上市公司收購中目標(biāo)公司董事信賴義務(wù)研究
[Abstract]:Acquisition has become the external growth mode for the development and growth of listed companies. To obtain the management control rights of the target companies through public offer acquisition has gradually become the main means of mergers and acquisitions of enterprises in various countries. In the process of acquisition, the directors of the target company have a substantial impact on the interests of the target company and its shareholders because they are closely related to the interests of the company, so their attitude or behavior towards the acquisition will have a substantial impact on the interests of the target company and its shareholders. And it is easy to fall into a serious conflict of interest, in view of the special position of the director of the target company in the acquisition, in order to effectively regulate its serious conflict of interest behavior, protect the interests of the target company and its shareholders. Anglo-American countries take the lead in introducing the theory of directors' obligations of traditional company law into the theory and practice of securities activities, and gradually develop into the two most representative models of directors' trust obligations of target companies in the world. It forms a relatively complete legal regulation on the director behavior of the target company today. Based on the reality of our country, this paper, by studying the relevant legislation and judicial practice of regulating the directors' behavior of target companies in foreign countries, puts forward some suggestions on how to construct the target directors' obligation mode in the acquisition of listed companies in our country on the basis of the relevant legislation. The full text is divided into preface, text and conclusion. The main body is divided into three chapters: the first chapter is the trust obligation of the target company. This chapter introduces the general theory of takeover and anti-takeover and points out that strengthening the trust duty of directors has become an important proposition in the legislation of anti-takeover combined with the origin and development of directors' fiduciary duty. The second chapter is the comparison of different models of directors' trust obligation regulation in listed companies. This chapter introduces the different legal regulations on the directors' trust obligation in foreign countries, that is, the neutral mode of directors in the United States and the decision mode of the shareholders' general meeting in the United Kingdom. Through the comparison of the two models, this paper analyzes the norms of the trust obligations of the directors in the anti-takeover in the background of the respective legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom. The third chapter examines the legislation and implementation mechanism of the directors' trust obligation in China's target companies. This chapter will focus on the current situation of our country, through the transformation of the functions of our directors and the analysis of relevant legislation, to explore the shortcomings of our current legal system, This paper also analyzes the premise that the director's trust duty can be reasonably fulfilled in China's anti-takeover, and puts forward some concrete systems to strengthen the director's trust obligation in the anti-takeover. It is suggested that, while perfecting the relevant legislation, under the guidance of the idea of encouragement and restraint, and through the joint action of internal control and external control, the maximization of directors' trust obligations can be guaranteed. The conclusion part summarizes this article, and puts forward that we should make the legislative restraint of the trust duty of directors in our country play its due effect, on the one hand, we should constantly perfect our legal system. On the other hand, it is necessary to cultivate the cultural foundation on which the legal system is effectively implemented and try to establish a perfect trust culture in our country as soon as possible.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2011
【分類號(hào)】:D922.291.91
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