(tài)，為優(yōu)化中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的配置提供事實(shí)依據(jù)；最后，在前述研究的基礎(chǔ)上，充分考慮中國電力行業(yè)的本國特點(diǎn)，針對中國配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力之實(shí)然狀態(tài)中存在的問題，得出具體的優(yōu)化中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的制度設(shè)計(jì)。 除緒論外，本文共計(jì)五章，采三段論式的邏輯結(jié)構(gòu)。電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的理據(jù)和域外先進(jìn)國家電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的立法得失部分是全文的大前提，中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的實(shí)然狀態(tài)部分是全文的小前提，中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的優(yōu)化方案部分是全文的結(jié)論。以下分別介紹各部分的邏輯主線及主要內(nèi)容。 作為大前提部分的理論基礎(chǔ)，包括前三章內(nèi)容，研究政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力的法理特征、合理的乃至更優(yōu)的電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置在理論上應(yīng)然的內(nèi)在理念與外在表現(xiàn)、域外先進(jìn)國家電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置立法上實(shí)然的相關(guān)經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn)，旨在為優(yōu)化中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的配置提供理論上的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，是全文的重點(diǎn)。其中： 第一章界定與電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力相關(guān)的基本概念，解決“電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力是一種什么樣的權(quán)力”的問題�！氨O(jiān)管”是一個(gè)頗有爭議的概念，本文所確定的法學(xué)中的“監(jiān)管”概念，是“市場監(jiān)管”的簡稱，指在市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體制條件下，為了矯正、改善市場失靈，國家機(jī)關(guān)通過制定、執(zhí)行法律、法規(guī)，干預(yù)市場主體活動的行為。政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力是隨著市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷發(fā)展和成熟，現(xiàn)代社會為了應(yīng)對復(fù)雜現(xiàn)實(shí)需要而產(chǎn)生的替代傳統(tǒng)司法權(quán)的一種新型權(quán)力，具有公權(quán)力性、準(zhǔn)司法性、主動性與集合性特征。這些特征使其在理論上與傳統(tǒng)的行政權(quán)、司法權(quán)既相同又相異，決定了新型的政府監(jiān)管制度與規(guī)范傳統(tǒng)公權(quán)力之制度的相似性和差異性。政府監(jiān)管權(quán)的以上特征決定了合理的政府監(jiān)管制度所應(yīng)該具有的特征：應(yīng)該確保政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力的公共利益目的性和有限性；應(yīng)該確保政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生上的非政治化，外部法律地位上的獨(dú)立性、內(nèi)部機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置上的分離性、監(jiān)管人員在知識上的專業(yè)性；應(yīng)該分權(quán)配置并制衡政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力。作為政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力的一種，規(guī)范電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置制度，當(dāng)然應(yīng)該具備政府監(jiān)管制度的以上特征。 第二章研究配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的理論依據(jù)，包括電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)條件、價(jià)值目標(biāo)和配置路徑選擇，解決以下三個(gè)最基本的理論問題：在什么樣的條件下，才能夠授權(quán)政府監(jiān)管電力行業(yè)？授予政府電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的目的是什么？應(yīng)該怎樣具體配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力？ 經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)監(jiān)管理論（公共利益理論、部門利益理論）、公共強(qiáng)制理論、法律不完備理論，解釋了建立政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力機(jī)制的正當(dāng)性（實(shí)質(zhì)合理性）問題。電力產(chǎn)業(yè)屬于市場不能有效配置資源的特殊產(chǎn)業(yè)，，兼具自然壟斷性與競爭性、公用性與不可替代性、正、負(fù)外部性、統(tǒng)一性與脆弱性等客觀的經(jīng)濟(jì)與技術(shù)特征，這些特征為證明電力監(jiān)管之存在具有正當(dāng)性提供了事實(shí)上的根據(jù)。以前述理論為指導(dǎo)，以電力產(chǎn)業(yè)的客觀特征為依據(jù)，可推導(dǎo)出配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)條件有四：“電力行業(yè)存在著市場失靈、電力監(jiān)管以維護(hù)公共利益為目的，電力監(jiān)管是應(yīng)對電力行業(yè)市場失靈最優(yōu)的公共控制策略、人們不得不承擔(dān)政府監(jiān)管電力行業(yè)的成本”。只有在同時(shí)滿足這四個(gè)條件的前提下，電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的配置才具有正當(dāng)性，分別滿足這四個(gè)條件的程度越高，電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)度越高，同時(shí)，若不能滿足其中任何一個(gè)條件，則該電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置就不具有正當(dāng)性。 市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的效率性、經(jīng)濟(jì)法的社會本位與電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)條件，決定了電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力所追求的價(jià)值目標(biāo)應(yīng)該是公平和效率,二者之間既統(tǒng)一又沖突。配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)條件及其所決定的價(jià)值目標(biāo)，共同決定了效率與公平是電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置制度應(yīng)該遵循的內(nèi)在理念，因此，促進(jìn)效率與公平的實(shí)現(xiàn)程度是檢驗(yàn)這些法律制度的實(shí)質(zhì)合理性的內(nèi)在依據(jù)。某條具體的電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置規(guī)則，越有利于促進(jìn)公平和效率價(jià)值的實(shí)現(xiàn)，該條規(guī)則的正當(dāng)度越高。 現(xiàn)代電力監(jiān)管職能的多樣化、專業(yè)化特征使現(xiàn)代國家面臨“應(yīng)選擇什么樣的路徑具體配置電力監(jiān)管職能，才能更加合理”的問題。政治學(xué)中的權(quán)力制衡理論、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的多委托代理理論與多重博弈協(xié)調(diào)理論為解決此問題提供了理論依據(jù)。基于這些理論，合理的電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置路徑是：應(yīng)分權(quán)配置并使之相互制衡，但是分權(quán)應(yīng)被限制在合理的范圍內(nèi)，并建立監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的合作機(jī)制與溝通渠道，應(yīng)明確電力監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)的總目標(biāo)并將其合理地分解到各監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)，并構(gòu)建激勵各監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)愿意協(xié)調(diào)到意向均衡的激勵機(jī)制。因此，在配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的路徑選擇上，分權(quán)制衡與溝通協(xié)調(diào)的尺度把握得越好，所電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)度越高。 第三章研究域外先進(jìn)國家電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置立法方面的得失。