公司股東現(xiàn)金選擇權(quán)制度構(gòu)建探析
發(fā)布時間:2018-09-06 20:23
【摘要】:我國現(xiàn)行公司法規(guī)定的有限責任公司和股份有限公司股東回購請求權(quán)適用條件不一致;適用情形不適合中小股東在其利益受公司股權(quán)及其他重大變動影響時以公允的股權(quán)價格退出公司;回購業(yè)務(wù)主體單一,也不利于中小股東利益保護。構(gòu)建法定化保證小股東以公允的股權(quán)價值退出公司的現(xiàn)金選擇權(quán)制度來取代現(xiàn)行公司法上的股東回購請求權(quán),有利于中小股東公允價值現(xiàn)金退出和監(jiān)管利益沖突行為雙重功能實現(xiàn),從"一補一阻"兩個方面實現(xiàn)對中小股東利益的有效保護。現(xiàn)金選擇權(quán)制度的權(quán)利主體是對公司普通股或者優(yōu)先股享有法律上或者實質(zhì)上商業(yè)利益的人,義務(wù)主體為公司。合并、股權(quán)互換、公司所有的資產(chǎn)的實質(zhì)銷售、對任何股東的權(quán)利會產(chǎn)生不利影響的公司章程的修改等是現(xiàn)金選擇權(quán)產(chǎn)生的條件。如果不存在經(jīng)營者或控股股東與公司之間的利益沖突交易,則不產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金選擇權(quán)。應(yīng)明確規(guī)定以"第三方價格"定價方法來指導(dǎo)定價。
[Abstract]:The applicable conditions of shareholders' repurchase right of limited liability company and joint-stock limited company are inconsistent in the current company law of our country; The applicable situation is not suitable for minority shareholders to withdraw from the company at fair share price when their interests are affected by the company's equity and other major changes; the single subject of repurchase business is also not conducive to the protection of the interests of minority shareholders. To construct a legalized system to ensure that minority shareholders withdraw from the company's cash option system with fair equity value to replace the shareholders' repurchase claim in the current company law. It is beneficial to the realization of the dual functions of the fair value cash withdrawal of minority shareholders and the behavior of supervising conflicts of interest, and the effective protection of the interests of minority shareholders from the two aspects of "one supplement and one obstacle". The right subject of the cash option system is the person who has the legal or substantial commercial benefits to the common stock or preferred stock of the company, and the obligation subject is the company. Mergers, equity swaps, material sales of all the company's assets, amendments to the articles of association that adversely affect the rights of any shareholder are the conditions for cash option. If there is no conflict of interest transaction between the operator or controlling shareholder and the company, the cash option does not arise. The "third party price" pricing method should be clearly defined to guide pricing.
【作者單位】: 華東政法大學(xué)經(jīng)濟法學(xué)院;
【分類號】:D922.291.91
本文編號:2227439
[Abstract]:The applicable conditions of shareholders' repurchase right of limited liability company and joint-stock limited company are inconsistent in the current company law of our country; The applicable situation is not suitable for minority shareholders to withdraw from the company at fair share price when their interests are affected by the company's equity and other major changes; the single subject of repurchase business is also not conducive to the protection of the interests of minority shareholders. To construct a legalized system to ensure that minority shareholders withdraw from the company's cash option system with fair equity value to replace the shareholders' repurchase claim in the current company law. It is beneficial to the realization of the dual functions of the fair value cash withdrawal of minority shareholders and the behavior of supervising conflicts of interest, and the effective protection of the interests of minority shareholders from the two aspects of "one supplement and one obstacle". The right subject of the cash option system is the person who has the legal or substantial commercial benefits to the common stock or preferred stock of the company, and the obligation subject is the company. Mergers, equity swaps, material sales of all the company's assets, amendments to the articles of association that adversely affect the rights of any shareholder are the conditions for cash option. If there is no conflict of interest transaction between the operator or controlling shareholder and the company, the cash option does not arise. The "third party price" pricing method should be clearly defined to guide pricing.
【作者單位】: 華東政法大學(xué)經(jīng)濟法學(xué)院;
【分類號】:D922.291.91
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1 邱兆亮;強制要約收購制度研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2005年
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