效率和公平價(jià)值對域外發(fā)達(dá)國家電力監(jiān)管配置制度的影響已經(jīng)無處不在；以效率和公平為價(jià)值目標(biāo)，使二者相協(xié)調(diào)，是域外先進(jìn)國家在電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置立法在內(nèi)在理念方面的基本經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn)。域外先進(jìn)國家有關(guān)的立法實(shí)踐在為后進(jìn)國家確立電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的制度表現(xiàn)方面提供的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn)主要有：電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的法定性，是有效實(shí)現(xiàn)監(jiān)管目標(biāo)，避免監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)濫用權(quán)力的重要基礎(chǔ)；采獨(dú)立監(jiān)管模式，實(shí)行政監(jiān)分離，配置政策部門與專業(yè)電力監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的權(quán)力；分權(quán)配置專業(yè)電力監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)與綜合性監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的監(jiān)管職能，并建立二者有效的協(xié)調(diào)溝通機(jī)制；在尊重本國當(dāng)時(shí)電力行業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)和法律背景等具體情況的前提下，配置專業(yè)電力監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)與反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)之間的權(quán)力，反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)的作用應(yīng)隨著電力行業(yè)市場競爭機(jī)制的不斷成熟而逐漸提升。后進(jìn)國家配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的制度表現(xiàn)，吸取這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn)的程度越高，其正當(dāng)度可能越高。 由此，作為整個(gè)立論的大前提，前三章的內(nèi)容為判斷“怎樣配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力才是合理的乃至更優(yōu)的”提供了理論上的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，合理的乃至更優(yōu)的電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置應(yīng)該是：1、具備政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力之法理特征決定的政府監(jiān)管制度之建構(gòu)應(yīng)具備的特征；2、同時(shí)滿足四個(gè)正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)條件，并且，分別滿足這四個(gè)條件程度越高，其正當(dāng)度就越高；3、以效率和公平為價(jià)值目標(biāo)，促進(jìn)這些價(jià)值的實(shí)現(xiàn)程度越高，其正當(dāng)度就越高；4、分權(quán)配置并使之相互制衡，建立溝通協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制，分權(quán)制衡與溝通協(xié)調(diào)的程度越高，其正當(dāng)度就越高；同時(shí)，越能吸取域外先進(jìn)國家電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置立法實(shí)踐中的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn)，后進(jìn)國家電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)度可能就越高。 作為整個(gè)立論的小前提，第四章研究中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置實(shí)然狀態(tài)中所存在的主要缺陷，為“為什么中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置需要優(yōu)化”提供事實(shí)依據(jù)。一方面，盡管與西方傳統(tǒng)市場經(jīng)濟(jì)國家相較，中國電力行業(yè)的市場失靈有其自己的特點(diǎn)，但是，中國電力行業(yè)市場失靈的存在為中國配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力提供了客觀上的正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)條件；另一方面，中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的實(shí)然狀態(tài)中存在著諸多具有中國特色的“政府失靈”現(xiàn)象，以滿足另外三個(gè)正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)條件的程度為衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，中國現(xiàn)行電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)度不高，有待優(yōu)化。中國現(xiàn)行與電力監(jiān)管價(jià)值有關(guān)的立法內(nèi)容存在諸多缺陷，以有利于公平和效率價(jià)值的實(shí)現(xiàn)程度為衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，中國現(xiàn)行電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)度也不高。盡管中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的配置格局經(jīng)過了多次演變，但具體的配置格局依然存在諸多缺陷，新國家能源局仍無法走出原電監(jiān)會監(jiān)管無效的困境，以實(shí)現(xiàn)分權(quán)制衡與溝通協(xié)調(diào)的程度及吸取域外先進(jìn)國家在電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置方面的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn)的程度為衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，中國現(xiàn)行電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的正當(dāng)度仍然不高，有待優(yōu)化。 作為全文的結(jié)論，第五章給出優(yōu)化中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的具體方案，解決“應(yīng)該怎樣優(yōu)化中國的電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置”問題，最終為中國怎樣才能走出電力監(jiān)管無效困境的現(xiàn)實(shí)問題，提供具體的答案。中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的優(yōu)化，應(yīng)遵循滿足并盡量同步提高影響電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置正當(dāng)度的各因素之滿足程度的原則。具體而言，優(yōu)化中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置之內(nèi)在理念的方案是：（1）在構(gòu)建電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的配置制度時(shí)，尊重并反映政府監(jiān)管權(quán)力的法理特征；（2）在構(gòu)建電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的配置制度時(shí)，充分反映本國電力行業(yè)市場失靈的特點(diǎn)，通過“以維護(hù)公共利益為配置電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力的目的，確保電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置資源的有效性和監(jiān)管本身的有效性，降低電力監(jiān)管的成本”，糾正本國電力監(jiān)管方面存在的“政府失靈”現(xiàn)象；（3）以公平和效率為電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的價(jià)值目標(biāo)，完善對效率、公平價(jià)值的立法表述并設(shè)計(jì)處理效率與公平價(jià)值沖突的規(guī)則。優(yōu)化中國電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置之制度表現(xiàn)的方案是：（1）在新頒布的《能源法》及修訂的《電力法》中，對電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力進(jìn)行配置，實(shí)現(xiàn)對電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置的法定化。其內(nèi)在理念和外在制度兩方面。（2）按能源監(jiān)管模式與獨(dú)立監(jiān)管模式組建能源部并在其中設(shè)置內(nèi)部獨(dú)立的能源監(jiān)管委員會，前者作為電力監(jiān)管的政策部門，后者作為專業(yè)電力監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)，承擔(dān)包括電力行業(yè)市場準(zhǔn)入權(quán)及定價(jià)權(quán)在內(nèi)的全部經(jīng)濟(jì)性監(jiān)管職能；（3）由環(huán)境、安全等綜合性監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)承擔(dān)電力行業(yè)全部的社會性監(jiān)管職能。將電力行業(yè)非核電安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管職能，配置給一般的綜合性安全監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)；成立核能安全綜合性監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)，承擔(dān)核電安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管職能；明確電力普遍服務(wù)義務(wù)監(jiān)管職能的歸屬；（4）賦予能源部協(xié)調(diào)職能，建立以上各監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間有效的協(xié)調(diào)和溝通機(jī)制；（5）按主導(dǎo)——制衡方式配置能源監(jiān)管委員會與反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)之間的權(quán)力，能源監(jiān)管委員會對電力行業(yè)之壟斷行為的事前、事后監(jiān)管事務(wù)，都有管轄權(quán)；反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)對能源監(jiān)管委員會的事后監(jiān)管權(quán)力的運(yùn)行，享有復(fù)議權(quán)，有權(quán)撤銷能源監(jiān)管委員會的監(jiān)管決定并依法作出新的監(jiān)管決定。 全面系統(tǒng)采用以上優(yōu)化方案，實(shí)現(xiàn)對電力監(jiān)管權(quán)力配置之法律形式與實(shí)質(zhì)的優(yōu)化，將使中國走出電力監(jiān)管無效的困境，實(shí)現(xiàn)對電力行業(yè)的有效監(jiān)管。
[Abstract]:Chinese State Electricity Regulatory Commission since its establishment in 2003, has been in the supervision of invalid predicament, large power enterprises have long been in charge of the overhead power, the electric power industry market reform, so far still free in the power industry's edge. This state is led to the low efficiency of China's electric power industry, the lack of institutional reasons for sustainable development ability. In order to promote market-oriented reform of power industry, improve the efficiency of the electric power industry, enhance the ability of sustainable development of electric power industry in 2013, the institutional reform of the State Council, the revocation of the SERC, the electricity regulatory function is assigned to the newly established National Energy Bureau. The new national energy board can walk out of the original SERC supervision invalid hook? Or, how to get rid of the invalid Chinese electricity regulatory dilemma? Observed from the perspective of law, this Chinese realistic question answer depends on To explore the basic theory of regulation power distribution power: how reasonable and optimal allocation of electric power supervision power? Or, how should configure the electricity regulatory power, it has legitimacy and has a higher degree of legitimacy? (just as it is rational, while the higher degree is better.)
The purpose of this study was to optimize the China electricity regulatory power configuration (which is legitimate or more legitimate degrees) to provide a legal basis and system design, the three step in the path of research: first, through the establishment of electric power supervision power disposition ought to be in the theory of legitimate state, provide the theoretical basis for optimizing Chinese electricity regulatory power configuration; secondly, through the establishment of State Electricity Regulatory Chinese power distribution, to provide evidence for optimization of power supervision China configuration; finally, on the basis of the foregoing, considering its own characteristics China power industry, according to the existing configuration of power supervision Chinese's factual problems in the system design Chinese electricity regulatory power configuration optimization of concrete.
In addition to the introduction, this paper consists of five chapters, the logical structure of syllogism. Mining power supervision power disposition rationale and extraterritorial configuration of the state electricity regulatory power advanced legislation and part is the premise of the State Electricity Regulatory China part power allocation is the premise of small, China optimization scheme of electric power supervision power disposition part of the thesis is the conclusion. The following describes the logic thread of each part and the main content.
As part of the theoretical basis of the premise, including the first three chapters, the legal characteristics of the power of government supervision, internal and external performance and reasonable concept of better electricity regulatory power allocation in theory should be the relevant experience abroad, allocation of legislative power regulation on the real power of advanced countries and lessons, and to provide the theory on the criteria for the optimization of power supervision China configuration, which is the focus of this paper:
The first chapter defines the basic concepts related to the electricity regulatory authority, to solve the "electricity regulatory power is a kind of what kind of power". "Regulation" is a controversial concept, this article determined the "regulation" concept, is referred to as the "market supervision", refers to the market economy system under the condition, in order to correct the market failure, improve the state organs, through the formulation, execution of laws and regulations, the main market intervention activities. Government regulatory power is with the development of market economy and mature, a new power to replace the traditional judicial power of modern society in order to cope with the complex needs of the reality, is the public power, quasi judicial, initiative and the set of features. These features make it in theory and the traditional administrative power, judicial power of both the same and different, decided the new government regulation system and the traditional norms of public The similarities and differences of the power system. The characteristics of government supervision system in the above characteristics of the supervision right of the government decided reasonably should have: should ensure that the purpose of public interest and limited government supervision; government regulatory agencies should ensure that non political generated on the independence of the legal status of external, separation internal institutions, professional supervision personnel in knowledge; decentralization should configure and the restriction of government regulatory power. As a kind of government regulatory power, regulate the power regulation of power power regulation power distribution system, the above characteristics of course should have the government supervision system.
The second chapter studies the theory of power allocation of regulatory powers, including the legitimacy of power supervision conditions of power allocation, selection of value goal and configuration path, to solve the following three basic theoretical questions: under what conditions can authorize the government supervision of the power industry? What is the purpose of the power supervision power granted to the government? How should the specific configuration of the electricity regulatory authority?
The traditional economics theory of economic regulation (public interest theory, department interests theory, the theory of public enforcement of law), incomplete theory, explains the legitimacy of the establishment of government regulatory power mechanism (substantive rationality). Special industry electric power industry belongs to the market fails to allocate resources efficiently, both the natural monopoly and competition, public and irreplaceable, positive and negative externalities, economic and technical characteristics of unity and fragility of the objective, these features to prove the existence of power supervision has legitimacy provided in fact. According to the theory, the objective characteristics of the electric power industry as the basis, legitimacy conditions can be pushed export configuration of electricity regulatory power has four: "the electric power industry is a market failure, power supervision in order to protect the public interest for the purpose of power regulation is the optimal response to market failure public power industry Total control strategy, people have to bear the cost of the electricity industry government regulation ". Only in the premise of meet these four conditions, the electricity regulatory power configuration that has the legitimacy, the higher respectively satisfy these four conditions, the electricity regulatory power allocation while the degree is higher, at the same time, if not meet them any one of these conditions, the electric power supervision power disposition has no legitimacy.
The efficiency of the market economy, social standard and power supervision power disposition the legitimacy of the conditions of the economic law, determines the value goal of the electricity regulatory power should be pursuing fairness and efficiency, both between the two unity and conflict. The legitimacy of the value target of basic conditions and the power allocation of electric power supervision decision, together determines the efficiency and fairness is the intrinsic idea, power regulation power distribution system should be followed accordingly, promote the realization of efficiency and equality degree is to test these legal system intrinsic rationality basis. A specific power regulatory power allocation rules, more conducive to promoting the realization of fairness and efficiency value, the rule of justice the higher the degree.
The diversification of modern electricity regulatory functions of the professional characteristics of the modern country faces "should choose what kind of path specific allocation of electric power regulatory functions, can be more reasonable." the politics of power balance theory, economics of multiple principal-agent theory and multiple game coordination theory to solve the problem of providing a theoretical basis. Based on these theories, the electricity regulatory power configuration path is reasonable: decentralization and balance allocation, but decentralization should be limited in a reasonable range, and to establish cooperation mechanisms and channels of communication between regulators, should always targeted electricity regulatory system and use it reasonably decomposed into various regulatory agencies and the construction of incentive regulatory agencies to coordinate to the incentive mechanism of intention equilibrium. Therefore, the choice of the path allocation of electric power regulatory powers, decentralization and coordination of the ruler The better the degree of certainty is, the higher the legitimacy of power regulation power is.
The third chapter studies the allocation of legislative power of extraterritorial regulatory powers in advanced countries in terms of gains and losses. Affect the efficiency and the fair value of foreign developed country electricity regulatory disposition system has been everywhere; with efficiency and fairness as the value goal, so the two coordinate is foreign advanced countries in the allocation of legislative power, supervision power in the idea of the basic experience and lesson. The practice of legislation of extraterritorial advanced countries in providing for the developing countries to establish system of electric power supervision power disposition experience and lessons: qualitative electricity regulatory power configuration, is effective to achieve regulatory objectives, avoid important regulators of abuse of power; adopt independent supervision mode, the implementation of administrative supervision between the separation. The allocation of policy departments and professional electric power regulatory power decentralization; allocation of professional power regulatory organizations and comprehensive regulatory agencies Between the regulatory functions, and establish coordination mechanism two effective; in respect of domestic electric power industry was the economic foundation and legal background and other specific circumstances, the allocation of professional electric power regulatory institutions and the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of power between the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies should be with the market competition mechanism in power industry continues to mature and gradually improve the system performance. The backward country allocation of electric power regulatory power, the higher the draw the experience and lessons of its proper degree may be higher.
Thus, as the whole premise of the argument, the first three chapters for the judgment of "how to configure the electricity regulatory power is reasonable and even better" provides a theoretical standard, reasonable and better power supervision power allocation should be: 1, the government decided to legal supervision power has the characteristics of government the construction of supervision system should have; 2, satisfy the four conditions of legitimacy, and the higher, respectively meet these four conditions, the proper degree is higher; 3, with efficiency and fairness as the value goal, promote the higher the degree of realization of these values, the proper degree is higher; 4, the allocation of decentralization and balance, establish communication and coordination mechanism, decentralization and coordination degree is high, its proper degree is higher; at the same time, the allocation of legislative power to absorb foreign advanced countries supervision practice and experience of teaching The legitimacy of power regulation power allocation in the backward countries may be higher.
As a premise of the argument, the fourth chapter studies the main defects of Chinese power supervision power disposition practice in the state, "why China electricity regulatory power configuration need to provide factual basis for optimization". On the one hand, while with the traditional western market economy countries compared to China, electric power industry market failure has its own characteristics. However, there are Chinese power industry market failure provides the legal basis for the objective conditions for allocation of electric power supervision power China; on the other hand, there are many Chinese with characteristics of "government failure" phenomenon China state electricity regulatory power configuration, in addition to meet the three conditions for the degree of legitimacy China measure, the current electricity regulatory power allocation while the degree is not high, needs to be optimized. The contents of the current legislation and supervision power value Chinese There are many defects, in order to realize the extent of benefit value of fair and efficiency as the standard, Chinese current regulatory power allocation while the degree is not high. Although the power regulatory power configuration China pattern through a lot of evolution, but the specific configuration of the pattern still has many defects, the new national energy administration still can not get out of the original electric power supervision will the invalid supervision dilemma, in order to achieve the balance of power and coordination degree and the experiences and lessons of foreign advanced countries in terms of the allocation of power supervision power level as the standard, Chinese current regulatory power allocation right is still not high, needs to be optimized.
As a conclusion, the fifth chapter gives the optimization scheme China specific power regulatory power configuration, solve "how to optimize the electricity regulatory power allocation problem China, finally China realistic problem how to get out of the plight of the power supervision is invalid, provide specific answers. China optimization electricity regulatory power configuration, should follow

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D922.294;D922.67

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 葉衛(wèi)平;;論反壟斷法上的公平價(jià)值[J];北方法學(xué);2007年04期

2 任繼勤,方春陽;國外電力改革的經(jīng)驗(yàn)及啟示[J];北京交通大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會科學(xué)版);2004年02期

3 宋慧宇;;行政監(jiān)管概念的界定與解析[J];長春工業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會科學(xué)版);2011年01期

4 彭昱;;我國電力產(chǎn)業(yè)環(huán)境效率評價(jià)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2011年02期

5 曹嘯;計(jì)小青;;管制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的演進(jìn)——從傳統(tǒng)理論到比較制度分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2006年10期

6 郭大方;建立完善權(quán)力運(yùn)行機(jī)制 清除產(chǎn)生腐敗行為的條件[J];重慶社會科學(xué);2001年05期

7 謝理;;電力產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)制效果的實(shí)證研究:綜述與展望[J];東方企業(yè)文化;2010年05期

8 曾鳴;劉寶華;張毅;欒鳳奎;;電力行業(yè)激勵性監(jiān)管方式的探討[J];電力技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì);2005年01期

9 唐敏;;普遍服務(wù)的法理基礎(chǔ)與制度建構(gòu)——以電力產(chǎn)業(yè)為例[J];電力需求側(cè)管理;2010年01期

10 王威;邵山;李磊;湯洪海;趙巖;夏清;;電力市場效率理論及其評價(jià)方法[J];電網(wǎng)技術(shù);2009年14期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前5條

1 梁捷;尋求一致的公平理論[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2010年

2 馬洪雨;論政府證券監(jiān)管權(quán)[D];西南政法大學(xué);2008年

3 張輝;宏觀調(diào)控權(quán)法律控制研究[D];中南大學(xué);2010年

4 宋慧宇;行政監(jiān)管權(quán)研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2010年

5 黃超;中國自然壟斷行業(yè)的行政法規(guī)制研究[D];中南大學(xué);2012年

本文編號：1658984